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China’s social, political and economic modernisation in the first decades of the 20th century has 
been attributed to Sun Yat-sen (1866-1925), who countered dynastic despotism and foreign 
imperialism, and to his political philosophy best defined as emancipatory communication. Sun’s 
exposure to Western influence such as Christianity, Western language and medical science 
inspired him modern rationality, which, he believed, was the key to the nation’s modernisation. 
However, rather than blindly adopting Western advancements, Sun endeavoured to reconcile 
Chinese and Western values and systems. As a physician, Sun formed a detailed diagnosis of 
China’s ailments, concluding that a revolution was unavoidable in order to save the nation. Sun 
advocated national unity, which catalysed the 1911 revolution and, eventually, the establishment 
of the first Chinese republic. The tenets of “Three Principles of the People”, Sun’s core 
emancipatory communication, comprise nationalism, democracy and the people’s livelihood. 
Firstly, the minzu principle (nationalism) emphasised national unity to preserve Chinese race and 
its territory. The second principle of the discourse is minquan principle (democracy), wherein Sun 
stressed the imperative for balance between citizens’ rights and the powers required of the state, 
proposed a supporting constitution as the essential framework. Thirdly, the minsheng principle 
(people’s livelihood) argued for the equalisation of land to protect tenant farmers’ economic rights. 
In propagating his agenda, Sun focused on the role of print media, public speech and pledging 
allegiance in order to raise the people’s political awareness. Furthermore, Sun’s Tongbao inclusion, 
conceived by reconciling Confucian fraternal love and Christian universal love, helped the 
overseas Chinese overcome their geographical distance and psychological liminality in building 
transnational patriotism. On the other hand, Sun argued that the absence of national unity was due 
to the culturally rooted Chinese loyalty to the emperor and family, and he tried to transfer the 
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people’s loyalty to the nation by invoking anti-imperialism and anti-Manchuism. In the process, 
the racially defined nationalism of Sun’s minzu principle supported the ethnic majority of Han race, 
ignoring the rights of ethnic minorities. Moreover, in the minquan principle, Sun’s proposal of a 
three-stage national reconstruction plan imposed military operation and political tutelage to be 
administrated by elites, compromising individual freedom and equal citizenship. Sun’s land 
equalisation plan in the minsheng principle created tension with the landlords due to his morally 
charged assertion that economic harmony was attainable through cooperation in dealing with 
material conflict concerning landownership. Sun’s emancipatory communication brought forth a 
modern Chinese nation-state, but Sun’s struggle in modernising China represented his inner 
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By the mid-1830s, the opium trade became more profitable than any other commodity for Britain. 
Its trading volume with China grew approximately by tenfold between 1800 and 1839, and 
correspondingly, the Chinese payment for opium in silver rose from 1,020,012 to 3,743,158 taels 
during the same time period.1 In 1839, the Chinese efforts to halt the opium trade provided the 
British with incentive to launch the first Opium War.2 China faced a humiliating defeat and opened 
trading ports under the Nanjing Treaty of 1842. The Opium War was then followed by the Taiping 
Rebellion led by the Christian Hakka, claiming more than 25 million lives. Both events put the 
nation in political and economic disarray, leading to the decline of the Qing dynasty.3 Added to 
these two major disruptions were Nian (1853-1868), Moslem (1855-1873), and Boxer (1899-190l) 
rebellions, which took place in the latter part of the 19th century. 
The politico-economic impact of these historical events was felt throughout China, 
particularly among the peasants. Since crop taxes were paid in silver and there was almost 100 
percent appreciation in the silver exchange value, peasants were forced to sell nearly double the 
amount of crops in order to pay the same taxes as before. Higher taxes were of concern to both 
large landlords and small owner-cultivators alike: as a result, local landlords created self-defence 
militias to oppose tax payment.4 Furthermore, the disruptive economic fallout of the opium trade 
was further compounded by the general influx of foreign goods in the treaty port areas.  
It is broadly acknowledged that Sun helped transform China from a pre-modern nation to 
a republic. By propagating his principles of nationalism, democracy and the people’s livelihood, 
Sun endeavoured to emancipate the socially and economically marginalised Chinese people by 
including them in his communication. In this thesis, I argue that, even though Sun’s emancipatory 
communication catalysed the first Chinese republic, his exclusionary praxis created a division 
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among the Chinese citizens, undermining the nation’s unity. Nevertheless, by communicating and 
instigating Tongbao inclusion in an effort to establish an all-inclusive modern nation-state, Sun 
ultimately reconciled his exclusionary praxis. This is significant because Sun’s exclusionary praxis 
had denied the rights of racial minorities and individual citizens as his paternalistic elitism led him 
to disregard the binary aspects inherent in social, political and economic construct of race, 
citizenship and land ownership. Through Tongbao inclusion, Sun realised that the nation’s unity 
required the inclusion of all Chinese people, and national unity could be achieved only by the 
coexistence and empowerment of all the citizens rather than exclusion or assimilation of some.    
There are two key terms in Sun’s political philosophy in relation to China’s modernisation: 
“Emancipatory communication” and “Tongbao inclusion”. The Three Principles of the People, 
Sun’s core political communication, can be best defined as emancipatory because its target group 
was, from the outset, primarily the socially and economically excluded Chinese people. The 
objective of Sun’s emancipatory communication was to extend equal citizenship to the 
marginalised groups such as the undereducated, tenant farmers, and the overseas Chinese. Thus 
the underlying principle of Sun’s emancipatory communication was the equality and freedom of 
all Chinese citizens against class hierarchy through an intersubjective understanding of others’ 
suffering.  
The word Tongbao was a linguistic breakthrough, which enabled Sun to reconcile the 
identities between native and overseas Chinese by amalgamating nationalism and 
cosmopolitanism into a hybrid form of transnational patriotism. Sun realised that the traditional 
Chinese identity was narrowly defined by geographical centeredness, and as a result, the overseas 
Chinese were often excluded from Chinese identity, impeding the transformation of the overseas 
Chinese into autonomous citizens. Thus Sun’s Tongbao inclusion offered an intersubjective 
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understanding—between the Chinese on native soil and the overseas Chinese—of the latter’s 
suffering by the former’s compassion. Christianity was also closely related to Sun’s Tongbao 
inclusion as the latter originated from Sun’s reconciliatory approach to Confucian fraternal love 
and Christian universal love; Christian love reflected a theistic compassion, which corresponded 
to Confucian humanistic benevolence.  
This thesis is guided by two main research questions. The central question is: “What is 
Sun’s emancipatory communication and what kind of impact did it have on China’s 
modernisation?” followed by “What is the significance of Sun’s Tongbao inclusion to the 
establishment of the Chinese modern nation-state?” A supplementary question is “How did Sun 
utilise language and the media to reconcile the Chinese and Western ideologies and systems in 
transforming China?” In answering these questions, employing an interdisciplinary research 
methodology used in political philosophy and communications studies in relation to language and 
the media helps situate Sun’s emancipatory communication in the history of China’s 
modernisation.  
In addition to Sun’s own writings, the following is an exemplary set of literature that was 
referenced to address the research questions. For example, on Sun’s political philosophy and the 
1911 revolution: Bergère (1998), Chong, K. R. (2010), Jansen (1970), Linebarger (1925), Martin 
(1970), Schiffrin (1968, 1980), Wang (1981), Wilbur (1976), Wong, J. Y. (1986a, 1986b); on 
Confucian influence: De Bary (1999), Yao (2011),  Levenson (1964), Wang(2003), Metzger 
(1996), Schwartz (1959, 1985), Bol (2008); on language and communication: Habermas (1984),   
Bourdieu (1991), Daruvala (2000)  Fei (1992) , Elman (1984), Heller (2007); on China’s 
modernisation: Fairbank and Goldman (2006), Hsü (2000), Wakeman (1975), Rowe (2009), 
Strand (2011), He (2002); on race and nationalism: Crossely (2006), Duara (1995) Jenco (2010),  
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Culp (2007)) , Tsu (2005), Dikötter (1992), Fogel and Zarrow (1997); on cultural identity: Gellner 
(1988), Harrison (2000), Rhoads (2000), Leibold (2007), Unger (1996), Standen (2007), 
Dennerline (1981), Wong, Y. (1989), Ogden (2002), Cohen (1988); on constitutionalism: Chang 
(1987), Huang (1972), Schwarzmantel (2003); on citizen’s rights and duties: Angle and Svensson 
(2001), Wang (2003), Esherick and Kayal (2006), Marshall and Bottomore (1992);  on the media 
and public opinion: Habermas (1984), Reed (2004), Dikötter (2008), Judge (1996), Lean, 
Fitzgerald (1996), McQuail (1992), Goode (2005), Garnham (2000); on labour and peasant’s land 
ownership: Callinicos (2004), Gregor (2000), Chong (2010), Nederveen (1990), Elster (1986) 
Cohen (1988); on Christianity and its influence: Bays (1996), Chong, K. R. (2010), Yan (1976), 
Ching (1977), Hillier and Jewell (2005); on the overseas Chinese: Yan (1976, 1985), Wang (2000), 
Lee and Lee, et al. (2011), Nyíri and Saveliev (2002).  A more detailed discussion of the literature 
will be conducted in the section of Literature Review.  
 
Sun’s Early Life (1866-1895) 
Sun was born into a Hakka family on November 12, 1866 in the village of Choyhung, a district of 
Xiangshan in Guangdong’s Pearl River delta, located fifty miles from Hong Kong and thirty miles 
north of Macao. Sun was the fifth son of six children, and his father, a tenant farmer with less than 
half an acre of arable land, had to work various odd jobs to support his family.5 In the face of 
deepening social and economic hardship after the Opium Wars and the Taiping Rebellion, many 
peasants and coolie labourers, particularly from Sun’s native province of Guangdong as well as 
the nearby Fujian region, had to leave their native land to work on plantations, mines and railway 
construction in the New World. Many of these coolie labour émigrés (huagong) would continue 
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to stay in their host nations, forming the overseas Chinese (huaqiao) communities together with 
earlier migrants to Southeast Asia, who were more affluent merchants (huashang).  
In 1879, at the age of 13, Sun moved to Hawaii, where his elder brother Sun Mei had 
emigrated earlier; Mei was then developing lowlands and running a general store in Honolulu. 
While aboard the SS Grannoch, a British steamship sailing from Macao to Honolulu, Sun 
witnessed the advancement of Western technology for the first time in his life in its production of 
the steamship. His profound admiration for Western science and technology began with this long 
journey across the Pacific. 6 At the same time, Sun developed a critical view of China’s reluctance 
to adopt Western science and technology by asking himself, “We Chinese could not make the 
things that the foreigners did, and I immediately felt there must be something wrong with China. 
Was not the fact that foreigner could manufacture and mount these great metal girders proof that 
in other respects, too, they might be superior to the Chinese?”7 
Hawaii provided Sun with a chance to learn the English language and adopt Christianity. 
According to Bishop Willis of Iolani, a local diocesan school in which Sun was enrolled 8, Sun 
was a devoted assistant at Bible classes, duly attending daily morning and evening prayers. Hence, 
by intention and principle though not by baptism, Sun had already become a Christian at Iolani.   
Early in 1885 in Hawaii, the American missionary Charles Hager, who had been in Guangdong 
for some years, is believed to have baptised Sun as a Congregationalist.9 However, Sun’s father 
ordered that he immediately return to China to “take the Jesus nonsense out of him”, expressing 
dismay that Sun would “take up with the superstition of the foreign devils”.10 
In 1894, after having completed his medical studies in Hong Kong, Sun publicly 
demonstrated his interest in modernising China by writing a lengthy proposal to the noted official 
Li Hongzhang, the leading statesman and viceroy of Zhili Province. In this letter, Sun argued that 
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China should independently develop Chinese industry and commerce. Most importantly, Sun 
emphasised the importance of education and training experts in the areas of earth sciences and 
agriculture. He also argued that a key to the nation’s wealth and power could be found in the 
promotion and protection of trade and commerce by developing the transportation network. Li 
never paid attention to Sun’s letter; disappointed, Sun decided to forego his medical career 
completely in order to concentrate on revolutionary activities and emancipate China from the ill 
management of the Qing government. Toward the end of 1894, Sun established the “Revive China 
Society (Xingzhonghui)”, a secret society, during another trip to Hawaii. However, Sun’s first 
revolt attempt in Guangdong on October 26, 1895 ended in failure and Sun was forced to escape 
to Japan.  
 
Class Hierarchy, Land and Tax   
Since the establishment of the Qing Dynasty (1644-1911), the Manchus founded a Chinese-style 
government hiring officials regardless of their ethnic background, and the Qing government had 
become a legitimate state and won the general loyalty of the Chinese by the 18th century. Its 
government employed the Confucian concept of state to maintain social order, which was highly 
hierarchical: the emperor was at the top of society with a mandate to control the world (tianxia), 
supported by well-educated civil servants (bureaucrats). Below them were the aristocrats and the 
literati (unofficial gentry), followed by Manchu bannermen, farmers, artisans and merchants in 
order of social respect. This also formed social polarity between the officials (guan), who served 
the state, and the people (min), including farmers, artisans and merchants, who did not.11   This 
dichotomy was also a general reflection of the Confucian influence on social division through the 
implied superiority of governors and inferiority of the governed.  
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Furthermore, the gentry enjoyed many unique privileges, including reduced tax payment, 
and the larger part of their income came from private investments, mostly in land and other forms 
of usury. At the very bottom of the rural community were the hard-working peasants, who worked 
year-round for hand-to-mouth subsistence. A tenant farmer usually had to pay 50 percent of the 
yield for rent, and because the rent paid not in grain but in silver, which had to be converted from 
copper, more pressure was imposed on peasants after the Opium War as the value of silver 
increased.12 Sun was well aware of this economic distress of the peasants, particularly of the tenant 
farmers, from his observations of his own father.   
The underlying cause of peasants’ destitution and worsening return on harvest during the 
late Qing era may have been explosive population growth relative to the available arable land. The 
population reached a new high of 430 million by 1850 from around 272 million in 1779, an 
increase of almost 200 percent; however, the amount available arable land rose relatively slowly 
in that time, an increase of about 35 percent. Consequently, the per capita acreage declined by 43 
percent to less than half an acre per person.13 To make matters worse, about 50 to 60 percent of 
arable land was held by the rich families of the gentry, another 10 percent by Manchu bannermen 
and officials, leaving only 30 percent of arable land available to peasants. Accordingly, 60 to 90 
percent of people had no land at all. This unfair land ownership motivated Sun to view the tenancy 
system critically, which also influenced his future argument against the exploitation of peasants. 
Thus Sun’s proposal of land equalisation plan, the core tenet in his minsheng principle, was closely 
related to the hardship of peasants resulting from disproportionate land holdings, including that of 
Sun’s own father.  
 
Reconciliatory Approach  
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After another China’s defeat in the first Sino-Japan War of 1894, reformers such as Kang Youwei 
and Liang Qichao urged the emperor Guangxu to emulate Peter the Great of Russia and the Meiji 
Emperor of Japan in establishing not a complete Westernisation, but a hybrid polity of reconciled 
Chinese and Western elements.14 Despite his early education abroad and the influence of Western 
culture and science in his youth, Confucian values often resonated in Sun’s political philosophy. 
In particular, his pursuit of the Confucian ideology of hierarchical collectivism (tianxia weigong) 
was often quoted and is even inscribed on his tombstone. At the same time, Sun also recognised 
that the Chinese monarchical rule was incompatible with China’s political and economic progress 
toward a modern nation-state; and he started endorsing republicanism as a result. On the other 
hand, constitutional monarchy was advocated by the reformists such as Liang Qichao and Kang 
Youwei.  
Yao (2011:396) aptly explicates that “the question of Confucian identity did not become 
pressing until the beginning of the modern age, when Confucian culture was dismantled and 
devalued by modernity and its associated values”. Initially, the foundation of Sun’s reconciliatory 
approach to both Confucian and Western cultures seems closely related to the influence of 
language. Sun discovered the intrinsic logic of grammar in Western languages, and even though 
Sun was fascinated by and proud of the historical particularities of the Chinese language, he also 
identified some of the exclusionary aspects in the Chinese language. In order to include every 
Chinese in modern education, Sun insisted that the written and spoken Chinese language be 
merged into one synchronised system, which would eventually help abolish illiteracy and class 
division. Sun’s insistence on the synergetic effect of grammar and logic as well as the unity 
between the written and the spoken Chinese language ultimately symbolised his belief that a 
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cooperative and intersubjective communication across all classes of Chinese people would give 
rise to China’s modernisation.  
The underlying intention of Sun’s critique of Chinese linguistic structure, namely the 
absence of clearly stipulated grammar and pedagogy, was in fact a manifestation of his desire to 
help Chinese people communicate logically. Sun discovered that logic was immanent in language 
and that scientific reflection was a necessary method for awakening the Chinese people, just as 
grammar served as a bridge to learning correctly. Consequently, Sun insisted that social awakening 
was attained by means of logic, which could be obtained from a clear understanding of grammar 
in language. Later, Sun’s belief in public opinion and its role in forming a modern nation-state was 
also closely connected to his argument for the necessity of logic. Sun’s political philosophy was 
also influenced by the logic of inclusion and his desire for the unity of the Chinese people by 
means of language so that everyone could understand and communicate rationally. He believed 
this could be achieved through all-inclusive education, which must be made available and 
accessible to every Chinese citizen, especially the underprivileged and undereducated.  
On the other hand, some scholars have suggested that studying medicine inspired Sun’s 
emancipatory intention. Sun himself admitted that medical science served as the kindly aunt who 
brought him out on to the high road of politics.15 Sun entered Queen’s College in Hong Kong to 
study medicine in 1884, and after transferring, he graduated from Hong Kong Medical School with 
the title of “Licentiate in Medicine for Chinese, HK” in 1892. In his writings, he often compared 
the condition of China to that of human body, and diagnosed that China was suffering from social, 
economic and political ailments. Sun argued that the people were deprived of autonomy and 
equality; therefore, only revolution would save China and the Chinese people.  
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Christianity was also closely related to Sun’s personal and political philosophies. The 
freedom of religion to protect Christianity was one of the reforms he adopted upon his inauguration 
as President on January 1, 1912, and a series of radical measures taken by Sun can be also 
interpreted as the influence of his Christian faith. In particular, his reconciliatory approach to 
Christian universal love and Confucian fraternal love catalysed the transnational Tongbao 
inclusion that empowered the overseas Chinese. On his death, his family held a Christian funeral 
in private according to his will, followed by a separate official funeral.16 
 
Nationalism and Race   
Under the influence of social Darwinism, Sun became convinced that national unity was the key 
to preserving the Chinese race; he therefore argued for a racially defined nationalism based on 
consanguinity. Sun’s insistence on the naturally constructed biological race could have been 
influenced by the positivistic approach to the human body in Western medicine as well as the 
traditional Chinese ethnocentric framework that differentiated the Han from other ethnic groups.17 
Racism in modern history was first developed in order to justify the systematic use of labour central 
to the emergence of capitalism as a world system18. Social Darwinism produced racial hierarchy 
and justified imperialism as race became a source of prerogatives in the 19th and 20th centuries.19 
The implications of social Darwinism also resonated in China through various debates. In order to 
maintain national unity against foreign encroachment, Sun insisted that cultural loyalty to family 
and clan had to be transferred to the nation. However, family consciousness played an important 
part in sustaining the elements of Confucian ideology, and the Chinese concept of race also seemed 
to have been originally influenced by Confucianism.20 Even after the 1911 Revolution, the Chinese 
people were still divided, and Sun realised that an all-inclusive cultural identity was requisite for 
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national unity and that racially exclusionary nationalism was antithetical to republicanism. Thus 
Sun proposed a Five Race Republic to include the ethnic minority groups by acknowledging their 
autonomy. 
 
The Overseas Chinese 
National identity is also shaped by primordial elements of shared soil and blood 21, and the Chinese 
social prejudice against the overseas Chinese was formed by the sense of geographical 
centeredness of the mainland Chinese, who regarded the overseas Chinese as the other. Among the 
classifications of overseas Chinese, the coolie pattern (huagong) derived from the migration of 
large numbers of labourers, normally men of peasant origin; landless labourers and the urban poor. 
In Southeast Asia, this was not the dominant pattern: instead, they were largely the merchant 
migrants (huashang). Together with the huashangs, many of these huagong émigrés stayed on in 
their host nations and formed the overseas Chinese (huaqiao) communities.22 
Many overseas Chinese also shared some of racial prejudices against the Manchus due to 
the Qing court’s treatment of the overseas Chinese, and their dissatisfaction was further 
strengthened by the Qing government’s inability to protect them.23 Sun consistently relied upon 
the contribution of the overseas Chinese to finance the revolution after the inception of the 
Xingzhonghui, the secret society he created in Hawaii in 1894, followed by the Yokohama and the 
Hong Kong chapters in 1895. In later years, Sun referred to the overseas Chinese as the “Mother 
of the Revolution”.24  Naturally, the Qing government, as well as the reformist and revolutionary 
organisations, all competed for the financial and political support of the overseas Chinese. 
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Initially, the word and concept of Tongbao were used only within the colonised territories 
of Hong Kong and Macao, but Sun expanded the geographical boundary to Southeast Asia as well 
as the Americas. In an effort to include the overseas Chinese in the process of building a new 
Chinese republic, Sun also came up with the Tongbao transnational inclusion, which was inspired 
by both Confucian fraternal love and Christian universal love; it also symbolised Sun’s 
conciliatory approach to nationalism and cosmopolitanism. Sun also empowered the overseas 
Chinese with participatory citizenship, which eventually brought forward transnational patriotism. 
Consequently, it was Tongbao citizenship that formed transnational solidarity among the overseas 
Chinese, helping them transcend the geographical barrier and overcome their psychological 
liminality. Tongbao inclusion and citizenship emphasised the autonomous achievement of political 
and economic citizenship through voluntary participation. Hence, transnational Tongbao 
citizenship was conceived for the overseas Chinese, who were finally included in the collective 




Constitutionalism and the Revolution (1896-1911)  
In 1896, Sun was kidnapped and detained in London by the Qing Legation to be shipped back to 
China for trial and possibly execution. Dr. Cantlie, Sun’s mentor at medical school in Hong Kong, 
appealed to the newspaper The Globe as a last resort to release him. By the time of his release, Sun 
experienced not only the power of the press and public opinion in England, but also the 
confirmation of his Christian belief. Sun stayed in London eight more months following his release 
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and, during his sojourn, developed an outline of his idea on the Three Principles of the People. 
Sun also started formulating his own communicational praxis in order to propagate his political 
agenda.  
Sun and his revolutionary alliance founded the monthly journal Minpao in 1905, in which 
Sun frequently debated with Liang Qichao, who also published his scholarly essays in the New 
Citizen Journal. Between 1906 and 1908, an increasing number of uprisings were staged. Sun 
became persona non grata in Japan in 1907; however, after Cixi’s death in 1908, public sentiment 
in favour of the revolution strengthened, further debilitating the already declining Qing 
government. Between 1907 and 1911, there were seven unsuccessful revolts led by Sun and his 
revolutionary party. The Xinhai Revolution of October 10, 1911 finally succeeded, taking 
everyone by surprise including Sun himself.  
In an effort to transform the premodern monarchical government to a republic, Sun 
attempted to shift the people’s loyalty away from the Qing monarchy to the newly established 
republic. The absolute authority of the monarchy, which was based on class hierarchy, had to give 
way to constitutionalism, which represented a balance of power between the people and the state. 
In the early 20th century, constitutionalism became the guiding ideology of the modern nation-state 
and was understood as a formal statement specifying and delimiting the scope of government 
action, shifting an imperial to a constitutional mode of politics within the rule of law.25 After 1905, 
constitutionalist societies sprang up in China, and under this political pressure, the Qing court 
reluctantly announced its intention to promulgate the constitution. To many Chinese, the idea of 
constitutionalism represented a political transformation to a modern nation.  
Regarding the structure of constitutionalism, Sun and other revolutionaries opposed the 
ideas of Liang and the reformists who tried to cooperate with the Qing court. While Sun insisted 
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on a republic, Liang originally asserted that the Qing government could accommodate Western 
political principles if it was reconfigured as a constitutional monarchy.26 In fact, Liang’s interest 
in Western constitutionalism mainly stemmed from the idea that a government should be set up 
and operated according to a promulgated constitution in which a popularly elected legislature 
played the leading role. A provisional National Assembly was thus established and convened in 
Beijing in October 1910, and Liang became the major voice in that institution.  
However, when a 13 member cabinet was announced by the reluctant Qing government in 
April 1911, it turned out that it contained only four Han officials and one Mongol, compared with 
eight Manchu princes of royal blood. In fact, the Qing’s Outline of Chinese Constitution actually 
gave the throne even greater power than under the Japanese Meiji Reformation. This also 
demonstrated that constitutionalism was not the Manchu court’s true priority nor its intention, 
confirming the doubts among the people about the true political interest of the Manchu monarchy. 
Liang later modified his rhetoric to a constitutional democracy after the 1911 revolution.   
In fact, the form of government, whether a republic or a constitutional monarchy, was a 
matter of expediency rather than of principle for Liang. However, given Sun’s deeply rooted 
distaste of monarchy, which was antithetical to his belief in the equality and freedom of the people, 
any form of monarchy was unacceptable. Apart from the form of government, Liang and Sun also 
differed in the time frame for establishing the modern nation-state: Given China’s political and 
economic urgency, Sun favoured revolution while Liang felt China was not ready. Liang 
repeatedly cautioned Sun against rash action and called for gradualism, arguing that the Chinese 
people did not yet possess the necessary qualifications to be citizens of a modern nation.  However, 
for Sun, the revolution was not a mere matter of political agenda, but the core element of his 
emancipatory communication to create a Chinese republic.   
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For Liang, the existence of written law of constitution was the most important element of 
a modern nation-state. For Sun, however, a republic was an absolute prerequisite. Apart from their 
political stances, Sun and Liang also differed fundamentally in their cultural origins and 
educational backgrounds, which was a source of tension between the two.  Sun had not received 
much classical education, while Liang was an accomplished classical scholar and a holder of the 
jujen degree after having passed the state examination at an early age. Consequently, Sun drew 
most of his support from the socially underprivileged classes of peasants, coolie labourers and the 
overseas Chinese while Liang appealed primarily to the well-to-do and elites in society.  
Liang also argued for the cohesive balance in the individual freedom and rights in 
comparison with those of collective, promoting the notion of each individual’s unselfishly 
developing his capacities.27 In contrast, Sun’s concept of freedom and rights was firmly based on 
the people for the nation, indicating that the sacrifice of personal freedom was accepted and even 
encouraged. Eventually, after the revolution of 1911, Sun proposed the Fivefold Constitution. It 
was a hybrid of traditional Chinese court systems and Western cabinet structures that included the 
equal membership of every citizen in the republic by law. It also represented China’s 
transformation from a premodern community (Volksnation) to the modern nation-state 
(Bürgernation).  
Emancipatory Communication 
Sun’s emancipatory communication had three sequential aims: First, to defy the exclusionary class 
hierarchy, which was the prerequisite of the Manchu monarchy; second, to build solidarity among 
the citizens by empowering them with equal constitutional citizenship; finally, to catalyse national 
unity by including all Chinese citizens through intersubjective communication and cooperative 
understanding of others’ suffering. Nederveen (1989) emphasises that the ultimate goal of 
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emancipation in the West was for freedom and autonomy. However, it was for the bourgeoisie first, 
and then for the underprivileged classes of people; the latter’s emancipation, in fact, coincided 
with the advent of rational society. On the contrary, in Sun Yat-sen’s emancipatory communication, 
the target group was, from the outset, primarily the socially and economically excluded group of 
the people. Thus the objective of Sun’s emancipatory communication was to extend the political 
and economic rights to marginalised groups such as tenant farmers, the overseas Chinese and 
coolie labourers.  
 Sun Yat-sen’s emancipatory communication also aimed to counter coercive powers by 
defying the hierarchical subject-object relation: it argued for an intersubjective relationship based 
on compassion and mutual understanding. To achieve this, Sun relied on public opinion with the 
help of the press and public debates in order to rationally persuade the citizens and to consolidate 
their solidarity. Particularly for the overseas Chinese, whose cultural identity and patriotism were 
influenced by both China and their host nations, Sun empowered them transnationally by means 
of participatory citizenship. Throughout his public speeches and written communications, the idea 
of inclusion was often present; Sun regarded the inclusion of socially excluded people as an 
essential element in the emancipation of China. He also promoted the inclusion of women in public 
space such as in the military service and voting, thereby defying gender exclusion. However, his 
logic of inclusion tended to lean toward the majority of the population based on collectivism, 
resulting in ignoring the rights of individuals and ethnic minorities.   
 
The Early Republican Period (1912-1925)  
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On January 1, 1912, the first Chinese republic was inaugurated and Sun was sworn in as president 
in Nanjing. However, Sun acknowledged the unavoidability of securing cooperation from Yuan 
Shikai, the powerful commander of the Beiyang Army; he therefore offered the presidency to Yuan 
on the condition that he guarantee the abdication of the Manchu monarchy and accept the principle 
of republican government. Upon his agreement, Yuan was elected Provisional President of the 
Republic of China by the Nanjing Senate on February 14, 1912. China then had its first proper 
constitution, albeit in provisional form, containing a detailed list of citizens’ rights with the 
stipulation of the system of democratic government based on the separation of powers in the 
cabinet.  
From November 1912 to February 1913, national elections were held to form the new 
House of Representatives and the Senate. In January 1913, however, the results of China’s first 
elections showed that the Kuomintang Party (KMT) had won a smashing victory, much to Yuan’s 
disappointment. After Song Jiaoren, a close ally to Sun and a republican revolutionary, was 
allegedly assassinated by Yuan, Sun once again had to flee to Japan.28 Yuan forced the parliament 
to elect him president, and in January 1914, Yuan formally dissolved the parliament in an attempt 
to build a dynasty of his own.  Yuan also attempted to revive state Confucianism but his attempt 
ended in failure. He formally abandoned the empire after 83 days; he was defeated and then died 
in June 1916.29    
After Yuan’s death, Sun returned to China, which was suffering further fragmentation by 
the rival warlords of regional military cliques. Sun reorganised the KMT party based on both the 
organisational structure of the Soviet Communist party and the Three Principles of the People. 
Over the years, the details of Sun’s Three Principles had changed and the final version, published 
in 1924, reflected the influence of the Soviet revolution, including Lenin’s theory. Furthermore, in 
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his Programme of National Reconstruction, also published in 1924, Sun imposed a three-phase 
government period that included military operation and political tutelage before a full 
constitutional government.   
However, after a fight with cancer, Sun died on March 12, 1925 in Beijing.  On February 
20, 1925, Sun (1925:1) communicated his last words: 
“For forty years I have devoted myself to the cause of the people's revolution with but one end in 
view, the elevation of China to a position of freedom and equality among the nations. My 
experiences during these forty years have firmly convinced me that to attain this goal we must 
bring about a thorough awakening of our own people and ally ourselves in a common struggle 
with those peoples of the world who treat us on the basis of equality. The work of the Revolution 
is not yet done. Let all our comrades follow my "Programme of National Reconstruction," 
"Fundamentals of National Reconstruction," "Three Principles of the People," and the "Manifesto", 
and strive on earnestly for their consummation. Above all, our recent declarations in favour of the 
convocation of a National Convention and the abolition of unequal treaties should be carried into 
effect with the least possible delay. This is my heartfelt charge to you.”30 
Seen from the contemporary perspective, Sun was a glocal revolutionary—a global thinker 
and local reformer—a form of hybridity resulting from his reconciliatory approach. However, these 
two powerful yet mutually opposing elements of ‘global and local’ symbolised Sun’s persistent 
dilemma in his praxis of emancipatory communication, juxtaposed with conflicts such as 
‘inclusive and exclusionary’, ‘individual and collective’, ‘pedagogical and autonomous’ and the 





In addition to Sun’s political significance as a revolutionary leader, the Three Principles of the 
People has been the central theme in Sun Yat-sen scholarship. While the Three Principles of the 
People still remains the core leitmotif in Sun scholarship, a new set of themes has emerged in an 
effort to situate Sun in the modern history of China, such as the questions of what inspired Sun 
China’s modernisation, how Sun reconciled traditional Confucian moral values and Western 
pragmatic approaches, and what the implications of Sun’s nationalism and political tutelage were 
in relation to the rights of the people and the formation of modern rationality.    
Fairbank and Goldman (2006) divide China’s periods of social and political modernisation 
into three key stages between 1850 and 1911. The first stage was the success of the gentry-elite in 
supporting the Qing dynasty against rebels such as the Taiping on the basis of loyalty; the second 
stage of the post-Taiping era commenced when the gentry-elite became active in the revival and 
growth of Confucian education in academies, managing a wide range of urban welfare and 
community works until 1890s; and in the third stage beginning in the late 1890s, the rise of 
nationalism came with the reformist urban elites. During the third period, the economic and 
political structure of traditional China was exposed to and actively interacted with Western powers, 
which came with military and material advancements. Fairbank and Goldman (ibid.) claim that the 
Chinese elites found the Manchus too slow, obstructive, and incapable of leading China toward 
the modernisation facing foreign encroachment; it was during this third period that Sun’s 
involvement with China’s modernisation began, since he felt the Qing was responsible for being 
unable to protect the Chinese people and its territory from foreign imperialism.   
After finishing medical school, Sun wrote an edict to Li Hongzhang with his suggestions 
on how to modernise Chinese industry and commerce, emphasising the importance of education 
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and training experts in the areas of earth sciences and agriculture. At this time, Sun was not yet 
considering overthrowing the Qing dynasty, but he expressed his concerns about the growing 
power of the West and wished to enlighten Li with Western methodology in industrialising China. 
Hsü (2000) argues that China’s consecutive defeats in the Opium Wars and in the first Sino-
Japanese war eventually shaped the need for the rapid modernisation of China by elite reformists 
such as Kang Youwei and Liang Qichao. They urged the emperor to emulate Peter the Great of 
Russia and the Meiji Emperor of Japan in imposing a hybrid polity based on reconciled Chinese 
and Western elements rather than a complete Westernisation. Right after China’s defeat in the first 
Sino-Japanese War of 1895, Sun launched his first uprising against the Qing Dynasty. 
Confucian influence on Sun remained strong throughout his political life, and Sun tried to 
reconcile Confucian moral values with Western rationality in modernising China. There are 
various views on the implications of Confucian influence on the process of China’s modernisation. 
In terms of its impact on the people’s characteristics, De Bary (1999) suggests that Confucianism 
engendered an attitude of passive acquiescence, if not subservient obedience, to all forms of 
established authority. He notes that Confucianism, whether as imperial order or as an ethical 
system, was not questioned, so Confucianism had come under total attack at a later date when the 
interaction between Western culture and China became more active. De Bary (ibid.) further asserts 
that Confucianism played a role as an absolute and authoritative institution, which might have 
contributed to China’s delay in modernisation as Confucianism resisted the modernisation or 
Westernisation of China. Furthermore, Yao (2011) claims that the question of Confucian identity 
became an issue only with the beginning of the modern age when Confucian culture was 
dismantled and devalued by modernity and its associated values.  
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Accordingly, the Chinese people’s submissive attitude toward social hierarchy also seems 
to be closely related to Confucian teachings. Judge (1996) argues that the imperial government 
maintained a policy of keeping the people ignorant throughout Chinese history based on the 
Confucian principle that “the people may be made to follow a path of action, but they may not be 
made to understand it”. Confucian inculcation became the system for educating and disciplining 
the masses under hierarchical rule. Sun also reflected this tendency in his political lexes and praxis. 
In fact, the media in the late Qing period blamed this system for engendering and enforcing 
weakness in the Chinese character, from insularity to submissiveness, passivity and a lack of self-
reliance.  
Sun’s advocacy of freedom and equality of the people in his pursuit of establishing a 
republic also seems to have resulted from his opposition to class hierarchy and the dynastic 
structure of the Qing dynasty, which represented a pre-modern political system. Levenson (1964) 
provides the underlying reason why Chinese peasantry, for example, still worked under the 
condition of social hierarchy by referring to Mencius’s famous dictum: “Some labour with their 
minds, and some with their strength. Those who labour with their minds govern others, those who 
labour with their strength are governed by others; those who are governed by others support them 
and those who govern others are supported by them”. Thus Mencius’ teaching broadly represents 
the internalisation of the intellectual superiority of governors and the importance of the 
intellectually inferior masses submitting to and accepting social hierarchy. The juxtaposition of 
Sun’s rejection of class hierarchy in monarchism and the traditionally strong influence of 
Confucian hierarchy represented his future political conflict in modernising China.  
For Sun, among many indications of Confucian influence, it seems evident that the 
ideology of tianxia weigong taught him the importance of social order and collectivism. 
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Additionally, paternalism was implied in the ideology of tianxia as people even took the lead in 
deifying the emperor, calling the emperor their “Heavenly Father” and showing him the same filial 
devotion owed to ones’ own father. Sun showed a trace of paternalism in his political involvement, 
such as in the formation of public opinion as well as political tutelage. Confucian society was 
clearly delineated by the vertical structure of the world or the ideology of ‘all under Heaven’ 
(tianxia), consisting of the taxonomical order of Heaven, the emperor and family. Here collective 
purpose (weigong) overrides that of an individual. This conflicted with Sun’s republicanism, as 
that principle was based on the freedom of individual citizens and the equality of the people.  On 
the other hand, Judge (1996) insists that since ancient times, Chinese society had been also 
conceptualised in terms of the dichotomy between the officials (guan) and the people (min).  
As De Bary (1988) points out, despite its hierarchical and divisive aspects, Confucianism 
also had a unifying element in the ideology of ‘Grand Commonalty’ (datong); for example, it 
inspired Sun to seek economic harmony through his land equalisation program in the minsheng 
principle. Moreover, Wang Gungwu (2003) draws upon the Confucian humanistic relationship, 
delineated by social roles such as affection between father and son; righteous conduct between 
ruler and subject; distinction between husband and wife; proper order between the old and the 
young; and trust between friends. At the same time, Wang (ibid.) argues that these relationships 
were defined mainly by duties imposed on the weaker. Later, these disciplinary duties imposed on 
the people by Confucian loyalty further inspired Sun to seek the political rights of citizens and 
constitutionalism.  
On the other hand, Huang (1972) claims that, despite the hierarchical and duty-bound 
society, “primacy of the people” was also the central ideology: Mencius argued that the ruler and 
his officials were merely servants of the community, and their task was to carry out the wishes of 
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the people. Angle and Svensson (2001) point out that there was also an ambiguity concerning 
Confucianism’s stance on the officials and primacy of the people; for example, Mencius also 
indicated that “even though people who act against a bad ruler cannot be blamed for what they do, 
they still do not act rightly.” The ambiguity of Confucianism also corresponded to Sun’s conflict 
with regard to his political praxis.  
Metzger (1996) maintains that the influence of the Confucian tradition prevented the full 
realisation of an individual’s potential, while Schwartz (1959, 1985) emphasises its political 
ambiguity, arguing that dualistic concepts were a characteristic of Confucianism. Wang (2011:82) 
adds that Confucianism’s various manifestations existed in a complicated relationship with the 
construction of the dynastic system and political legitimacy. Bol (2008), on the other hand, 
elucidates Neo-Confucianism by comparing its moral values, the essence of which is being true to 
nature or self-seeking, with the concept of profit-making in Western capitalism. He insists that 
Neo-Confucianism’s purpose was different from the pursuit of power and wealth, instead 
emphasising becoming moral beings. In fact, Sun agonised between Confucian moral duty and the 
Western pragmatic approach to material progress, particularly with his land equalisation plan in 
his minsheng principle; he employed both the Confucian ideal of datong communalism and 
Western communism in order to counter the materialistic aspects of Western capitalism.  
However, China’s traditional reliance on the sole input of human labour rather than 
technological innovation together with the lack of trade and industry, resulting from the 
government’s strict policy and heavy taxation, ultimately delayed its modernisation. He Ping (2002) 
notes that the focus of traditional Chinese academic institutions on linguistic, rhetorical and ethical 
learning instead of on practical issues also deepened the delay in modernisation; thus, compared 
with the social structure of decentralisation and openness in Europe, the Chinese maintained 
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unification and monotony. He (ibid.) further argues that science in the West was the history of an 
intellectual tradition that started with literary recovery of classical science. Sun was aware of these 
fundamental problems of China associated with its modernisation when he first wrote his edict to 
Li Hongzhang, who disregarded it because he was occupied with the settlement after China’s 
defeat in the Sino-Japan War of 1985.  
Christianity also had a profound impact on the modernisation of China. For example, 
Christianity influenced the formation of the rebel Hung’s ideology in the Taiping Rebellion. 
Wakeman (1975) argues that, to Hung, Christianity signified that which he admired or feared in 
the West. Rowe (2009) also points out that the Opium War treaties allowed Christian missionaries 
to enter the interior of the empire and mandated the protection of Western as well as Chinese 
converts, increasing the number of legal conflicts and violent incidents with the Qing government. 
Moreover, Hsü (2000) claims that the Boxer Rebellion was the representation of antipathy of 
Christianity as the gentry regarded Christianity as a threat not only to social order, but to their 
imagined cultural superiority. Thus Christianity, as a heterodox faith in China, became a target and 
representation for antiforeignism. 
For Sun, Christianity signified not only a religious belief in monotheism, but also access 
to Western science and technology in addition to the benefit of political alliance with the Christian 
revolutionaries. On the other hand, Fairbank (1986) points out that the Christian missionaries 
played an increasingly important role in Chinese life in the form of print media, which became one 
of their social and cultural influences. Judge (1996) supports Fairbank’s argument regarding the 
influence of Christian missionaries on the development of Chinese print media by noting that 70 
percent of Chinese language newspapers were created by missionaries for evangelisation in the 
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late Qing period, and the rapid growth of the media was also accompanied by serious political 
discussions of the Manchu’s reform from 1901 to 1911. 
The fact that Sun’s background is both Hakka and Christian has an interesting cultural 
implication on his political philosophy. Constable (in Bays 1996) argues that the Hakka’s Christian 
identity does not take a particularly Chinese form, but Christianity allowed Hakka Christians to 
negotiate their Hakka identity. Thus, for the Hakka, Christianity was not constructed in opposition 
to Han identity or culture; instead, Christianity could be used and renegotiated in their continued 
claims to a legitimate Han identity. This may also explain why Sun was able to assertively 
propagate his racially defined nationalism in mobilising the Han majority. Chong, K. R. (2010) 
relates Sun’s flexibility in reconciling different cultures to his Hakka origin as well as to his 
Christianity and Western education, arguing that the importance of the Hakka role in the Chinese 
revolution cannot be overlooked. In regard to Christianity, Chong also insists that Sun’s radical 
measures can be interpreted as manifestations of his Christian faith being reconciled with long-
standing Chinese traditions.  
 
Language and National Unity 
Daruvala (2000) holds that, since the late Qing dynasty, while the people had been the most 
important component of the nation, language, and more specifically, the use of the vernacular, was 
the instrument by which the people’s commitment to the nation was to be mobilised. Interestingly, 
Sun was initially introduced to modern rationality through the grammar and pedagogy of Western 
language. Consequently, Sun became convinced that the unity of spoken and written Chinese was 
vital to the modernisation of the nation and he advocated an all-inclusive education, particularly 
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for women and for the illiterate. For Sun, language was not only a tool for communicative 
rationality but an essential instrument for national unity.  
Elman (1984) maintains that philology was an important cultural element in the late Qing 
period. For Qing scholars, philology was a required discipline to recover and relearn the past 
structures of Confucian culture because it made the retrieval of the past possible; philology was 
therefore not a peripheral or frivolous enterprise. In Neo-Confucian discourses, theoretical issues 
were usually first reduced to their rational principles before conclusions based on deductive norms 
could be drawn. Elman (ibid.) insists that Qing philology demonstrates that changes in social 
norms are often responsible for new approaches to knowledge.  
In the West, language has been also regarded as a core cultural element that influences and 
shapes national identity. Saussure once said that language was a collective treasure shared by all 
members of a community (Bourdieu 1991). Likewise, communication is a collective activity in 
which language is utilised to convey meaning across populations. Language is thus a necessary 
tool to achieve intersubjective understanding among all members in communication. Heller (2007) 
sees language as a set of resources that circulate in unequal ways in social networks and discursive 
spaces, and whose meaning and value are socially constructed within the constraints of social 
organisational processes. She argues that hierarchies are not inherently linguistic, but rather social 
and political; language is thus only one terrain for the construction of relations of social difference, 
inequality, and social hierarchy. In a similar vein, Bourdieu (1991) maintains that language can 
neither be analysed nor understood in isolation from its cultural context and the social conditions 
of its production and reception, indicating the inextricable relationship between language and 
cultural identity in communication. Language therefore also influences the formation of identity 
by its binary characteristics of social inclusion or exclusion.  
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Bourdieu (in Myles 2010) also suggests that wherever spoken language and issues of social 
inequality arise, either as reported in the media, or as aspects of the media as an institution in 
society, the concepts of accent, dialect and voice are usually central issues to the debate. He further 
notes that some argue that the Chinese pictogram writing system is able to represent multiple 
regional dialects, consonant and vowel sounds with ease, whereas alphabetic systems are highly 
restricted in comparison, stimulating standardisation and rationalisation more generally, and 
creating the problem of ‘marking’ regional accents as a consequence. As such, even though some 
contemporary Western scholars found a positive implication of the Chinese language from the 
perspective of written language, Sun was acutely aware that an important linguistic element to 
unite and mobilise the Chinese people was through the synchronisation of written and spoken 
Chinese.   
Furthermore, Bourdieu (1984) identifies the connection between culture and science 
through language, arguing that language is a social historical phenomenon pre-constructed by a 
set of social historical conditions. As an example, he notes that, until the French revolution, the 
process of linguistic unification was bound up with the construction of a monarchical state; 
regional and purely oral dialects were defined negatively and pejoratively in opposition to the 
official language.  On the other hand, Fei (1992) emphasises that all communicators who share a 
common culture, language, consciousness and endogamous kinship constitute a distinct ethnic unit. 
Moreover, he argues that in large groups, people’s experiences are complex and often disconnected, 
so they have fewer common experiences on which to base their language. However, Fei (ibid.) 
also suggests that because ethnic identity is both subjective and situational, ethnic identity was 
based not on a static set of objective criteria, but rather on a constantly evolving network of 
relationships in specific local conditions. 
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Liang Qichao, in order to spread knowledge and education, argued for the necessity of 
synchronising written and spoken language, which was truly radical at the time. (Huang 1972)  In 
fact, Sun, in his book “Memoirs of a Revolutionary”, argued for the importance of the 
synchronisation of written and spoken Chinese. On the other hand, Strand (2011) stresses the 
foreign influence on Chinese language from the exile and emigrant communities abroad; 
furthermore, Hu (1960) insists that the creation of new words and expressions is characteristic 
mainly of vernacular Chinese, baihua, rather than literary Chinese, wenyen, or wenli, the language 
of the Chinese classics, as preserved by several scholars.  
Wang Hui (in Yeh 2011) suggests that, in setting up a modern nation-state, a general 
national language along with an artistic forms of language are always among the most important 
means for building cultural unity; and many scholars have noted the clear historical links between 
the formation of modern nation-states and the creation of a written language on the basis of a 
spoken vernacular. Wang (ibid.) further suggests that even though there are evident links between 
the vernacular and nationalist movements, the former cannot be seen as simply having been based 
one particular dialect; since it was written language, the replacement of classical language by the 
baihua, or written vernacular, cannot be described as phono-centrism either . 
Goldman and Lee (2002) highlight the fact that the vernacular and its function of popular 
enlightenment had been advocated and practiced by a host of late Qing thinkers. The idea of a 
literary revolution, which was first conceived by Hu Shi in America, was welcomed 
enthusiastically by the late Qing, advocates of baihua as a medium of popularisation and political 
education. On the other hand, Schwarcz (1986) insists that Sun was not much of a supporter of the 
Chinese vernacular, arguing Sun was ill-prepared for his encounter with the Chinese enlightenment 
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movement. However, it was his prompt appreciation of the significance of student patriotism that 
prevented him from becoming an enemy of the May Fourth Movement. 
Furthermore, there is a connection between language and human labour. Marx’s notion of 
human labour as a necessarily social activity is closely related to his view of language, claiming 
that language is practical and as old as human consciousness. (Callinicos 2004). On the other hand, 
Cohen (1988) treats labour and language as social relationships that function through human 
cooperation in a community. In terms of cooperation and language, Habermas (1984) stresses that 
the ultimate purpose of language is to understand common meaning among the communicators, 
insisting that the culture and science are fundamentally and structurally oriented towards the 
production of mutual understanding and agreement between actors who reciprocally recognise 
each other by sharing meanings. Sun leveraged the social characteristics of language as a political 
tool to include all the classes of the people for the common understanding of a modern nation-state, 
while also acknowledging labour as a cooperative tool to achieve common economic harmony. 
Sun believed that language was directly related to national unity.  
 
Language and Nationalism   
Sun regarded the Chinese language as a cultural fortress that preserved its history as well as its 
national power through the assimilation of other races. He also noted that during the 4000 or 5000 
years of Chinese history, Chinese characters had told the story of all the events that took place, 
exactly and continuously, arguing that this was an exceptional peculiarity of the Chinese language. 
Duara (1995) highlights the openness or vulnerability of language as susceptible to strategic 
appropriations as he asserts that language can be mediated by social reality and political forces. 
However, Duara (ibid.) also argues that language is not infinitely manipulable: the limits imposed 
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by the meanings of words do not reflect the unalterable truth of some historical reality, implying 
the malleability of linguistic function and meaning in different times and places. On the other hand, 
Culp (2007) considers the efficacy of language in terms of national cohesion when used in 
textbooks, arguing that textbooks promoted the universalising project of “civilising” and 
standardising diverse peoples’ cultures, languages and behaviour during the late Qing dynasty and 
in the early Republican period.  
On the other hand, Sun presented linguistic logic as an essential element in the nation’s 
modernisation by comparing it to scientific rationality. At the same time, he was also aware of the 
limitations of translation; he therefore recommended not drawing too narrow an interpretation, 
demonstrating Sun’s reconciliatory approach to an intersubjective understanding between cultures. 
Rowe (2009) points to the problem with translation as early Chinese translators used Chinese 
words such as Shangdi or Tian to render the Christian name God, conflating these meanings and 
applying them awkwardly between different languages.  On the other hand, Judge (1996) maintains 
that Western concepts became integrated in Chinese culture in the mid- to late 19th century as the 
Chinese reform discourse became a synthesis of ancient principles and imported ideas. She argues 
that the new foreign terms were also transformed since they were associated with classical 
principles, translated into a culturally familiar language and appropriated into the late Qing 
discourse. Sun also considered the translation and import of foreign ideas as a vehicle to broaden 






Print Media  
Eight months after the May Fourth Movement of 1919, Sun pointed out the importance of raising 
literacy ratio in China in his speech to the Beijing’s progressive and anti-imperialist university 
students (Reed 2004). Dikötter (2008) asserts that the emergence of many new publications 
resulted in a decentralisation of power, and textbooks were one of the most efficient vehicles in 
educating citizens. Culp (2007) adds that the textbooks of the 1910s also sought to establish the 
historical roots of the Chinese people as Chinese historians adopted the Western historical methods 
of evaluating sources and constructing arguments, which also formed a path to modernisation. In 
the late Qing society, newspapers were used as various discourses and practices took place within 
the society, revealing ways to reconcile new cultural meanings and age-old political practices. 
Chang and Gordon (1991) point to Sun’s use of the media for political propaganda and debates, 
arguing that Sun’s newspaper the Minpao became an important source of information for the 
members of the overseas secret society Tongmenhui, featuring debates over the question of 
revolution versus reform, particularly Sun’s arguments against the positions advocated by Liang 
Qichao and other reformists.  
Fairbank (1986) emphasises the relationship between the formation of public opinion and 
the growth in journalism and publications in the early 20th century; chief innovations were made 
to distribute Western works in translation and to publish news and comments on public issues. He 
insists that the rapid growth in the print industry was accompanied not only by the serious political 
discussion of the Manchu’s reform from 1901 to 1911, but also by modern fiction; Liang Qichao, 
for example, advocated the key role of fiction to awaken people and to change their ideas. On the 
other hand, Judge (1996) analyses the role of public opinion in Chinese political history and argues 
that it helped transform elite opinion, which was only within the bureaucracy, to collective opinion 
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of the common people. The modern phenomenon of public opinion (yulun) on government and 
society thus became a key component in the larger agenda of forcing a transition to a more open 
mode of politics by the early 1900s. Public opinion then became central to constitutional politics 
with the role of ensuring that the collective sense of right and wrong in society remained clear to 
the public.  
Sun (1897:220) once pointed out, “In England, public opinion expressed its sympathy with 
the revolution, but the government was opposed to it”, suggesting the independence of public 
opinion in England from the political input of the government, and moreover lamenting the 
absence of public opinion in China. Moreover, Judge (1996) notes that the censorship laws in 
China, designed to limit the influence of the print media by the Qing court, also indicate how 
threatened the dynasty felt by the newly emerging public opinion and how ineffective government 
measures were in silencing it. Therefore, although print media invoked popular power and public 
opinion as new deterrents to official power, the media also understood that these forces needed to 
be legally secured and formally institutionalised. 
However, with regard to the process of forming public opinion, Fitzgerald (1996) 
problematizes Sun’s influence on the media, referring to it as the ‘downgrading’ of public opinion 
in the political discourses of the 1920s. Fitzgerald argues that the development occurred after Sun 
decided to reorient the Nationalist Party policy away from liberal constitutional politics; Sun 
deemed the latter unruly for the politics of a disciplined mass party in the first quarter of the 20th 
century. Lean (2007) adds that while the phrase ‘public opinion’ continued to be used in the 1920s, 
and 1930s, it lacked the political potential and significance that it had in the late Qing period 
discussions. On the other hand, Xu (2000) asserts that the ascendancy of journalism would have 
been a necessary condition for legitimating the expansion of a modern state even in a different 
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historical context.  
Moreover, McQuail (1992) relates the formation of citizen solidarity to the media; the 
principle of solidarity represents the symbolic extension of sympathy to the individuals or groups 
in trouble or need, reminding people of their common humanity. On the other hand, Goode (2005) 
relates the role of media to democracy and citizenship, arguing that an unproblematised hierarchy 
in communication produces privileges in speech and the printed word; he also asserts that 
communications technologies such as printing allow citizens some element of connectivity with 
physically absent actors and social processes through which their experiences and action choices 
are structured. Goode (ibid.) maintains that the dispersion of communications technologies also 
enhances the linkages between ‘lived experience and mediated experience’, creating new social 
relations.  
Early on, Sun recognised the political role of the media in catalysing the solidarity of the 
people and public opinion for modern rationality, publicly acknowledging the media’s contribution 
to the Chinese revolution in the first issue of the Minpao. Garnham (2000) argues that history links 
the development of mass media by providing an analysis of the key characteristics of the shift from 
traditional to modern societies within a wider communicational context; this was also accompanied 
by a shift from coercion to persuasion, followed by the growth in rationality and the scientific 
worldview. The birth of public opinion catalysed modernity. Garnham (ibid.) claims that modernity 
became possible through a ‘break with the past’ helped by public opinion, emancipating itself from 
the fetters of tradition since a part of human autonomy was seen to derive from a reflective critique 





Public Speech, Sympathy and Pledge   
Regarding the public opinion that the print media helped catalyse, Lean (2007) posits that the 
public sentiment of compassion, or public sympathy (tongqing), also contributed to the 
modernisation of China; specifically by bringing women’s presence from the private space of 
home to the public space of court. She argues through the case of a woman’s murdering an enemy 
man that the collective affects constituted a powerful and new communal form of sentiment based 
on a long-standing premise of the ethical authenticity of emotions. In fact, the communal sentiment 
of the public could serve as an antidote to an era of inauthenticity generated by slick mass media, 
the corrupt factionalism of the Nationalist regime, and the lack of justice in the courts. Thus Lean 
(ibid.) emphasizes the rawness of tongqing sentiments was something like what a spectacle would 
bring out from the audience. Additionally, tongqing signified a transformation from a communal 
sentiment of renqing (sympathy between family members) to the relations of the larger political 
order of the public, thus an indication of China’s political modernisation.  
Traditionally, the concept of speech or utterance in China according to Confucius was 
consisted of four categories: deyan (virtuous speech), xinyan (trustworthy speech), weiyan (upright 
speech) and yayan (correct speech). Lu (2004) argues that Confucius was primarily concerned with 
the speaker’s moral character, which determined the intention and effect of a speech as opposed 
to its presentation and delivery. Thus, those who excelled at the presentation and delivery of a 
speech might have been perceived negatively, provoking suspicion and even hostility from the 
audience.  
Public speech, a modern phenomenon, also contributed to the formation of public sympathy. 
While print media covered geographically hard-to-reach places both in China and overseas, 
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helping to build public opinion and political awareness among distant citizens, public speech 
appealed to and relied upon live audiences for a more immediate and intimate effect. In fact, 
speechmaking became a principal campaign tactic during the national elections of 1912–13. Strand 
(2011:77-8) explains the origin of public speech in China by relating it to the modernisation of 
China, arguing that the function of public speech was applied in politics, which helped Chinese 
society transform from relying on bourgeois opinion to popular opinion; with the help of the media, 
public speech also helped build national unity. Strand (ibid.) also suggests that Chinese culture, 
which traditionally discouraged speaking out, had the effect of oppressing public awareness and 
awakening, possibly with the effect of delaying modern society.   
Strand (ibid.) further insists that, in the so-called pre-communist era, ‘a great alliance of 
the masses’ signified the inclusion of traditional and elite bodies like guilds, native place 
associations and popular and progressive organisations. Regarding the methodology for engaging 
in public debates and speech, Liang Qichao called for mutual tolerance while Kang Youwei 
emphasised social solidarity and socialisation. Thus public speech and debates were believed to 
have fomented sociability for students through the sharing and exchanging of ideas, catalysing 
collective intimacy. Hu Shi contributed to the literary revolution in China as he specifically 
recommended that Chen Duxu not avoid using vernacular words and speech (Goldman and Lee 
2002). There is also an implication that Sun reconciled this traditional view on public speech with 
modern rationality in that Sun delivered his speech with the intention of rationally persuading the 
audience with his emotional affect. 
On transforming a passive audience into a voluntary participant, Garnham (2000) 
emphasises that, even though a dialogue is initiated by one party, once it has started, neither party 
is the originator or the receiver: the two parties merge into one. Thus, they both become one and 
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the other in turn, resulting in a constant and subtly managed shifting interplay of roles. This is 
when persuasion must come into play. Gellner’s (1988) analysis of the shift from coercive power 
to rational persuasion represents the key characteristics in the transformation from traditional 
community to a modern society. Garnham (2000) further argues that this process requires the 
development of formal systems of education as the core of the mode of persuasion, as well as the 
historical analysis and explanation for the growth of rationality and the scientific world view.  
Habermas (1984), in his theory of communicative action, points out that human speech acts 
can and indeed do tend to enable mutual understanding, agreement and consensus. Humans must 
also communicate with each other through the use of symbols understood between subjects within 
communities. Public speech thus requires the notion of competence and a capacity to produce 
expressions that are appropriate for particular situations. Habermas (ibid.) further asserts that 
participants are motivated to accept or reject a problematic claim on the basis of reasons alone.  
Mutual agreement on the communicative act is produced by swearing an oath in public, 
which symbolises that both parties accept the duties and rights of the citizen by performing 
citizenship in the form of written and spoken communication. Sun also regarded the public 
pledging of allegiance as an act of performative patriotism in the synchronised written and spoken 
language. Tsao (1947) also claims that one of the most important duties of the citizen is allegiance 
to the state, while Habermas (1984) asserts that communicative action includes the possibility of 
coming to agreement due to the fact that human beings are part of an intersubjective linguistic 
community. Furthermore, communicative action is driven by the pragmatic goal of reaching 





Race and Nationalism  
Tsu (2005) asserts that nationalism is usually understood as a state-imposed ideology, reinforced 
by ethnic affinity and mostly examined for its instrumental use for particular political ends. For 
Sun, both people and territory were two main constituents of a nation, and his choice of the word 
minzu highlights the importance of the people. Sun insisted that the difference between minzu 
(nation) and guojia (state) lay in that the former was produced by natural forces and the latter by 
force of arms; he further noted that the natural formation of bloodline in race was the foremost 
important element. See Sin Heng (in Lee and Lee, et al. 2011) also analyses the etymological origin 
of nation (minzu) and the state (guojia) in nationalism, positing that the word nation connotes the 
birth of the people in a similar territory, sharing a similar cultural and religious background, 
whereas the word state refers to the bureaucratic and political machinery that arises within the 
modern state system. Heng argues Sun’s understanding of nationalism was clearly influenced by 
Western political theory, and his conception of “nation-state” appears to be influenced precisely 
by this concept of ethnic groups and political entity that is the state.  
Emphasising the malleability and abstract nature of race, Dikötter (1992) posits that race 
is an identifying construct that evolves according to changes in the symbolic universe in the groups. 
He also argues that group membership can only exist in a relational context, but ethnicity in history 
cannot be separated from the evidentiary processes by which all history is understood. Crossley 
(2006), on the other hand, argues that ethnic phenomena are not only dynamic across time, but 
produced by intertwining acts of naming others and oneself using distinctly “ethnic” institutions 
of language, religion, economic activity or family organisation, or using solely the impressions of 
difference and similarity. As a result, these mechanisms produce “centres” and “peripheries”, 
“histories”, “nationalities”, and “cultural others” that are discernible on social, cultural or 
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ideological canvases and that play out dominance, submission, resistance, conversion or 
subversion.  
In a similar vein, Duara (1995) claims that race refers to a categorical difference of people 
engendered by perceived physical and attendant sociocultural differences, which include notions 
of “blood” or “species”. Thus the construct of ethnicity either includes or excludes others based 
on the needs of a collective. For example, Banton (1987) demonstrates that different eras have 
employed different discursive concepts to explain and legitimate this difference such as ancestry, 
blood, or genetics. Crossley (2006) adds that ethnic categories are constructed, as are lineages, 
communities, nations; and when ethnic categories are intertwined with these other identities, one 
finds powerful languages of exclusion. Furthermore, the malleability of geographical boundaries 
is a central element in the dynamic processes that generate ethnicity.    
Evolutionism began to make an impact on the non-Western world as it blended with 
Darwinism in the end of the 19th century. It represented the underside of Enlightenment rationality 
since it sustained the hierarchy of “advanced” and “backward” races and justified the 
destructiveness of imperialist exploitation (Duara 1995). Under the influence of social Darwinism, 
Sun’s main concern was the possible end of the Chinese race and the partition of Chinese territory 
by the encroachment of foreign powers. This led him to emphasise the importance of population 
as a representation of the power of a strong race. Liang Qichao also accepted the social Darwinist 
vision of ruthless competition in disregarding absolute values or universal ideals of international 
harmony (Fogel and Zarrow 1997). Although Sun acknowledged social Darwinism, he also argued 
strongly for cooperation as the core element of human evolution.  
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Nevertheless, Dikötter (1992) argues that there was not a significant difference between 
the social Darwinism-inspired race hierarchy and the Chinese racial distinction given the Han 
perception of the minority Chinese remained embedded in an ethnocentric framework that stressed 
socio-cultural differences. On the other hand, Duara (1995) disputes that race has to be understood 
within a wider discourse because social Darwinism represented a closed, mutually defining 
discourse of history, nation and race in which the only justification for nationhood was whether a 
race could be shown to fit in with or to advance historical progress. Ultimately, Duara (ibid.) argues 
that we should not allow these arguments to conceal the extent to which the racism of social 
Darwinist global discourse formed the intellectuals’ view of the world in the period.  
 
Cultural Identity  
Harrison (2000) points to the paradox of treating ethnicity and nationalism as separate disciplines 
in Chinese modern history, namely nationalism by historians and ethnicity by anthropologists. 
Historians mainly looked at the impact of the West, modernisation and the effect of imperialism 
focusing on China’s progress toward the modern nation-state, while anthropologists examined 
cultural identity. She points to the invented nature of many of the traditions of nationalism, thus 
regarding both ethnicity and nationalism as historical constructs. Furthermore, connecting 
ethnicity and nationalism with cultural identity, Harrison claims that cultural performance is not 
just a means of social integration but also a means of creating hierarchies of power between 
communities.  Rhoads (2000) explains that the field of Qing studies has complicated our 
understanding of Manchu identity, demonstrating the persistence of a distinct Manchu ethnic 
sovereignty and how Manchu identity was central to the expansion, consolidation and ultimate 
downfall of the Qing Empire.  
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Sun distinguished between race and nationality, claiming that China is made up of a 
common race unlike other nations, which were made up of different “nationalities”. Sun thus 
emphasised that race could not be forged by coercive power of arms, but only by natural force, 
implying his rejection of the Manchu conquest and the colonisation of China by Western 
imperialism since both directly represented coercive power of arms. Leibold (2007) claims that 
the introduction of the concept of race (minzu, renzhong, zhongzu, etc.) set within a global system 
of territorially bounded and naturally competitive race-states (guozu), significantly altered Chinese 
thinking on ethnic difference. It also represented a transition from China’s premodern empire to a 
modern nation-state during which both exclusivist ethnocentrism and inclusivist universalism were 
actively involved in the process of shaping what it meant to be Chinese.  
Leibold (ibid.) further argues that ethnic identity was viewed as a set of objective cultural 
traits and, as Western imperialism forced Chinese nationalists like Liang Qichao to ultimately 
reject Chinese tradition and embark on the path of modernity, nationalism became a form of 
identity. In fact, Kang Youwei justified nationalism as a necessary stage in the ultimate 
achievement of the “great unity (datong)” of all peoples of the world. Datong was also an ideal 
that Sun Yat-sen would later employ in his emancipatory communication. Even Liang, who had 
opposed the racially defined racism of the revolutionaries by calling the nationalism of the Han a 
narrow nationalism (xiaominzuzhuyi) in opposition to his own conception of a great nationalism 
(daminzuzhuyi), could not fully avoid the racialist underpinnings of the discourse (Duara 1995).  
Unger (1996) examines the replacement of culturalism with nationalism in the late Qing 
and early Republican periods, insisting that the logical outcome of rejecting culturalism and 
developing nationalism provided a new basis for China’s defence and regeneration. He also asserts 
that the culturally based confidence and identity thrown into doubt by political and economic 
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challenges expedited the disintegration of the empire. At the same time, Unger (ibid.) also 
emphasises that the Chinese empire was so much more durable than other pre-modern systems 
because of China’s cultural identity. Gellner (1983), on the other hand, argues that the modern 
nation-state was founded upon bonds of solidarity among its citizens and that it was nationalism 
that engendered nations, not vice versa. He emphasises education and universal literacy as major 
prerequisites for the realisation of such a national culture.  
Wang S. (1981:31) problematizes Sun’s insistence of nationalism based on race, noting 
that nationalism integrated the traditional Chinese concepts and the Western concept of statism. 
Townsend (in Unger 1996) maintains that the underlying assumption in the shift from culturalism 
to nationalism is that a set of ideas labelled culturalism, incompatible with modern nationalism, 
dominated traditional China and yielded only under the assault of imperialism. However, he also 
points out that Chinese culturalism did not utterly give way to modern state nationalism, and that 
this transformation of collective cultural and political identity was a long and traumatic process. 
Townsend (ibid.) asserts that it was because supreme loyalty was attached to the culture itself, not 
to the state, arguing that ethnic nationalism is produced when an existing ethnic group strives to 
attain, enhance or protect its nationhood by unity.  
Duara (in Unger 1996) comparatively explores the Chinese nationalist view and the 
Sinological view of Chinese nationality and argues that the question of the historical nature of the 
Chinese nation is intimately tied to the question of national identity. By stressing the multiplicity 
of identities correlated with the variety of histories, the nation is to be understood through different, 
contested narratives both historically and within the framework of the new nation-state system. 
Duara (ibid.) further posits that nationalism is rarely the nationalism of the nation, but rather marks 
the site where different representations of the nation contest and negotiate with each other. The 
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nation-state is therefore a political form with distinct territorial boundaries within which the 
sovereign state is said to be “representing” the nation-people.  
While Duara (ibid.) claims that nationalism is often considered to override other identities 
within a society, he also points out the dualistic nature of identity as both subversive and supportive 
of the nation-state, stressing its ambiguities, changeability and interplay with other identifications. 
Crossley (2006), in examining the origins of nationalism and cultural identity in China, explores 
the relationship between the increasingly abstract ideology of the centralising Qing emperorship 
and the establishment of the concepts of identity before the advent of nationalism. She argues that 
identity also enables one to locate and make sense of oneself within a range of categories, or to 
formulate a description and account of who and what one is; by definition, this entails a 
demarcation of what one is not, a marking out of ‘the other’ and of one’s difference.  
Chinese nationalism was also closely connected to its territory. By late 1911, the core 
provinces of Ming China had broken away from the Qing court, and many of its impoverished 
peasants sought out new land and opportunities in the remote and formerly sequestered frontier 
regions. At the same time, the dependencies (fanshu or shudi), Mongolia, Tibet and Xinjiang 
sought their political independence from China while England, Russia, Japan and other imperialist 
powers carved deeper zones of influence in the faltering Qing geo-body empire (Leibold 2007). 
Toward the end of the Qing dynasty, the nationalists ultimately demanded that the future republic 
assume the geographical contours of the entire Qing Empire.  
Sun initially propagated anti-imperialism against Western capitalism. However, he 
identified monarchism as directly antithetical to his ideal of republicanism, which was based on 
the freedom and equality of all citizens. Accordingly, Sun shifted his initial argument from anti-
imperialism to anti-monarchism while adding the racial element of anti-Manchuism. Laitinen 
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(1990) argues that anti-Manchuism was not simply an expression of discontent with the Qing 
government, but a modern phenomenon and a reflection of modern national ideas. By inquiring 
about the historical roots of anti-Manchuism from the perspective of cultural prejudice and anti-
barbarism, Laitinen (ibid.) argues that modern nationalism in China was born as a result of military, 
commercial and cultural penetration by the West, and that anti-Manchuism became a demarcation 
line between revolutionaries and reformers, meaning that anti-Manchu propaganda had little to do 
with the Manchus.  
Wong, Y. (1989) argues that it was Zhang Taiyan who first theorised the anti-Manchu 
nationalist movement, and that he was responsible for the theoretical expositions of nation, culture 
and history that led to the adoption of a modern nationalism unique to China. On the other hand, 
in his analysis of Zhang Taiyan’s nationalism, Laitinen (ibid.) claims that his anti-Manchuism was 
born of his nationalistic concern and was only a practical means for strengthening nationalist spirit.  
After the 1911 Revolution, however, Sun shifted his argument from a racially defined nation 
(guozu) to a multi-ethnic republic (daminzu gongheguo) by advocating equal citizenship for all 
ethnic groups. Heng (in Lee and Lee, et al. 2011) argues that Sun’s aims remained ambiguous 
because Sun proposed that China could become “one” by consolidating the different groups into 
one, which subsequently means that China could become “free” by limiting the freedom of the 
Chinese people.  
Regarding the relationship between nationalism and modernisation, Pye (in Unger 1996) 
maintains that modernisation is an equally elusive subject as nationalism because it was initially 
confused with Westernisation. Pye (ibid.) further insists that nationalism must also respond to the 
times, given that the character of nationalism in the particular society can become quite 
unpredictable when there is a rapid social or revolutionary change. Thus revolution can solidify 
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nationalism while also producing confusion and disillusion. Duara (in Unger 1996) also points to 
a built-in ambivalence in modern nationalist ideology toward the historicity of the nation in the 
writings of Sun, claiming that the ambiguity of Sun’s intention is concealed through a political 
attack on his enemies, transforming it into a problem inherent in Confucian cosmopolitanism.  
 
Loyal Duties and Citizen Rights  
In his minquan principle (democracy), Sun’s main objective was to balance power between the 
government and the people, which was also the core foundation of constitutionalism. Angle and 
Svensson (2001) examine the word quan in its historical context in an effort to connect it to the 
present day connotation of rights; they argue that the term that has come to be most widely used 
to stand for rights is not quan but the compound quanli, and, given that no one in China in the 
1890s advocated full scale democracy, the goal of minquan was to advocate an institutionalised, 
consultative role in a constitutional monarchy. Wang (2003) explains that quan means power, 
influence and privilege, and li mean profit and benefit; in this sense, quanli was often used in 
contrast to the Confucian ideal of renyi, meaning benevolence and righteousness. Quanli expressed 
more specific rights of freedom, equality and even the autonomy of the individual.  
By 1919, the idea of rights had been fiercely debated, and the world quanli had come into 
common language in public. On the other hand, Judge (1996) indicates that journalists did not use 
minquan in its original radical sense as equivalent to minzhu, or democracy; instead, they redefined 
it as the power or authority of the people (renmin de quanli).  The press advocated the expansion 
of popular power under the dynasty (minquan) while opposing the replacement of dynastic 
authority by popular power (minzhu); the journalists’ advocacy of civil rights was thus expressed 
in the context of the citizens’ collective rights rather than the rights of the individual. In fact, Sun 
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critically analysed the Chinese people’s disciplinary loyalty to the emperor and to their own 
families, accusing it of being the main cause for the absence of national unity. Sun understood that 
it was necessary to retain the people’s loyalty, but contemplated how to shift it to the Chinese state. 
However, loyalty was traditionally a moral obligation. De Bary (1991) argues that hierarchy is the 
oldest and most significant Confucian ideology; at the public level, it was the worship of di or 
shangdi, the high god with universalist claims, and at a lower level, the worship of one’s own 
ancestors. However, the balance between the rights and duties were unequal, with an overemphasis 
on performing duties.  
Levenson (1964), on the other hand, problematizes the moral conflict over loyalty 
concerning the Confucian disapproval of the transfer of loyalty from a deposed dynasty to its 
successor, arguing that the absolute dynastic claim on loyalty may well have been ambiguous. 
Esherick (in Esherick and Kayal 2006) argues that the intimacy and reciprocity of patron-client 
relations compensated for the relative impersonality and formality of the hierarchical bureaucratic 
order; thus, patron-client relations were congruent with complex bureaucratic forms of 
organisation. Dikötter (1992), on the other hand, argues that the notion of group membership can 
only exist in a relational context with reference to other groups, and that the nature of the 
relationship between elite and popular culture is still an important point of debate.  
Loyalty was expressed as a kind of moral superiority and virtuous attitude that included 
generic virtue, filial piety and respect for elders, loyalty, sincerity and all qualities concerning 
honesty and uprightness. Standen (2007) emphasizes that changing political allegiance 
automatically implies moral failing. Dennerline (1981) points out that dynastic loyalty, or literally 
‘loyal obligation’ (zhongyi) or ‘great obligation’ (dayi), was the language of China’s classically 
educated literati. Thus, the so-called nationalism in imperial China was a patriarchal loyalism, and 
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national heroes were those who had dedicated themselves to the dynastic cause: they served, fought, 
and died for their own dynasty (Wong, Y. 1989).  
On the other hand, Confucian revivalists (the new Confucians) contend that the Confucian 
insistence on the priority of socio-political relations embedding the individual may not be 
incompatible with the Western discourse of human rights; in fact, the Confucian principles of 
reciprocal moral obligations and duties as the basis for “rights” are based on social hierarchy with 
differential treatment of individuals depending on rank and relationship to oneself. Thus, the 
Chinese conceive of the self within the context of a hierarchical community (Ogden, S. 2002).  
Furthermore, Liang Qichao (1959) insisted that the right consciousness (quanli sixiang) of 
an individual was to be balanced with that of collective. Liang argued that right consciousness 
does not merely concern the duties (yiwu) that one ought to exercise toward oneself; rather, it is 
also concerned with the duties that an individual ought to exercise toward a general group (Angle 
and Svensson 2001). In contrast to Liang’s concept of balanced rights between individuals and the 
collective, Sun’s concept of people’s rights was for collectivity and for the nation. Wang (2003) 
again emphasises that Sun described families and clans as rivals to collective Chinese identity, 
comparing China to a heap of loose sand and arguing that China desperately needed the cement 
that would catalyse national unity and collective freedom. Sun’s minquan principle was for 
collective power arising from the people, their share in determining China’s destiny and their role 
in saving it.  
Likewise, Tony See Sin Heng (in Lee and Lee, et al. 2011) posits that Sun’s understanding 
of democracy was “people’s rights” (minquan) rather than merely “government by the people” 
(minzu), and that instead of individual rights, Sun was more interested in the rights of the state. 
Thus, Sun was not advocating the freedom and rights of each individual but rather rights and 
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freedom for the state. Gregor (2000) supports the assertion that Sun clearly rejected any contract 
theory of the state that sought to interpret the nation as a voluntary association of individuals. Sun 
argued that such a conception of rights would weaken the integrity of a nation group, undermine 
its viability and leave the Chinese exposed to national threats.  
In Jenco’s (2010) view, democracy captures plural instincts about political action, and its 
defining characteristics is the recognition of a mass of actors with valid claims to participate in 
political processes. However, some Chinese intellectuals such as Zhang Shizhao took an approach 
to politics based not necessarily on collective action but on self-awareness, the use of one’s own 
talent and the accommodation of differences. In a similar vein, Zhang Taiyan’s stance on 
individualism focused on the autonomy of the individual to resist collective demands, denounce 
universal principles and reject the imperatives of social norms. In an effort to affirm the absolute 
existence of the individual, Zhang rejected the scientism of material determination and universal 
law because his concept of an individual was not a corporal and material entity, but a subjective 
participant (Wang H. in Yeh 2001). Wang (ibid.) argues that Zhang followed a binary logic that 
placed the individual in exclusive opposition to the nation-state.  
De Bary (2008) regards communalism as a higher form of collectivism. Confucianism 
emphasizes particular forms of human respect, personal responsibility and mutual support that 
could supplement modern legalistic definitions of human rights. De Bary insists that, without such 
advocacy, one cannot expect economic development and rising affluence alone to produce a civil 
society or constitutional order protective of human rights. In relation to collective power and 
citizenship, Marshall and Bottomore (1992) contend that citizenship grew from civil rights in the 
18th century, political rights in the 19th century and social rights in the 20th century. They argue 
that citizenship in its early form was a principle of equality and that the core of citizenship at this 
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stage was civil rights.  They gave each man the power to engage as an independent unit in the 
economic struggle as part of his individual status. 
Additionally, Strand (2011) points out that the meanings of citizenship, patriotism, rights 
and justice were shaped by Lenin, and revolutions were carried out by individuals whose modes 
of expression could influence individual and collective identities as people came to believe in and 
perform them.  In Tsao’s (1947) opinion, the rights of citizens correlate to the duties incumbent 
upon the state under the protection of constitutionalism. This gives rise to passive or negative duty 
on the part of the state or government, and the correlating citizen’s right may be called a passive 
or negative right of citizenship.  
With regard to women’s rights, Schoppa (2006:164-7) maintains that, from 1917 to 1921, 
intellectual discussion and emphasis on individualism reached its highest point along with the rise 
of youth rebellion among both males and females against patriarchy and social authority. In 
particular, women writers contributed to individual and gender emancipation, while working 
women were placed at the bottom of class hierarchy particularly often. Angle and Svensson (2001) 
explain that Chinese reformers and revolutionaries both were eager to include women among their 
followers as they believed that the contribution of women was needed in order to complete the 
mission to save China; Liang even urged men to share natural rights with women voluntarily.  
On the other hand, Harrison (2000) analyses the shift of culturalism to modernity through 
the lens of gender, emphasising women’s mobility from private space to public space. She notes 
the examples of the prohibition on foot-binding and of letting many girls move freely from home 
to streets, parks, schools and institutions. Furthermore, after the 1911 revolution, women could 
enter government. Sun even metaphorically compared China’s economy to women’s bound feet. 
Chang and Gordon (1991) point out that Sun urged that the discussion of women’s political rights 
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be brought to the parliament for a resolution. On the other hand, Kang Youwei also commented 
on the condition of women in his Book of the Great Unity (Datongshu), wherein Kang claimed 
that men repressed, restrained, deceived and bound women (Strand 2011).  
Sun encouraged the inclusion of women in public service and in the rights and duties of 
citizens as he emphasised the importance of women’s political awareness and participation. From 
a postmodern perspective, gender is regarded as a performance, and gender identity is not only 
presumed to be natural, but also to give rise to political activities and to motivate and direct 
political goals and aspirations. The very identity that is posited as prior to and motivating political 
activity is actually the effect of a set of actions or performances. Butler (1990) calls gender 
performative, a doing ‘action’; it is not merely a given social or cultural attribute, by introducing 
the concept of interpellation, the process by which individuals become social subjects rather than 
autonomous subjects. Thus performativity of gender in combination with women’s citizenship 
produced women’s subjectivity.     
 
Constitutionalism  
In 1906, when the Qing court announced an imperial edict for constitutional preparation, it was a 
shared product of the Qing court and exiled intellectuals. However, there were conflicts between 
Sun and Liang in terms of conceptual differences regarding collective and individual rights, 
citizenship and constitutionalism. In particular, Sun argued that there were remnants of autocracy 
in the monarchical constitution since the Manchus used constitutionalism as a camouflage to 
consolidate their control.  Later, Sun proposed the five-power constitution for the new republic by 
amalgamating both Chinese and Western systems. Chang (1987) suggests that, in Liang’s mind, 
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nationalism was inseparable from democratisation, so freedom of participation and of national 
independence were essentially two sides of the same coin. For Liang, a constitutionalist 
government was pre-eminently a limited government with two essential ingredients: the 
promulgation of a written constitution and the primacy of the legislative organ in the constitutional 
government. Chang Hao (ibid.) also notes that Liang’s interest in this Western phenomenon 
ultimately derived from his belief that constitutional government could ensure the political 
participation of the majority of the people.  
On the other hand, Huang (1972) indicates that, for Liang, Sun’s plan of overthrowing the 
dynasty for a republic and Kang’s plan restoring the Guangxu Emperor to establish constitutional 
monarchy differed in their means, not ends. However, Sun’s anti-Manchu revolution was not a 
mere matter of expediency, but the core element of his political philosophy and the future of China. 
Ogden (2002) suggests that Liang thought freedom, constitutionalism and republicanism were 
ideal but unsuitable for China, arguing that authoritarian rule was more appropriate considering 
China’s political conditions.     
Wakeman (1975) adds that, from the dynasty’s point of view, bureaus and assemblies were 
ultimately intended to build national unity without surrendering imperial sovereignty, and Liang 
Qichao was disappointed as a consequence. Furthermore, Judge (1996) points out that the 
government officials not only resisted implementing true constitutional reform that would expand 
popular power, they also attempted to obstruct the dissemination of the new learning, which 
threatened Confucian intellectual hegemony. Liang Qichao believed that only a vital and binding 
unity between the citizen and the nation could counter the lack of cohesiveness that threatened 
Chinese society. Fogel and Zarrow (1997) also posit that the constitutionalists (lixianpai) favoured 
retention of the Qing in order to avoid the perils of revolutionary chaos, but wanted the dynasty to 
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become a genuinely constitutional monarchy; on the other hand, the revolutionaries (gemingpai) 
favoured the expulsion of the Manchus in order to establish a republic.  
For the Qing government, the Japanese model was not particularly appealing, but some of 
its contents appealed to the Manchu court, particularly the dominant power it granted the emperor, 
the restrictions it place on the powers of the Diet and its recognition of imperial decree as above 
the law. Sun, on the other hand, contemplated both American and the French constitutions as model 
for the Chinese constitution. Schwarzmantel (2003) compares the essential differences between 
the American and the French republican models. In America, two methods of union were proposed: 
one to promote solely the rights of the people, the other solely the rights of the nation. The 
American Constitution divides power into three branches, namely legislative, judicial and 
administrative, and Sun partially adopted this system. Regarding the issue of constitutional rights 
of the citizen, Tsao (1947) also posits that it must be constitutionally provided that the citizen may 
enjoy freedom and the state is bound by law to abstain from encroaching upon such freedom; for 
example, the state is under responsibility to provide educational institutions and facilities. Sun’s 
idea of open access to education may have been also inspired by the active right of citizenship.  
Schwarzmantel (2003) also maintains the shift from a premodern to modern nation by 
employing Habermas’s (1996a, 1996b, 1997) distinction between Volksnation and Bürgernation; 
the former signifies a folk-community while the latter describes a political nation. The idea of a 
Volksnation, a primordial unit, as well as its criteria of identity and membership rest on common 
descent, such as blood and soil. Thus a Volksnation as a community of descent is to be 
differentiated from a Bürgernation, or community of citizens, whose criteria of identity are based 
on holding political rights in common irrespective of citizens’ ethnic origins. Schwarzmantel (ibid.) 
stresses that what Habermas calls the Bürgernation, or a nation of legally empowered citizens, is 
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certainly more open and less restrictive in its membership than a Volksnation. It follows a much 
more voluntaristic logic that all can join, at least in principle, as long as they accept certain 
standards of tolerance and recognise of the rights of others.  
 
Political Tutelage 
However, Sun judged that China was not yet ready for a full constitutional government, placing it 
under the three-phase government programme as he continued to inspire the Chinese people to be 
prepared to sacrifice their rights for the common good of the nation. On April 12, 1924, Sun 
completed the draft of the Programme of National Reconstruction, dividing reconstruction into 
three periods with the second defined as the “tutelage period”. After his death, people believed 
that the tutelage period of government could be prolonged indefinitely, and that China could be 
governed without a constitution. Hu Shi argued that genuine protection of human rights requires a 
legal foundation; Angle and Svensson (2001), on the other hand, assert that Hu Shi neglected to 
say that Sun was also no defender of unqualified human rights. 
Fitzgerald (1996) argues that pedagogy was a style of politics as much as it was a goal of 
political action for Sun. He further claims that it was a style of the Nationalist state in the 1920s, 
as Nationalist revolutionaries established a pedagogical polity in which the ethical community was 
defined not by its awakening, but in the act of being awakened since the political instructors were 
entitled to rule the country and discipline the people until the community had reached an approved 
level of self-consciousness. Thus the relationship between a conscious state and an unconscious 
community was installed in the ideology and programs of both parties through political tutelage. 
Elitism was also manifested through the hierarchical relation. Jenco (2010) holds that, after the 
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revolution of 1911, elites remained the centre of political action, and the juxtaposition between 
elites and the masses was often articulated by both reformers and revolutionaries. However, Jenco 
(ibid.) also argues for the necessity to differentiate between the particular will (i.e. what people as 
individuals want) and the general will (i.e. what the individuals as people want) in order to avoid 
tyrannical imposition.  
During the Nationalist rule of Canton, Sun initiated methods that enabled the party to 
mobilise and discipline the authority of the people, justifying such moves with his theories on 
corporatist politics and party rule. In the 1920s, when Leninism made its way into the Chinese 
Nationalist and Communist parties, an awakening to specific forms of consciousness came to 
substitute for sympathy in conferring the right to represent the people. For Sun, Fitzgerald (ibid.) 
argues, there was little prospect that Nationalist cadre (the engineers of political practice) would 
learn anything from their reform of political society (the engineering project).  
Furthermore, Lean (2007) points out that Jiang Jieshi argued that, based on Sun’s Three 
Principles, internal consolidation within the regime and the establishment of a corporatist party-
state was the equivalent of moving from the military government stage, the first stage of the 
Nationalist Revolution, to the second stage of tutelage government, a period when the Nationalists 
would exercise state power on behalf of the people. To secure control over professional societies, 
the new regime required all groups to register and subjected them to a barrage of new regulations 






Arable Land and Tax 
Confucius remarked that a wise ruler should strive to achieve social harmony (Wang S. 1981). De 
Bary (2008) also points to Dong Zhongshu’s memorial on land reform illustrating the purpose of 
the ancient tax system: “The people had wealth enough to take care of the aged and look after their 
parents, serve their superiors and pay their taxes, and support their wives and loved ones.” 
Accordingly, Feng (1960) explains the significance of agriculture in traditional China, claiming 
that land was the primary basis of wealth and that throughout Chinese history, social and economic 
thinking and policy have centred on the utilisation and distribution of land. Feng adds that the 
peasants were respected as they were believed not to abandon their land in the time of danger.  
Despite the traditional Confucian ideology based on an amicable and cooperative 
relationship between landlords and peasants through a fair system of landholding and taxation, Lin 
(1997) highlights the actual relation between landlords and tenants in Guangdong between 1870 
and 1937 concerning various facets of landlordism and the interests of the landlords. Furthermore, 
Perry (2002) explains the implication of the tax situation and the people’s reaction in the mid-19th 
century, noting that the proliferation of militias was associated with a dramatic rise in the frequency 
and scale of tax resistance. As higher taxes were of concern to large landlords and small owner-
cultivators alike the newly created self-defence forces, led by local landlords and gentry and staffed 
by ordinary peasants, constituted an effective vehicle for tax resistance. Accordingly, late 19th-
century China saw an outburst of anti-tax riots, several of which developed into significant 
rebellions against the Qing government.   
Sun was also influenced by the Confucian ideology as, in his minsheng principle, the 
government would regulate private capital to put an end to monopolisation in order to narrow the 
gap between the rich and poor. Sun’s minsheng principle was originally based on his moral 
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obligation to peasants from observing their economic hardships, which were caused by unfair land 
ownership and onerous tax burdens in the late Qing dynasty. Chang and Gordon (1991) suggest 
that Sun’s compassion for the peasants could have been aroused by Peter Alekseyvich Kropotkin, 
a Russian anarchist whose sympathy for the peasantry and defiance of authority won acclaim in 
Russian and abroad. Wang, S. (1981) also adds that Sun was impressed by Henry George’s theory 
in his Progress and Poverty advocating the public ownership of land since he believed that the 
more civilisation progressed, the poorer mankind would become because of the imbalance in the 
economic distribution. Marx’s advocacy for the public ownership of capital also appealed to Sun. 
Wang, S. (ibid.) further insists that Sun noted that the radical socialists advocated the equalisation 
of wealth as a way to ameliorate economic inequality, believing that social problems stem from 
economic inequality. 
Sun argued for both equalisation of land and redistribution of capital with the downside of 
creating fear among the landlords and warlords and making them protective of their land. However, 
Sun did not employ confiscation; instead, he conflated the equalisation of land and the distribution 
of capital to avoid the negative effects of capitalism, such as class conflict. Chong (2010) reasons 
that, by refuting the Marxist theory, Sun proposed the plans for the reform of society and industry, 
public ownership of transportation and communication, direct taxation and collection of taxes and 
distribution of national wealth on the basis of social and individual needs. Chong (ibid.) further 
argues that Sun did not completely adopt the Russian political ideology even though enormous 
Russian aid was given to China. On the other hand, Gregor (2000) suggests that Sun opposed the 
abolition of private property and private enterprises, arguing that Sun was anti-Marxist, nationalist 
and class-collaborationist.  
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Nederveen (1990) points out that when Marxist analysis began to recognise the importance 
of peasants outside of Europe, the notion of peasants rather than proletarian revolution came to the 
fore. In fact, in the case of China, the effective contradiction in economic conflict was not between 
‘bourgeoisie-proletariat’ but rather ‘landlords-peasants’. Callinicos (2004), on the other hand, 
points to the layered taxation system in Asia wherein states taxed not only peasants but also 
landlords, putting a double burden on both sources of tax revenue.  Elster (1986) mentions the case 
of French and English peasants’ active movements: When disappointed with the low level of grain 
prices on the one hand, and by the growing burden of taxes and mortgage debts on the other, the 
French and English peasants began to manifest actively so that the governments would take certain 
measures.  
 
Labour and Exploitation 
Cohen (1988) describes four different levels of productive power and the associated forms of 
society. In the first stage, productive power is too meagre to enable a class of non-producers to 
live off the labour of producers. In the second stage of material development a surplus appears of 
a size sufficient to support an exploiting class, but not large enough to sustain a capitalist 
accumulation process. This is followed by the third stage, wherein the surplus has become 
generous enough to make capitalism possible. In the final form of society, which is in the stage of 
non-primitive communism, the modern classless society emerges.  
In fact, Sun wanted to achieve the final stage of socialism directly without the negative 
consequences that occur during the second and third stages. During these stages, Elster (1986) 
notes that Marx identified three flaws in capitalism: inefficiency, exploitation and alienation, with 
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the theory of class struggle in the central place of exploitation. Tenancy system in China also 
represented a systematic exploitation of tenant farmers, which inspired Sun’s land redistribution 
plan in his minsheng principle. However, Sun eventually realised that he could not skip the 
different phases of economic development to directly reach “non-primitive communism”, or his 
ideology of the stage of economic harmony. 
Callinicos (2004) also explains exploitation by arguing that it is the appropriation of 
surplus-labour; that is, it compels producers to work longer than necessary to produce the means 
of subsistence for themselves and their dependents. (This was also antithetical to the Confucian 
ideology of communalism, datong). Thus exploitation, when perceived by the exploited, provides 
a motivation for revolt, protest, riot or revolution. As such, it enters into the explanation of class 
struggle and social change. On the other hand, Callinicos also insists that exploitation is a 
normative concept and part of a wider theory of distributive justice. In fact, Elster (1986) contends 
that exploitation can occur in capitalist as well as pre-capitalist societies; for example, it can occur 
in market and nonmarket economies as well as in class societies and in societies without class 
divisions. In the pre-modern economic structure of agriculture in China, Sun’s minsheng principle 
was targeted to emancipate tenant farmers from economic exploitation and return their surplus 
labour to them through the equal distribution of arable land. 
 
Land to the Tiller  
Regarding the land redistribution efforts made by the early Neo-Confucians, who contemplated 
the conflict between the practical solution of the land problem and the moral responsibility of the 
government, Bol (2008) argues that the ultimate question for Neo-Confucians was not whether 
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they should accept the reality of economic inequality. Their aim was to end the private land market 
by distributing the estates of landlords in equal proportions to farmers and restoring an egalitarian 
rural society based on the idealised ‘well-field system’ of antiquity. The Neo-Confucians’ 
endeavours were meant to be different from pursuing power and wealth and from following the 
status quo in politics and society. Consequently, Bol (ibid.) notes that the Neo-Confucian emphasis 
was on becoming conscious of the moral guides innate to us as human beings.  
He (2002), on the other hand, points out some of the consequences of conflicts between 
Confucian morality and economic benefit. He explains that Confucianism discouraged even the 
educated from the pursuit of wealth, insisting that acquisitiveness was a source of social and 
personal unrest, unbecoming to one’s status and morally dubious. As a result, given that 
Confucianism deliberately sought to maximize the people’s moral wellbeing instead of their 
economic wealth, and given the absence of ideological and political support from the elite and the 
government, the rational economic activities of the lower class were kept from developing in full. 
Sigren (in Sih 1974) argues that Sun was compelled to discredit the materialistic 
interpretation of history because Sun believed that only social equality could dissolve the class 
struggle between the oppressed and the oppressors. However, according to Marx, social forces 
cannot be explained without the dynamics of the dialectic inherent in the conflicts of each social 
system. However, Sigren (ibid.) asserts that Sun, after having examined the positive side of the 
economic progress seen among the Western working class, determined that it was the result of 
human cooperation, not the class struggle. Sun thus consistently maintained his stance that modern 
economic progress was the result of economic harmony through human cooperation for the 
common interests of society.  
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Hou (in Sih 1974) criticises Sun for eliminating historical necessity by attributing 
communism to the traditional communalism of ancient Chinese society, and envisioning reviving 
that past glory instead of seeking a modern nation-state. At the same time Hou (ibid.), argues that 
the very necessity for such adjustments implies the existence of conflicts, which develop as men 
continually struggle for existence and simultaneously provide for social progress. Moreover, to 
accomplish the objective of “Land to the Tiller”, the government would have to acquire a massive 
volume of farm land for distribution to the tenants. Nevertheless, Sun’s ‘Land to the Tiller’ project 
was presented without a detailed plan. Hou (ibid.) notes that it was not until 1952 when the problem 
of financing was solved and land reform was successfully carried about by his followers in Taiwan. 
Allen (in Sih 1974) claims that “Sun has left this country a legacy of confusion.” 
Sun wanted to avoid a violent and coercive method of confiscating the land; instead, he 
was willing to reconcile the economic interests of both landlords and peasants in a peaceful way. 
In Sun’s speech titled ‘Land to the Tiller’, addressed to the graduating students of the Institute of 
Peasants Movement in 1924, he strongly urged a peaceful solution for distributing the land to the 
peasants. Additionally, Wang S (1981) suggests common characteristics between Sun’s minsheng 
principle and Christian socialism by observing that the latter sympathised with the poor and the 
weak and advocated social cooperation and moderate and gradual steps to improve labourers’ 
status and welfare.  
Furthermore, Sun’s principle specified that the modern democratic state is not a state 
belonging to any specific social class, but rather one seeking to reconcile class conflict and promote 
the interests of the people on the basis of mutual cooperation. On the other hand, Gregor (2000) 
expands the relevance of Marxism to Sun’s minsheng principle from the perspective of racialized 
global capitalism since Sun’s developmental program was projected on the joint involvement of 
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private capital and state initiative. Gregor (ibid.) further argues that Sun was convinced that 
development required an economy governed by market signals, and that it was his idea to make 
capitalists create socialism in China so that those two economic forces would work side by side in 
a form of state capitalism.  
 
Christianity and Inclusion 
Yan (1976) points out the close relationship between Christianity and Sun’s secret society: he 
insists that the most important element in the solidarity of secret society was the combination of 
Christian inclusiveness and Confucian brotherhood, since ordinary members could feel that they 
were organised and guided by older and more experienced members of the society while the 
egalitarian spirit served as one of the important bases of the organisation. Wang (in Lee and Lee, 
et al. 2011) also supports the connection between Christianity and the secret society, claiming that 
Christianity produced solidarity and revolutionary collegiality, pointing out it was at Christian 
schools that Sun absorbed Christian values and met Christian friends who shared his willingness 
to harness the institutions of secret societies.  
Wang (ibid.) believes that Sun realized that modernity did not need to be separated from a 
people’s heritage, i.e. Confucian tradition. At the same time, Sun believed that Christianity was a 
powerful belief system that supported Europe’s road to modernity as a source of great strengths. 
Although Sun had embraced a new worldview drawn from Christian concerns for society, he was 
imaginative enough to adapt a Chinese political organisation for his revolutionary purposes by 
reconciling Christianity and Confucianism. Sun also believed that Western rationality and Chinese 
moral values did not have to be mutually exclusive, but could both coexist. Sun’s core belief in 
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Christianity was based on its virtue of understanding others’ suffering and helping them, which 
constituted the main tenet in his emancipatory communication. 
Yao (1996) discusses the common aspects of universal love in Confucianism and 
Christianity by comparing Confucian jen and Christian agape; the former serves a humanistic 
purpose while the latter has a theistic function. Yao (ibid.) argues that the similarities between two 
religious traditions must be placed against the background of their differences, insisting that, 
without agape, there would be no such religion as Christianity; and without jen, Confucianism 
would not be the Chinese tradition as we know it. The initial sympathy between Christianity and 
Confucianism is grounded in the fact that Christianity as a theistic religion has many humanistic 
characteristics, while Confucianism as a humanistic religion also has some theistic characteristics. 
This offers an insight for analysing Sun’s motive and purpose of his emancipatory communication, 
and to a certain extent, his paternalistic style of political praxis.   
Ching (1977), on the other hand, argues that both Confucianism and Christianity exercised 
decisive influence in shaping the beliefs, moral codes and behaviours of large populations. She 
stresses the importance of comparative study between Christianity and the Jesuit interpretation of 
the Chinese tradition, which became known as Confucianism, emphasising the compatibility of 
Confucian rites and Christian beliefs in God. For Ching, Christianity refers to a religion that is 
historic and contemporary as well as individual and communal, arguing that Christianity and 
Confucianism are more compatible than other sets of religion.  
Some scholars have also made a connection between Sun’s medical training and his 
patriotism. For example, Hillier and Jewell (2005) point out that Sun often referred to medicine as 
the kind aunt that led him to the high road of politics. For Sun, Christianity and medicine were 
closely connected. Protestant missionary physicians pioneered the fields of medical education, 
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research, leprosy treatment and humanitarian services, and during his medical studies, it is known 
that Sun took a great interest in Chinese classics (Fairbank 1986). Accordingly, Chong (2010) 
suggests that Sun took a variety of ideas from many thinkers, often in the form of a mixture of 
both Chinese and Western ideologies, and that Sun reshaped them, often unknowingly, into 
something totally different; that is, these ideas and institutions.    
 
The Overseas Chinese     
Sun’s compassion for the overseas Chinese began during his adolescence in Hawaii. Sun’s 
expression that “the overseas Chinese are the mother of the revolution” demonstrates his close 
relationship with the overseas Chinese communities for their emotional and financial support 
during his revolutionary efforts. Yan (1976, 1985) emphasises that, even though the Opium War 
ignited Chinese emigration en masse, Chinese migrants were frequently regarded as other Chinese; 
furthermore, the Qing court became suspicious of all who had any contact with foreigners and of 
their loyalty to China.  
Wang (2000) notes that the change in the Qing’s attitude took place when the overseas 
Chinese became aware of the attention that Western powers gave to their own expatriate citizens, 
and especially when the Qing government as well as reformist and revolutionary organisations 
courted the overseas Chinese for their financial support. For example, since the overseas Chinese 
were an important source of political and financial power, both reformists such as Kang Youwei 
and Liang Qichao and revolutionary party members competed for their support. In this way, the 
conflict of interest between the revolutionaries and the reformists surrounding the overseas 
Chinese originated outside China. However, as Wang (ibid.) argues, the Qing government did not 
expect that the overseas Chinese would support Sun Yat-sen’s revolutionary party.  
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Chang and Gordon (1991) emphasise Sun’s versatile qualities, arguing that the young Sun 
learned a great deal about colonialism and imperialism as a student in Hawaii and Hong Kong, 
along with his conversion to Christianity and his early interest in Darwin’s theory of evolution. 
Moreover, Sun was not only familiarised with republicanism but also developed hopes of including 
the overseas Chinese communities in the making of a new republic. Bergère (1998), on the other 
hand, highlights the importance of the geography of China’s coastal provinces and the overseas 
Chinese communities in providing Sun with the cultural awareness to foresee and embrace 
Christianity and Western technology. In fact, Christianity played an important role in reconciling 
Confucianism for Sun as he merged the two to form the transnational Tongbao inclusion through 
which Sun argued for empowering the overseas Chinese with the rights of citizens.  
Wang (1991) broadly classifies the overseas Chinese into four major patterns: the Trader 
Pattern (huashang), the Coolie Pattern (huagong), the Sojourner Pattern (huaqiao) and the Descent 
Pattern (huayi). However, at the time of departing their native soil, the intention of the migrating 
Chinese to settle permanently in their host nation or to return to their homeland was not definitely 
decided. Cook (in Lee and Lee, et al. 2011) claims that many Huaqiao continued to be exposed to 
anti-Qing rhetoric long after it had died out on mainland China due to their involvement with 
overseas secret societies, arguing that the overseas Chinese played a critical role in Sun’s 
movement within the Nanyang colonies, combined with increasingly vigorous attempts by Sun to 
solidify overseas Chinese support.  
Nyíri and Saveliev (2002) explain the details of Sun’s efforts to include the overseas 
Chinese by granting them political rights. Wakeman (1975) also claims that Sun started to 
strengthen his power base among the overseas students with his inclusive rather than exclusionary 
attitude, which was his appeal. Sun, for instance, succeeded in uniting the exiles of Tokyo under 
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his leadership. Furthermore, after the 1911 Revolution, the members of the four non-Han ethnic 
groups residing abroad were also included in the concept of overseas Chinese, and children in 
overseas Chinese schools were told they were sons and grandsons of the Yellow Emperor and the 
Emperor Yan (Nyíri and Saveliev 2002). 
Yung Wei (in Sih 1974) clarifies that, although a dedicated nationalist, Sun was not totally 
anti-foreign. Sun, for example, called for the peoples of the world to help China to realise its goal 
of national independence. Sun also proposed inviting foreign capital for the development of the 
Chinese economy in his book The International Development of China. Thus Yung Wei (ibid.) 
asserts that the cosmopolitan background of Sun served to moderate his nationalistic zeal and 
permitted him to cooperate with people from many nations in his revolutionary efforts. In Sun’s 
transnational Tongbao identity, there was an interaction between nationalism and 
cosmopolitanism.  
Sun realised that Chinese identity was narrowly defined by geographical centeredness, 
which impeded the transformation of the overseas Chinese into autonomous patriots. Thus Sun’s 
conciliatory approach to both nationalism and cosmopolitanism gave birth to a hybrid of 
transnationalism.  See Sin Heng (in Lee and Lee, et al. 2011) posits that Sun’s emphasis on national 
unity meant that a rejection of cosmopolitanism. Heng further argues that Sun insisted that China 
was plagued by the problem of multiple ethnic groups and communities, each serving their own 
communal interests, resulting in their inability to conceive of themselves as a nation as well as 
foreign invasion and colonial takeovers of China. Schwarcz (1986), on the other hand, insists that 
Sun remained ambivalent about the pace and cosmopolitan implications of the cultural movement. 
However, this may also indicate Sun’s praxis of employing cosmopolitism in a sequential way, 
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since Sun thought that China urgently needed to achieve a national identity before it could adopt 
cosmopolitanism.   
Sun’s concept of participatory citizenship represented a democratic principle of inclusion 
and expansion of its members rather than exclusion and limits in the conditions of membership of 
the new Chinese republic. Regarding inclusive citizenship, Tsao (1947) contends that cultural and 
political bonding is as important as natural affiliation by blood. However, he also emphasises that, 
if the blood ties were not observed, the culturally loyal overseas Chinese would have felt more 
affiliated with the host nations. Consequently, Tsao (ibid.) stresses the importance of balance 
between culture and bloodline because it would be a great loss to the Chinese republic if the 
overseas Chinese lost either of these affiliations.  Furthermore, Wang (2013, 1996) suggests that, 
for ethnic minorities outside China, identity can be determined by the different political, social, 
economic or religious circumstances an individual faces at any given time.  Overseas Chinese 
identities in, for example, Southeast Asia are difficult to define and, despite many efforts to 
delineate them, are often dependent on nothing more than self-identification.   
From the perspective of the nature and formation of identity, Cohen (1988) insists that 
identity is the need to be able to say “not what I can do but who I am”, and its satisfaction has been 
historically found in identification with others in a shared culture based on nationality, race, 
religion or some part or amalgam thereof. He further argues that the identifications also take benign, 
harmless, and catastrophically malignant forms as they generate or at least sustain ethnic and other 
bonds whose strength Marxists systematically undervalue because they neglect the need for self-
identity satisfied by them. Therefore, Cohen (ibid.) maintains that the need for identity does not 
generally drive people to seek to achieve an identity because people do not usually lack an identity, 
rather receiving one as a by-product of the rearing process.  Moreover, Schwarzmantel (2003:87) 
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emphasises that citizens’ political aim should be to create a bond of civic community in which 
people will feel a sense of identification with the political framework, invoking values of shared 
citizenship and political equality. Kuper (1999), on the other hand, claims that civic identity should 
be an extension of democratic membership, arguing that civic identity plays a role in uniting people 



















This thesis is guided by two main research questions. The central question is: “What is Sun’s 
emancipatory communication and what kind of impact did it have on China’s modernisation?” 
followed by “What is the significance of Sun’s Tongbao inclusion to the establishment of the 
Chinese modern nation-state?” A supplementary question is “How did Sun utilise language and 
the media in reconciling the conflict between the Chinese and Western ideologies and systems to 
transform China?” In answering these questions, employing an interdisciplinary research 
methodology used in political philosophy and communications studies in relation to language and 
the media helps situate Sun’s emancipatory communication in the history of China’s 
modernisation.  
In interpreting the contextualised social conflicts during the economic and political 
collision between China and the West, discourse analysis is particularly useful in identifying the 
underlying social and cultural tensions, and in analysing how Sun tried to reconcile Chinese 
traditional values, based on Confucian class hierarchy, with the Western concept of modernity, 
based on the equality and freedom of the people.  
The selection of research data includes primary and secondary sources in English and 
Chinese written by Sun as well as Sun’s political supporters and opponents. Sun’s own writings 
of “The Program of National Reconstruction” (Jianguo Fanglue),31 “The Outline of National 
Resurrection” (Jianguo Dagang) 32, and “The Three Principles of the People” (Sanmin Zhuyi) 33 
are the essential material to examine Sun’s political thought. In particular, “The Three Principles 
of the People”, first published as a single volume in 1927, is generally regarded as his seminal 
work, demonstrating the foundation of his political philosophy. It is a compilation of sixteen 
lectures that Sun delivered in Canton in 1924 as Sun appealed to foreign imperial powers, domestic 
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oppositional factions as well as his supporters. It was initially conceived as early as 1897, soon 
after he was released from kidnapping in London, and his first lecture was delivered under the title 
of “The Three Principles of the People and the Future of China” in 1906.  
The Three Principles of the People is broadly divided into three parts: the minzu principle, 
the minquan principle and the minsheng principle. According to Price (in Sun 1930), who first 
translated Sun’s work, Sun used the word minzu with multiple meanings such as nation, nationality 
or race depending upon the context in his minzu principle (nationalism).34 Likewise, the minquan 
principle (democracy or civil rights) sometimes means sovereignty, rights, or, at other times, power 
or authority; and the minsheng principle refers to the economic notion of people’s livelihood. 
These three principles will be examined to illuminate the formation and development of Sun’s 
argument for the modern nation-state countering monarchical despotism and foreign imperialism. 
Specifically, Sun’s concept of race and nation in the minzu principle, his thought on freedom and 
equality in relation to collective rights and duties in the minquan principle and his understanding 
of the economic relationship between landlords and tenant farmers from the perspective of 
humanistic cooperation provides the key information for the research questions.   
“The Programme for National Reconstruction” (Jianguo Fanglue), is composed of three 
works: “The Political Doctrine of Sun Yat-sen” (Sunwenxueshuo or Memoirs of a Chinese 
Revolutionary 1927), “The International Development of China” (Shiyejihua 1920) and “The 
Primer of Democracy” (Minquanchubu 1917). These three works are also often known as 
Psychological Reconstruction (Xinlijianshi), Material Reconstruction (Wuzhijianshi) and Social 
Reconstruction (Shehuijianshi), respectively. In The Memoirs of a Chinese Revolutionary, 
published in first English and then translated into Chinese, Sun explains how to build the modern 
75 
 
nation-state, expounding his famous argument that “Action is easy; knowledge is difficult” against 
the traditional philosopher Fu Kueh’s argument that “Action is difficult; knowledge is easy”. 
In Memoirs of a Chinese Revolutionary, Sun’s revelation of Western rationality can be also 
traced from the linguistic perspective. After having analysed the differences in linguistic structure 
and grammar between Chinese and Western languages, Sun discovered that a binary aspect of 
inclusive and exclusionary qualities in the Chinese language was closely connected to Chinese 
national unity. Exploring the cultural influence of language on Sun’s development of political 
thought and modern rationality will help to analyse his motives for insisting on the logic of 
educating the underprivileged classes of people and for arguing for the unity of the spoken and the 
written Chinese language while critically viewing the exclusionary style of Chinese pedagogy 
employed by the literati.  Theories from social linguistics will be employed to analyse Sun’s 
argument for the synchronisation of spoken and written Chinese, and for the necessity of universal 
education as a key element in the making of the modern Chinese nation-state.    
The Outline of National Resurrection (Jianguo Dagang) is composed of Sun’s 25 
instructions to build a fully constitutional nation-state, which was announced a year before his 
death. In this outline, Sun reveals his reservations regarding China’s readiness for embracing full 
constitutionalism and proposes a preparatory government programme in three phases consisting 
of a first period of military operation, a second period of political tutelage and a third period of 
constitutional government. The outline will be analysed in order to examine Sun’s political stance 
and the implications of tutelage government in terms of individual and collective rights. 
The Manifesto of the First National Congress of the KMT contains Sun’s assessment of 
China’s political and economic relationship with Russia and his stance on China’s relationship 
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with Soviet communism. The manifesto will be an important piece of information in analysing the 
foundation of Sun’s inspiration for communism in his land equalisation plan. Additionally, Sun’s 
correspondence to Li Hongzhang written in 1894, his speeches before and after the revolution of 
1911, his lectures and his casual comments will be utilised to explore Sun’s relationship with the 
overseas Chinese and the influence of Christianity on the conception of transnational Tongbao 
inclusion.  
My initial approach to assess Sun’s political expositions is threefold. First, I aim to analyse 
the historical events in relation to the formation of Sun’s political philosophy, such as the social 
and economic conditions after the Opium Wars and the Taiping Rebellion: the Qing court’s 
taxation and land holding system, the conflict with tenant farmers, the massive migration of coolie 
labourers due to expanding imperialism and capitalism, conflicts between the revolutionaries and 
the reformists surrounding constitutionalism and the structure of the modern Chinese state, ethnic 
discord over citizen rights and so forth. This may show that these two elements – Sun Yat-sen’s 
emancipatory motives and historical events – are inextricably connected. 
Second, I intend to examine Sun Yat-sen’s constant attempts to reconcile Confucian and 
Western values and practices in an effort to break with China’s past, not by imitating the West but 
rather by selectively adopting Western social, economic and political advancements with Chinese 
particularities in the process of China’s modernisation. To this end, I aim to interpret Sun’s 
emancipatory communication as the traces of Sun’s cultural and political syncretism of tradition 
and progress.  
Lastly, regarding the social tensions created by political and economic exclusions of the 
peasants, coolie labourers and the overseas Chinese, I will closely examine the significance of 
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inclusion in Sun’s emancipatory communication. In analysing his embedded cultural and 
philosophical foundation, I seek to study Sun’s persuasive tones in his contextualized doctrines, 
his arguments for inclusion and reconciliation, and his support for intersubjective relationships and 
cooperative understanding among the people.  
Bennett and Frow (2008) suggest that there are four main traditions central to the forms of 
cultural analysis. First, they identify a universalist tradition (Williams 1983; Latour 1993) in which 
culture stands for certain human standards that are universally binding. Second, they describe a 
tradition that regards culture as relative to time and place, with an emphasis on cultural agency, 
creativity and multiculturalism (Boas 1982). Third, they include the structural tradition of the late 
18th and 19th centuries, which differentiates between and contrasts ‘modernity and its others’, 
dividing society into a number of distinct and analytically separable realms (Bourdieu 1991; 
Luhmann 2000). Finally, they identify a tradition that regards culture as a resource to be invested 
in (DiMaggio 2010). Therefore, a combination of the second and third options – cultural modernity 
– seems most useful in order to examine how Sun’s communication strove to consolidate Chinese 
cultural identity and deeply rooted loyalty in the people by analysing the process in which Sun 
tried to transfer them to the new republic. It also allows to examine how Sun persuaded the 
overseas Chinese to become transnational patriots in the making of the first modern Chinese 
nation-state despite their affinity with both Chinese and their host nation’s cultures, and against 
the social prejudice imposed by the mainland Chinese.  
Discourse analysis is also an effective method to relate the significance of Sun’s 
emancipatory communication from the cultural perspective to the economic and the political 
aspects of China’s modernisation. It allows me to analyse contextually how Sun tried to shift the 
deeply inculcated people’s cultural loyalty away from the emperor and family toward the newly 
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established nation-state. Reinterpreting the significance of Sun’s emancipatory communication 
from the contemporary view may also require social linguistics and media studies because 
“dominant interpretations are subject to change over time as they are reread in new social contexts 
and in the light of new intellectual concerns and understandings.”35 
In approaching language and its influence on Sun’s political philosophy, the focus will be 
on what caused Sun to regard language as both the implicit and explicit system of unity and 
division. First, I aim to situate language and communication in the context of cultural and social 
unity, and I will attempt to demonstrate the interplay between communicative practices and 
concrete forms of political life. This may reveal Sun Yat-sen’s thought on the structure and 
vulnerability of the Chinese language and intersubjective communication since it lacked the clearly 
stipulated grammar and an inclusive pedagogy; and its connotation of linguistic division between 
those with and without the privilege of education, which was closely connected to social hierarchy 
until the advent of the Chinese vernacular baihua. Cultural theories on language by Chinese writers 
(Fei Xiaotong, Hu Shi and Lu Xun) and Western authors (Bourdieu, Habermas and De Francis), 
along with works of other theorists, will be employed to explicate Sun’s stance that the national 
unity and modern rationality of the people were closely linked to language.  
In order to investigate the methodology of Sun’s emancipatory communication, the role of 
print media, public speech and public pledging of allegiance will be analysed as the public space 
of communication for the dissemination of information and political interaction, which was closely 
related to the advent of the modern Chinese nation-state. With regard to print media, investigations 
will be made into publications such as Minpao36 and other journal articles in order to demonstrate 
the political utility of the media. I will first discuss Sun’s kidnapping in London as Sun’s initial 
79 
 
introduction to the power of public opinion in England. Additionally, the implication of censorship 
will be also analysed in order to explore Sun’s political strategy to overcome the barrier.  
Sun’s public speech, which was employed to transform the illiterate and sceptical 
audiences into politically active participants, will be studied in light of the communication theories 
of Habermas (1989) in order to explicate the relationship between the establishment of a modern 
nation-state and the role of communicative rationality. Subsequently, Sun’s public speeches will 
be examined using Rancière’s (1991, 2009) argument with regard to persuasion by both rationality 
and affect.  This may help demonstrate Sun’s belief in rationality and his desire for China’s 
modernity through emancipatory communication from a pedagogical standpoint. In particular, 
both theories on public opinion and public sympathy will be employed to critically view Sun’s 
communicational praxis. Furthermore, the crystallisation of written and spoken communication is 
achieved in the form of public pledging of allegiance, which will be analysed as a speech act.  
With regard to Sun’s minzu principle (nationalism), first, the etymological origin of minzu 
will be examined including the Japanese neologism minzoku, which derived from the German 
word Volk, and the word of Bürger, the contemporary equivalent of citizenry, which helped to 
bring about the modern nation.  Then, a critical analysis of Sun’s racially defined nationalism will 
be performed in order to show what it was that influenced Sun to argue for race based on 
consanguinity. Social Darwinism together with Sun’s insistence on preserving the Chinese race 
and territory while facing the menace of foreign powers will be also considered in order to 
demonstrate how Sun’s racially defined nationalism in fact posed a risk of dividing the people and 
the nation. Furthermore, Dikötter’s historical assessment on race in relation to social Darwinism, 
Leibold’s analysis of the relationship between race and nationalism and Duara’s valuation of race 
in creating a nation-state will be employed to analyse Sun’s words and deeds. In analysing the 
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minzu principle, I also intend to reveal how Sun reconciled the concepts of the natural construct of 
human body with the cultural elements of race.    
In dealing with the minquan principle, Sun’s thought on constitutionalism and his work to 
shift the people’s loyalty to the new Chinese republic will be explored. In particular, opinions 
regarding the concept of constitutionalism as discussed by Sun and Liang will be considered by 
comparing and contrasting their views on the form of government as a republic or a constitutional 
monarchy, the time frame of establishing it and the readiness of Chinese people. Sun’s argument 
for equality of class and social hierarchy across all occupations will be examined by analysing 
Sun’s thought on the fundamentals of constitution and the motive behind his proposal of the 
Fivefold Constitution, a conflation of China’s traditional court departments and Western cabinets.  
Additionally, Sun’s argument for the collective rights of citizens in comparison with those 
of individuals will be examined by demonstrating debates on individual and collective rights in 
constitutionalism. In particular, Sun’s advocacy of the women’s rights to serve public service in 
his communication will be investigated to illuminate Sun’s political intention to emancipate 
women from the restrictive gender practices imposed by Chinese patriarchal tradition and his 
support for granting women’s performative citizenship. The postmodern theorist Butler’s theory 
of gender and performativity will be employed to shed light on women’s rights and subjectivity.  
With regard to the minsheng principle, Sun’s stance on the economic value of human labour 
in relation to land ownership will be examined along with surveying the unfair tax system in the 
late Qing dynasty, which also contributed to the massive emigration overseas. Sun’s conciliatory 
approach to the Chinese tradition of communal ownership, the communist system of 
nationalisation of land and his proposal based on the traditional Chinese system of “Land to the 
Tiller” will be also analysed.  Finally, Sun’s outright rejection of the negative effects of Western 
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capitalism such as the Marxian argument of class war will be explored by juxtaposing two elements 
within the tenancy system: class hierarchy and economic exploitation. This will reveal Sun’s ideal 
of the economic inclusion of tenant farmers by reconciling the Confucian ideal of communal land 
sharing and equalisation of the land.  
In investigating Sun’s relationship with the overseas Chinese, the origin of social prejudice 
against the overseas Chinese will be examined by exploring the construct of Chinese identity, such 
as the Chinese people’s own sense of geographical centeredness. Furthermore, the two main 
burdens of psychological liminality and geographical distance imposed on the overseas Chinese 
will be examined in order to reveal how Sun’s Tongbao inclusion and transnational citizenship 
were conceived and what triggered the transformation of the psychological and geographical 
obstacles of the overseas Chinese into transnational patriotism toward the new Chinese republic. 
Additionally, the conception of Tongbao inclusion as reconciling Christian universal love and 
Confucian fraternal love will be analysed from the perspectives of theism and humanism as well 
as nationalism and cosmopolitanism. Furthermore, in analysing Sun Yat-sen’s Confucian and 
Christian influences, the concepts of jen and agape will be compared and contrasted in an effort to 
explain the foundation of Sun’s intention to emancipate the overseas Chinese.  
 
Anticipated Challenges  
In examining and interpreting Sun’s political philosophy from the perspectives of historical 
sociology by cultural analysis, some challenges arise, for the most part linguistic. The first 
challenge would be how to reflect and delineate the constantly changing boundaries within and 
between political terms and social concepts such as class, race, identity and citizenship. This is 
related to historical developments and changes in the usage of concepts and words during the pre-
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modern, modern and contemporary transitions in China as well as globally. Price (in Sun 1930:ix-
x) aptly mentions the difficulty of translating Sun’s work himself: “The extemporaneous style of 
Dr. Sun's lectures, the constant repetition for sake of emphasis and the looseness of Chinese baihua 
(vernacular) construction make the original quite a lengthy book. Accordingly, there are many 
redundant expressions in Sun’s works in general for the purpose of emphasis or for the reason one 
Chinese word implied multiple meanings in Western concepts.” 37 Furthermore, Sun himself talked 
about the challenge of translating some of the meanings of Western words unknown to Chinese 
concepts into Chinese as he emphasises the importance of expanding the boundary of meaning or 
creating a new word by conflating the Chinese and Western concepts. This was briefly mentioned 
at the beginning of methodology, along with Sun’s word choices of “minzu (nationalism)” and 
“quan (rights)”.  As such, it becomes necessary to frequently compare the translated words with 
the original Chinese vocabulary.   
The second challenge of how to handle a word’s universal versus particular connotations 
is also closely related to the semantic boundaries between a word and its concepts. For example, 
it is a challenge to apply Sun’s understanding of freedom and equality to the local Chinese context 
in the late Qing period when the meaning of freedom and equality in the West may have been 
either purely conceptual or, at best, imagined through debates among elites during the early 
modernisation of China. Linebarger (1937:17-19) advises that finding a fine line between the 
Western interpretation of politics and the Chinese understanding and practice of politics may be 
key to interpreting Sun Yat-sen’s ideology; thus, he emphasised that Sun should not be judged for 
a seemingly poor interpretation or inexact ideologies as the Chinese ideology cannot be explained 
in its own terms, which exist only in the Chinese language. Linebarger (1937:11-2) succinctly puts 
the problem of translation concerning Sun’s work as follows: “Sun himself never explained his 
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philosophy; there remains a vexing problem of choice of method; a systemic condensation of his 
views cannot survey the same broad ranges. All come back to the problem of translation.”38 
The following methods help to overcome the aforementioned challenges. First, while open 
to changes in meaning and scope in the semantic application of words, this thesis will follow the 
contemporary usage and understanding of concepts and words, reflecting my authorial perspective 
as an autonomous citizen in contemporary time and space. Second, both universal and particular 
approaches will be employed by comparing and contrasting the causes and effects of the social, 
economic and political conflicts in China. After all, even though Sun’s emancipatory 
communication and praxis were particular to China, they were also influenced by and interacted 
with universal conflicts surrounding class and race. Employing both approaches may therefore 
shed light on the symbiotic nature of universality and particularity. Attempting to interpret Sun’s 
own reconciliatory approaches to both Chinese and Western cultures and systems may thus provide 
a better understanding of his hybridity and creative solutions to political arguments and economic 
plans. Third, English–Chinese and Japanese-Chinese dictionaries published in the early 1900s will 
be closely consulted in order to observe the effects of neologisms and newly introduced concepts 
in terms of which new words were derived from and translated into Chinese and how; how they 
were conceptually and etymologically applied in social, political and economic contexts in China 











STRUCTURE OF THE CHAPTERS  
Chapter I aims to analyse the influence of Western language on Sun’s modern rationality. It 
explores his inspirations for advocating the synchronisation of spoken and written Chinese, and 
how his analysis of the structure of Western language and its grammar prompted him to argue for 
equal and open access to education for the illiterate and the undereducated. This chapter also 
examines the underlying reason behind Sun’s criticism of the absence of clearly stipulated Chinese 
grammar as well as the exclusionary style of Chinese pedagogy. Apart from the effect of language, 
this chapter also deals with the methodology of Sun’s communicational praxis, including his use 
of print media, public speech and swearing an oath in propagating his political agenda. From Sun’s 
initial recognition of the political impact of the press on citizen solidarity, he demonstrated his 
firm trust in the role of print media and public opinion in building a modern nation-state. The 
effects of public speech are examined from the perspective of both rational and emotional 
strategies of persuasion. Furthermore, the linguistic aspect of swearing an oath is also investigated 
as an act of performing citizenship. By examining Sun’s usage of print media, public speech and 
pledging, this chapter analyses how the synchronisation of Sun’s written and spoken 
communication influenced the solidarity and allegiance of citizens.   
Chapter II examines Sun’s minzu principle by analysing his racially defined nationalism in 
relation to anti-imperialism and anti-Manchuism. By examining Sun’s motivation in adopting the 
exclusionary nationalism that solely supported the ethnic majority of the Han race, it analyses the 
cause of conflict between Sun’s nationalism and his pursuit of the modern nation-state. It also 
examines the concept of natural and coercive forces, which Sun regarded as the respective powers 
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that produced race and the state. It further studies the influence of social Darwinism on Sun’s 
nationalism in an effort to reveal the cause of his concern about the possible end of the Chinese 
race and the partition of its territory. Additionally, this chapter investigates the challenge that Sun 
faced in persuading the people to transfer their culturally rooted loyalty from the emperor and 
family to the new Chinese republic, and explores the influences that led Sun to alter his insistence 
on a nation composed of consanguine race to an all-inclusive Five Race Republic. 
Chapter III examines Sun’s understanding of citizens’ freedom and equality as well as their 
duties and rights in his minquan principle in relation to constitutionalism, a symbol of power 
balance between the people and the state. It also explores how Sun empowered citizens to 
participate and perform their citizenship in transforming China from a pre-modern community to 
a modern nation-state. In particular, it studies Sun’s attempts to include women in public space so 
that they could exercise the rights of citizens such as voting, being educated and doing military 
service. This chapter also analyses what inspired Sun to conceive the Fivefold Constitution, which 
was a hybrid of the traditional Chinese court system and Western constitutional structures. The 
implications of Sun’s imposition of a reconstruction plan, including military operation and political 
tutelage, will be also investigated in relation to constitutionalism and citizens’ rights.   
Chapter IV analyses the minsheng principle concerning Sun’s efforts to alleviate the 
economic hardships of tenant farmers. It examines Sun’s motivations for planning the eradication 
of the unfair land ownership and tax system with his land equalisation program. By studying the 
economic impact of historical events such as the Opium War on farmers’ livelihood and by 
exploring the taxation system that expropriated the economic rights of tenant farmers, this chapter 
attempts to reveal how Sun tried to return the value of their surplus labour back to the labourers as 
well as his inspiration for countering the material conflict resulting from land ownership with the 
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moral persuasion of economic harmony and cooperation. It also examines Sun’s ideas of 
Confucian communalism and Western communism along with the political and economic 
influence of the Russian Revolution on Sun’s land equalisation plan.  
Chapter V examines Sun’s motivations for including the overseas Chinese in his 
emancipatory communication and the ways in which he defied social prejudice against them. By 
exploring the origin of Chinese emigration and the cultural significance of Chinese identity in 
relation to geographical centeredness, it analyses the formation of Tongbao inclusion from the 
perspective of Christianity and Confucianism. It examines how Sun’s Tongbao inclusion 
transcended the narrow category of theism with a broader humanistic inclusion, and the conditions 
that made it possible for the overseas Chinese to overcome social prejudice and geographical 
distance in order to join in making the first Chinese republic. It also demonstrates Sun’s own 
realization of the exclusionary elements in his racially defined nationalism in the process of 














CHAPTER I  
Sun’s Language and Communication  
INTRODUCTION 
To Sun, the grammar and structure of Western language symbolised modern rationality, and he 
believed that the absence of national unity among Chinese people was closely related to the 
separate systems of the written and spoken Chinese language. Sun asserted that the synchronisation 
in Chinese language would lead to a better understanding of written communication for 
undereducated citizens, recommending Chinese scholars to educate with a more inclusive and 
accessible pedagogy.   
In this chapter, I argue that Sun advocated the linguistic inclusion of all Chinese people in 
order to counter the censorship imposed by the Qing court, to form public opinion for the Chinese 
republic and to raise political awareness for national unity. This is significant because Sun 
understood the social characteristics of language could be used as a unifying tool and believed that 
language was directly related to collective power and national unity. Thus Sun employed print 
media, public speech and pledging of allegiance to persuade and mobilise citizens while trying to 
include illiterate and reluctant citizens as well. Sun considered an inclusive communication was 
the bridge to a modern nation-state.  
Habermas (1984) stresses that the ultimate purpose of language is to understand common 
meaning among the communicators, insisting that the culture and science are fundamentally and 
structurally oriented towards the production of mutual understanding and agreement. Sun’s 
emancipatory communication was composed of a three-step process to political modernisation: 
first, a critical examination of China’s past, laden with despotism and imperialism; second, the 
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formation of political awareness among the citizens to break with China’s past; third, the 




















1.1 Language and National Unity  
The core tenets of Sun’s emancipatory communication were minzu (nationalism), minquan 
(democracy) and minsheng (livelihood), and each principle was closely related to the others in its 
emancipatory purpose. His communication consisted of four aims. First, he aimed to provide 
people of all social classes with equal rights to receive education so that they could attain modern 
rationality and common understanding through open access to both written and spoken 
communications. Second, he sought the inclusion of all citizens in the process of forming public 
opinion so that they would attain political awareness of the necessity of national unity. Third, by 
empowering citizens with legal rights, he aimed to give them the ability to participate in the 
common political cause of establishing a modern Chinese nation-state. Finally, he sought the 
emancipation of China and its people from social, political and economic oppressions by granting 
equality and freedom to all citizens.  
In order to attain these aims, Sun’s communicational praxis had four stages of 
implementation. First, he emphasised the importance of national unity by denouncing 
fragmentation among the Chinese people. Second, he defied the hierarchical subject-object relation 
in the monarchical system by advocating an equal subject-subject (intersubjective) relation for all 
citizens. Third, he encouraged the Chinese people to engage in common political struggle to 
counter dynastic despotism and foreign imperialism to achieve autonomy and citizen rights. Lastly, 
he empowered citizens with participatory citizenship by including socially excluded classes of 
people in the making of the republic. The cohesive aims and praxes of Sun’s emancipatory 
communication catalysed the advent of the first Chinese Republic in 1911, marking an end to the 
monarchical sovereignty of the Qing dynasty.  
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Sun was open to foreign inspiration such as the Japanese Meiji Reformation for initiating 
China’s modernisation, the advancements of America and England for their political and social 
institutions and the Russian post-revolutionary methodology for military and economic renovation. 
In formulating his emancipatory messages, Sun combined various elements of political ideologies, 
economic principles and cultural values, consequently creating a variety of new concepts and 
structures, such as the unique Fivefold Constitution, Tongbao transnational citizenship and the 
Five Race Republic.  
While Sun considered land and people as the two essential constituents of a nation, he also 
thought that language was a common sociocultural element that bridged people and the nation. 
Sun pointed out that language had an assimilating effect in constituting a race, saying that, “A third 
great force in forming a race is language. If foreign races learn our language, they are more easily 
assimilated by us and in time become absorbed into our race.” 1   Sun was fascinated by and proud 
of the cultural and historical particularities of Chinese language in which its history is preserved, 
noting that, “Since the beginning of history, these Chinese characters have told the story of all 
events which took place during these four or five thousand years, exactly and continuously. This 
is an exceptional peculiarity of the Chinese language.”2  
In his speech at a welcome party given by Cantonese Parliament members in Shanghai on 
July 1, 1916, Sun claimed that language was an essential tool to understand history, without which 
China’s modernisation could not be achieved. He said, “If we wish to reform our country, we must 
first know history. If we want to know history, we must have a command of the language.”3 
Furthermore, Sun argued that the Chinese language maintained its cultural connections to the 
surrounding Asian nations, serving as a medium of common foundations across Asia. As he argued, 
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“Beyond the boundaries of our country, [Chinese language] influence extends over Japan, Korea 
and Indo-China, which consider themselves akin to the Chinese in their language.”4 
However, upon analysing the peculiarities of Chinese language, Sun discovered the 
division between the spoken and the written Chinese, which, he believed, kept the undereducated 
from a fair access to knowledge and right expressions in communication. Due to his early exposure 
to the Western educational system, Sun was aware of the synchronised structure of Western 
language, noting that “The European (written) languages are phonology-based, and its phonology 
is closely linked to spoken language; thus when the spoken language changes, these changes can 
be also reflected in the written language.”5 Furthermore, Sun discovered the intrinsic logic of 
grammar in Western language. He said, “European countries all pursue the learning of grammar, 
which takes their own language as its research subject, and it is a compulsory subject that every 
student must take in their education.” 6  
Sun’s comparative analysis of the structural differences between Chinese and Western 
language continued in his insistence that grammar served as a medium to writing correctly and 
constituted the foundation of logic. Sun lamented the absence of grammar in Chinese language: 
“In Chinese, there is no [structured stipulation of] grammar, and that is why those who learn how 
to write are not able to compose even a single word unless they recite articles by their predecessors 
and mimic their writing style; thus either they know all about writing, or they know nothing even 
after 10 years of struggling with it. It has nothing to do with effort.” 7  
Arguing that grammar and logic are closely related, Sun critically analysed the pedagogical 
methodology in China, insisting that scholars were responsible for their complacency in education. 
Sun related the absence of a structuralised stipulation of grammar in Chinese language to the lack 
of logic in Chinese people, recalling the scholars’ responsibilities: “We have no grammar. … It 
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would be difficult to find writers whose works could be analysed with a view to determining “what 
ought to have been” the distribution of words and phrases, and “why” each word was used… If 
they [scholars] only know that one must act in a certain way, but cannot explain it, they cannot be 
respected as scholars.”8 In fact, the Chinese pedagogical method was concentrated on repetition 
rather than rational analysis, which may have produced a lack of inquisitiveness and scientific 
curiosity among the Chinese people: “The common people who study the classics constantly use 
the passage that I quoted in a conventional way, but they repeat the words without seeking their 
interpretation and with no idea of their deeper meaning.”9  
Moreover, Sun confessed that he had to rely upon Western translation to understand the 
Chinese classics. He pointed out the futile role of Chinese pedagogy in a speech given to Cantonese 
Parliament members in Shanghai on July 15, 1916: “Like other village students, I too recited the 
Four Books and Five Classics in a singsong manner for several years, but I forgot most of it 
later….So I obtained Western translations of the Four Books and Five Classics and the histories 
and read them. To my surprise, I was able to understand them [better].”10 Accordingly, Sun 
encouraged autonomy in learning, breaking with the ancient way of learning: “[Learning] should 
not only be appraised at its true worth [set] by scholars but also utilized by them. If it be utilized 
in the proper way, and if we make use of the ancient scholars, they will not lead us astray.” 11  
Sun suggested a more progressive methodology to Chinese scholars, arguing that the 
responsibility and criteria for being a scholar must be based on logic:  “When unable to answer 
what makes a good composition, the scholars would resort to the idea of some mysterious power, 
saying that some individuals possess some mysterious gift (talent) that enables them to be 
enlightened all of a sudden; doesn’t this response actually expose how ignorant our scholars are 
about their language?” 12   In a direct criticism, Sun further challenged Chinese scholars’ illogical 
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method of reasoning and ignoring the greater responsibility of educating the people and helping 
them with gaining logic: “Any scholar who deserves the name should know not only what a thing 
should be, but also why it should be so; if he is not capable of explaining why, then he should not 
be considered a real scholar.” 13  
On the surface, Sun seems to be challenging the structural problems associated with the 
Chinese language and its pedagogy, such as the absence of grammar and its consequent lack of 
logic among the people. However, Sun was, in fact, problematising the absence of national unity 
and modern rationality due to the structural particularities of Chinese language as well as the 
exclusionary attitude of scholars. In fact, Sun was communicating the necessity of universal 
education to abolish social hierarchy from the linguistic perspective, and his concern for the 
beginners in education ultimately stemmed from his compassion for the illiterate and the 
undereducated. Sun emphasised that “[for these pupils in Western countries], regardless of the 
depth they have achieved in their studies, when they set out to write, some can convey abstruse 
ideas, while others are only able to convey simple messages; however, they all succeed in 
conveying their information logically and fluently in terms of language.14  
Sun noted that unspoiled Chinese tradition and culture were maintained by secret societies, 
an important aspect of spoken language. He emphasised the inclusion of the undereducated class 
in society because they carried the untainted Chinese cultural identity that had been preserved for 
centuries in their spoken language. Sun’s argument also reveals his intention to form national unity: 
“The true national spirit is with the lowest class of society…Thus no matter how despotic the 
Manchu government became in the last two centuries, the national spirit was kept alive in the 
verbal codes transmitted by these secret societies…So they rallied the secret societies, whose 
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organisation and initiations were simple and adaptable, and intrusted to them the preservation of 
nationalism, not through literature but through oral language.”15  
The structure of Chinese language was closely related to Sun’s nationalism, as Sun’s 
argument for the unity in the written and spoken Chinese language laid an early foundation for 
pursuing national unity. In fact, Sun felt that the logic of linguistic inclusion through understanding 
both written and spoken Chinese was necessary for the unity of the people; furthermore, Sun had 
compassion for the undereducated, who had difficulty learning the written Chinese language. Sun 
recognised that grammar served as a structured set of guidelines to overcome the hindrances faced 
by the undereducated in learning, saying, “Because of the lack of grammar, beginners cannot find 
an efficient way to proper writing. This is just like when there is no bridge leading to the other side 
of a river; you have to travel ten times or hundreds of times more distance as you detour in order 
to cross the river.”16  
Sun empathetically argued that the scholars must share their responsibility for those who 
really need the bridge (a metaphor for grammar) to logic through education, thereby showing his 
sympathy to the undereducated in society. He said, “Those scholars who already know how to 
write properly no longer need to learn grammar. This is just like a man who has already crossed 
the river; he does not need to find a bridge.”17 Hence Sun’s emphasis on education was aimed at 
including those who needed to navigate with the help of grammar in gaining logic. Sun was also 
convinced that the synchronised Chinese language was a prerequisite for solidarity among Chinese 
people, and moreover, for modern rationality. He said, “Thus if we have a set of established 
grammatical rules that help to regulate spoken language and that can be attained by all people in 
this country as common knowledge, then everybody can learn grammar through everyday 
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speech…In that case, the coherence between the spoken and the written language can be finally 
restored.”18 
By recognising that a translated word can have various meanings, Sun emphasised the 
differences in perspective within the expression such as with the word ‘logic’, which can be 
translated as either ‘deduction’ or ‘argumentation’. Through this ‘linguistic reflection’, Sun implies 
that an intersubjective understanding in language and communication is what is most needed when 
interpreting new concepts derived from foreign cultures. In particular, Sun’s concept of 
intersubjectivity came from his innovative extension of the boundaries of meaning.  Sun implied 
that mutual understanding comes from broadening the boundaries of meaning. He presented an 
opposite case of narrowing of meaning: “The definition of logic in these two translations (science 
of deduction and science of argument) gets narrower and narrower, then they cannot capture the 
true meaning of logic.”19  
As language is a reconciliatory media for communicative understanding, the synchronised 
Chinese language would mediate for the unity of the people. Sun’s emphasis on the importance of 
grammar and its connection to logic supports his argument that an intersubjective understanding 
of words can expand the boundaries of meaning. Consequently, Sun regarded logic as immanent 
in language: “What is the rationality of writing (文理)？ It is what Western scholars call logic. 
Here I translate logic as wenli (the reasoning in an article), not because it is the most accurate 
translation, but because when you apply logic to an article, you are dealing with its reasoning.”20 
Furthermore, Sun presented linguistic logic as an essential element in the nation’s modernisation 
by connecting it to scientific rationality. As he was aware of the limitations of translation, he 
avoided too narrow an interpretation, demonstrating Sun’s reconciliatory approach to an 
intersubjective understanding:  “Based on Yan Fu’s translation of the term “logic” as “the science 
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of deduction” or “the science of argumentation”, one sees only a part of the truth. Nominalism is 
one of the two currents in the medieval ages in Europe, the other is practical learning.”21  
For Habermas (1984, 2001), the very fact that we use language means that we are 
communicatively able to reach an understanding of one another, arguing that modern society is 
based on rationality rather than on tradition. Furthermore, Habermas (ibid.) believes that an 
adequate account of our ability to learn and use language would have to take the phenomenon of 
mutual understanding as its fundamental object of explanation, rather than the speaker’s 
understanding of a language. Thus, in addition to access to language, mutual understanding in 
communication is the key to rationality. Ultimately, Sun’s insistence on the importance of grammar 
and the synchronisation of written and spoken Chinese language points to the necessity of 
including the socially excluded classes of the illiterate and undereducated in order to create mutual 
understanding. Sun believed that the method to attain logic should be clearly communicated in 
such a way that everyone could comprehend it within a synchronised language. The underlying 
intention of Sun’s critique of Chinese pedagogy and the absence of grammar was also to encourage 
and enable Chinese people to understand and communicate logically. Thus, for Sun, language 
signified coexistence by including the other. Ultimately, Sun’s understanding of language and its 
inherent logic as an essential tool for China’s modernisation catalysed his emancipatory praxis to 









1.2 Print Media    
Sun’s earliest experience of the power of print media took place on October 11, 1896 when he was 
kidnapped and detained at the Chinese Legation in London. Sun was lured into the legation by a 
group of Chinese men and kidnapped to be shipped back to China to be tried and executed for 
treason. By the time Sun was released on October 23 with the help of Dr. Cantlie, his mentor at 
the medical school in Hong Kong, he personally witnessed the power of the press: it formed public 
opinion strong enough to pressure Sir Halliday Macartney, the main inventor of the plot and close 
collaborator with the Qing government, to release Sun.  
At the same time, Sun also noted the role of the press, which maintained its independence 
from the politico-economic interests of the Qing government and England. Later, Sun (1897:220) 
succinctly pointed out, “In England, public opinion expressed its sympathy with the revolution, 
but the government was opposed to it”, lamenting the absence of public opinion in China. His 
subsequent correspondence with newspaper companies demonstrated Sun’s acknowledgement of 
the importance of the media and its protection by the constitutional law. Sun’s own letter to the 
newspapers written on October 24, 1896, thanking the press for what they did, says, “I have also 
to thank the Press generally for their timely help and sympathy. … Knowing and feeling more 
keenly than ever what a constitutional government and an enlightened people mean, I am prompted 
still more actively to pursue the cause of advancement, education and civilisation in my own well-
beloved but oppressed country.” 22  
Sun continued to critically evaluate the absence of public opinion in China and the Qing 
government’s oppressive censorship, which, he believed, ultimately impeded the modernisation of 
China: “I regret very much to record the fact the whole youth of China suffers from this defect of 
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thought. Consequently, there is no public opinion leading civilization along the path of progress, 
but an exactly opposite phenomenon is to be observed. By such ways, we can scarcely find the 
true path for the political and economic regeneration of China.”23   In fact, the character compound 
used for public opinion (yulun) dates back to at least the third century and has been used throughout 
Chinese history to describe elite opinion within the bureaucracy. Judge (1996:68-70) points out 
that, in the early 1900s, the publicists advanced this old term with a new political meaning, 
redefined as the collective opinion (gonglun) of the common people (yiban renmin) about 
government and society. Meanwhile, yulun became a key component in the larger agenda of 
forcing a transition to a more open mode of politics. Public opinion was central to constitutional 
politics, and the role of public opinion was to ensure that the collective sense of right and wrong 
in society remained clear.  
Interestingly, Wong (1986a) problematized the politics of London concerning its 
relationship with British mass media by citing the fact that, even though Dr. Cantlie had urgently 
reported the incident of kidnap to The Times, it did not publish the story immediately, possibly due 
to a political conflict. On the other hand, The Globe, which was then a newer and less established 
newspaper, willingly and promptly featured the story the very day while the original article was 
still sitting at the desk of The Times. Sun clearly recalls picking up a copy of the Globe in his 
detention room at the Chinese Legation: “On October 22nd, Cole (the servant and who secretly 
informed Dr. Cantlie of Sun’s detention) directed my attention and I picked up a clipping from a 
newspaper, which proved to be The Globe. There I read the account of my detention, under the 
heading of ‘Startling story! Conspirator Kidnapped in London! Imprisonment at the Chinese 
Embassy!’ And then followed a long and detailed account of my position. At last the press had 
interfered, and I felt that I was really safe.”24  
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Sun’s comment shows his firm trust in the role of mass media and public opinion in a 
modern nation-state such as England. Even with regard to Sir Halliday Macartney, Counsellor of 
the Chinese Legation at that time and the man who plotted to send Sun back to China, Sun (ibid.:90) 
commented with his forgiveness, revealing his confidence in public opinion that equalled human 
conscience. He said, “It is not for me to discuss the behaviour of Sir Halliday Macartney; I leave 
that to public opinion and to his own conscience.  In his own mind, I have no doubt, he has reasons 
for his action; but they seem scarcely consistent with those of a sane man, let alone the importance 
of the position he occupies.”25 
During its revolutionary movements, the secret society’s involvements with the press also 
characterised Sun’s strategy to publicise political sentiments against the Qing government, which 
interdicted public gatherings or debates. The Tongmenghui, known as the Chinese Revolutionary 
Alliance or the Chinese United League, was a secret society and underground resistance 
movement founded by Sun Yat-sen, Song Jiaoren and other revolutionaries in Tokyo on August 20, 
1905. In light of what Sun had learned earlier about the power of print media in England, he started 
to publish a monthly journal titled Minpao (民报), which featured Sun’s writings and lectures in 
support of the Tongmenghui.  
In the first issue of the Minpao on November 26, 1905, Sun explained the purpose of 
establishing Minpao, saying, “Within any group, there are always a few who, possessing an 
enlightened outlook, spur on the rest, applying the most appropriate principles of government to 
our people, and then applying those principles that have advanced our people to the rest of the 
world. This is the heavenly duty of those who are prescient and the reason for our establishing 
Minpao.”26 Sun thus recognised early on the political role of the media in catalysing the solidarity 
of the people, yet, from a pedagogical and elite point of view.  
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Sun also commented on the power of print media and its influence on politics, publicly 
acknowledging the media’s contribution to the Chinese revolution. On his visit to Min-li Pao on 
April 16, 1912, Sun said, “That the revolution has finally succeeded today is due to the power of 
the press. The press enjoys this power because it is able to instil ideals in people’s minds.”27 The 
press not only represented the people’s opinions, but also served as a forum for mapping new 
modes of social interaction, new levels of social integration and new strategies of social 
mobilisation.28   Sun was aware of the role of print media in propagating his political ideas in order 
to mobilise citizens. He recalls in A History of the Chinese Revolution, published on January 29, 
1923, that “Thereafter, impelled by the same motives, party branches in various places began 
publishing magazines, daily newspapers, and books. In addition, pamphlets were secretly 
distributed in the interior to promote my ideas…Those pamphlets were eagerly copied and 
circulated in the schools, cities and marketplaces despite the interdictions of the Qing 
government.”29 As such, Sun’s utilisation of print media, though informal, had begun even before 
his kidnapping in London, dating to as early as his first attempted uprising in 1895. Sun only 
reconfirmed the power of the press on the occasion of his kidnapping.  
 
National Unity  
Schiffrin (1980) argues that the Boxer Rebellion brought forward the crucial erosion of Confucian 
values; and that China started to get access to Western values and political ideologies as political 
philosophy was debated between the revolutionaries and reformists through print media. The press 
challenged imperial authority and expressed popular opinions, encouraged debate over 
government policies and educated their compatriots about the urgent need to reform the structures 
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of dynastic power. Lenin also argued that newspapers were both substance and symbol of the 
revolutionary cause; the French Revolutionary journalist Jacques-Pierre Brissot claimed that 
without newspapers, the American Revolution would never have succeeded. Liang Qichao also 
declared in 1912 that the establishment of the Republic of China was the result of a revolution of 
ink, not a revolution of blood.30  
Moreover, Dikötter (2008:23–5), specifically suggests there is a correlation between the 
growth in print media and the 1911 revolution, noting that there were more than 100 newspapers 
in circulation by 1907, and that the reformist and revolutionary press thrived because there were 
ample opportunities for readers to have access to writers who urged revolution against the ruling 
Qing dynasty. Dikötter (ibid.) also stresses that the wide circulation of newspapers was made 
possible by modernisation in the postal service system as, by 1908, there were nearly 36 million 
items of newspapers and printed matter for delivery, suggesting a close relationship between 
efficient communication and the modernisation of transportation.  
An immediate corollary of the rapid expansion of print media, which overcame the 
geographical vastness of China through advances in transportation, was the building of political 
solidarity among geographically distant citizens. Sun also commented on how communication 
through print media could overcome geographical distance: “Our members, however, are scattered 
in many locations, some in remote border areas, and some in distant coastal regions. Mountains 
and rivers impede communications. These factors have made it impossible to achieve uniformity 
of opinion.”31 Sun also fully utilised the benefits of speed and coverage area of print media to form 
unity among the people.  
Strand (2011:52) also asserts that political activists in China were reasonably well informed 
about the role played by political parties in the West and Japan either from study abroad or exile 
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experiences, or from reading magazine and newspaper accounts of American and European party 
politics. For example, in newspaper articles during the outbreak of the revolution, Sun was referred 
to as ‘the leader of the revolution’ in captions beneath his photograph, and also as the ‘Great 
Revolutionist’ (Geming Dajia). The Shanghai Minpao praised Sun’s ‘moral purity’ and decades 
of devotion to the revolution, describing him as ‘the Chinese George Washington’.32  Sun himself 
highlighted how he leveraged the effect of the press politically in his writing, titled History of 
Chinese Revolution on January 29, 1923: “In 1895, I instigated an uprising in Canton; 
unfortunately, it failed. Several years later, I instructed Chen Shao-pai to found the Zhungguobao 
(China Daily) in Hong Kong for the purpose of publicizing the Revolution. After 1900, 
revolutionary propaganda spread like wildfire.”33   
As such, Sun’s employment of various forms of print media as communicational 
methodology had an effect not only on catalysing citizen solidarity, but also on the strength of his 
political image. Sun fully recognised the political benefits of the press as he constructed himself 
politically as a national hero and promoter of solidarity among citizens. On the other hand, the 
print media also created scepticism as the incident of his own detention in London involved two 
newspapers, and the underlying role of the press in releasing Sun may have formed both trust and 
distrust towards the media and its role in politics. This was because, even though information about 
Sun’s detention was first offered to The Times by Sun’s mentor Dr. Cantlie, the newspaper delayed 
the publication of the article, possibly due to the bureaucracy and conflict of government interests. 
On the other hand, The Globe, then relatively small and new, promptly reported the incident of his 
detention, influencing public opinion in support of Sun’s release. Therefore, even though print 
media generally is understood to have contributed to the rise of public opinion, discrepancies 
between reports also generated distrust of print media.  
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Nevertheless, rather than focusing on the negative aspects of the press, Sun strongly argued  
for the unique role of the media, namely the formation of public opinion as well as uniting various 
opinions of the people. Sun even reprimanded the press if it did not emphasise the latter function. 
Sun openly talked about polemics and anti-dynastic discourses through the press, and his intention 
seemed to produce public opinion that was uniformly united toward reconstructing a modern 
Chinese nation-state. However, Sun seemed frustrated as he could not directly control the press 
and the sentiment of readers. Sun argued that the media must erase scepticism by strengthening its 
function of forming unity in his speech delivered to the reporters of Canton Newspapers on April 
27, 1912: “The recent overthrow of the Manchus in China was achieved by the military, but popular 
support for it was the result of endorsements it received by the press. The reason why the 
newspapers were able to accomplish this was the press was united. Now, although we have a 
Republic, our situation is still not really stable.  In order to achieve genuine stability, there must 
be unification.”34  
McQuail (1992:263) suggests that media solidarity is formed in such a way that there is 
support from media for the aspirations and identities of sub-groups in society and the solidarity 
refers to all those aspects of mass media performance, which involve the symbolic extension of 
sympathy from a small base to a larger group. Sun also commented on the role of the press in 
relation to the formation of citizen solidarity, emphasising that the role of the press should include 
helping people understand that the reward of a republic takes time. Sun’s comments revealed his 
paternalistic point of view, literally and metaphorically: “Today’s newspapers must change their 
policy in order for there to be unanimity in public opinion. Today people often remark that a 
republic is worse than a dictatorship. They do not realize that it will take ten years for the benefits 
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of a republic to become apparent. Analogously, although it is gratifying to raise a son, it takes 20 
years before that nurture is rewarded.”35  
On the other hand, Sun also argued that the role of print media should comprise recording, 
informing and ultimately uniting the citizens. However, high illiteracy rates exacerbated by the 
delayed formation of a Chinese vernacular hindered Sun’s efforts to keep the citizens of the 
Chinese republic properly and promptly informed. Strand (2011:82) explains that during the May 
Fourth Movement, literacy rate estimates ranged around 45 percent for men and 10 percent for 
women, making it necessary to raise the literacy rate. Accordingly, spoken communications gained 
popularity as a result of the low literacy rate. Eight months after the May Fourth Movement of 
1919, Sun pointed out the importance of raising the literacy rate in China in his speech to the 
Beijing’s progressive and anti-imperialist university students.36  
In addition, the Qing government’s imposition of censorship impeded access to 
information, functioning as a direct barrier to the dissemination of information, the formation of 
public opinion and ultimately China’s modernisation by delaying the development of political 
awareness among the public. In history, various political leaders have utilised a similar tactic to 
control subjects. The Qing government had attempted to restrain the press by passing a series of 
edicts in 1898 and again in 1901, although these measures were largely ineffective.  
In July 1906, the Qing Special Law on Printing was announced, regulating printed matter 
including newspapers; it stipulated that works of journalism must first be inspected before they 
were printed. In 1908, another stricter Press Law was made dictating that newly founded 
newspapers were required to pay a deposit, and all copy had to be submitted for censorship by 
midnight before the publication date.37 Reed (2004:269) points to the fact that, in 1912, the post-
Qing and nominally republican government of Yuan Shikai (1859–1916) also issued a new press 
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regulation and revised stipulations for textbooks, which were reinforced, in one form or another, 
by subsequent national and warlord governments.  
Censorship of the media was antithetical to the formation of public opinion and, 
consequently, the modern nation-state. Censorship was, by nature, a form of coercive exclusion in 
communication that served as a backbone to maintain Qing sovereignty. Given that the illiteracy 
rate was already high in China, censorship further obstructed access to information and the 
formation of public opinion. Furthermore, the prohibition of public gatherings impeded social and 
political mobilisation. Countering the censorship imposed by the Qing dynasty, Sun sought 
alternative methods for disseminating information, such as printing and distributing at night. 
Furthermore, Sun’s inclusive communication and his creative use of print media helped to form 
public opinion. Sun believed the power of public opinion together with participatory citizenship 
would be the key to China’s modernisation.  
On the other hand, Sun also demonstrated his tendency to “consolidate” public opinion for 
national unity instead of allowing the autonomy of the press. In doing so, Sun’s paternalistic 
attitude toward the newspapers often suggested that the press should not attack the government: 
“In dictatorial times, the newspapers were accustomed to attacking the government, but this was 
because the government was not a government of the people. In republican times, however, 
newspapers should not attack it, because the government now belongs to the people. Its officials 
are public servants.”38 Furthermore, Sun emphasised the unifying role of print media and its 
contribution to the Chinese republic in a speech in Canton on April 26, 1912: “Eventually, all 
minds will come to embrace the accuracy of these tenets. Precisely because newspapers have this 
capacity to mould political opinion, they should do their utmost in the coming reconstruction to 
hold fast to a single truth. This is what I expect of the gentlemen of the press.”39 Thus Sun did not 
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believe that public opinion was to form autonomously based on free debates and arguments among 
the citizens; instead, he argued that the press had to cooperate with the government in uniting 
public opinion for the sake of national unity.   
It is interesting to note that Sun believed in a single truth in forming an opinion, which may 
reflect his dogmatic stance on the function of the press. Furthermore, Sun’s stance on print media 
was that it had to create a unified “public opinion” in cooperation with the government. Sun did 
not agree that print media would provide different views to the readers; furthermore, he regarded 
the divided public opinion as the result of ignorance. Arguing against divisive newspaper articles, 
Sun commented the function of newspaper should be solely on uniting the people: “Yet, timid 
elements in our party have begun to say, ‘once the revolutionary uprising begins, the revolutionary 
party can fade away’, and such remarks are being openly published in the newspapers. This is 
strange indeed. It is rooted both in ignorance of the nature of our interests and in a hazy grasp of 
our party’s principles. Are these words of scholars? They are so worthless as to be hardly worth a 
smile.”40 Sun’s understanding and utilisation of the print media initially symbolised the advent of 
the modern Chinese nation-state: the construction of the Chinese republic. But instead of allowing 
an independent and autonomous functioning of print media in forming public opinion, Sun 
understood that it was the press’s responsibility to unify public opinion in cooperation with the 
government. 
Gellner (1988) points to the key elements that helped the shift from traditional to modern 
societies: in addition to the development of formal systems of education as the core of the mode 
of persuasion, it was historical analysis, the growth of rationality and the scientific world view that 
made this transition possible. In the case of Sun, print media was also responsible for spreading 
his idea of inclusive education and teaching the scientific world view in an effort to politically 
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awaken citizens in the process of transforming China from a premodern dynasty to a modern 
nation-state. In this regard, school textbooks also served as effective print media. Culp (2007:59) 
explains that textbooks of the 1910s also sought to establish the deep historical roots of the Chinese 
people by recounting myths of the sage kings, the legendary heroes credited with founding Chinese 
culture. Additionally, Sun felt it was also necessary to awaken the people with political awareness 
through print media.  
Accordingly, Sun looked to print media for its function of influencing and persuading 
readers in the process of constructing a new Chinese identity. In his 1920 essay titled “First Steps 
of Local Self-Government” (Difang zizhi kaishi Shixingfa), Sun identified the primary tasks of 
local self-government as the practical work of census taking, assessing land value, repairing roads, 
reclaiming wasteland and establishing schools.41 For example, in contrast to Chinese history 
textbooks’ narrative of assimilation and inevitable national unity, Republican period Chinese 
geography textbooks raised serious doubts about ethno-cultural cohesion; and most geography 
textbooks of the Republican period included discussions of the Chinese national community’s 
effort to establish its intrinsic unity, albeit the basis for national cohesion varied widely among 
textbooks.42 Thus textbooks as a category of print media played an important role in informing, 
educating and consolidating citizens.    
 
An Imagined Community  
Goode (2005) argues that communications technologies such as printing allowed some element of 
connectivity between physically absent actors and citizens, producing social processes through 
which their experiences and action choices were structured. Sun also recognised the advantages of 
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print media, which helped include those who were residing in the places of geographical distance 
such as the overseas Chinese. Accordingly, with the help of print media, political awareness and 
participatory citizenship among the overseas Chinese were formed, and the imagined community 
of the new Chinese republic was shaped transnationally. Sun’s communicational praxis with print 
media was to leverage a wide circulation overseas, such as with Minpao and other political journals. 
Subsequently, communications technologies enhanced connectivity between the mainland Chinese 
and the overseas Chinese, effectively instituting inclusive communication between physically 
absent actors and citizens through which Sun’s arguments for the Chinese republic were actively 
disseminated and discussed.  
Sun offered a blueprint for the future republic, connecting the image of a free and equal 
society to the people, whose imagined society was created with the help of print media. Benedict 
Anderson (1998:4) explains nationalism or nationness, which describes cultural artefacts of a 
particular kind and why they command such profound emotional legitimacy. He aptly posits that, 
in essence, a nation is an imagined political community: that is, a nation is ‘imagined’, not 
‘imaginary’. For Sun, print media helped create the imagined community of the future Chinese 
republic, even for distant people, including the overseas Chinese, by linking them to the new 
Chinese republic. Goode (2005:93) further asserts that the dispersion of communications 
technologies also enhances the linkages between ‘lived experience and mediated experience’, 
creating new relations. 
On the other hand, Garnham (2000:26–9) stresses the influence of the media in relation to 
nation-state formation, insisting that public communication and the subsequent formation of public 
opinion catalysed the modern nation-state. In this regard, Sun’s emancipatory communication of 
employing print media for the overseas Chinese also helped them overcome exclusion by social 
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prejudice due to geographical distance, as eventually the overseas Chinese contributed to the 
formation of public opinion and the establishment of the first Chinese republic. Sun emphasised 
that print media was responsible for helping China constructing a new Chinese nation-state by 
breaking with its past, which was tainted by despotism and imperialism; he argued the press had 
to maintain a single truth. In a speech in Shanghai on April 16, 1912, Sun commented, “Although 
the real issues were obscured at first by confused opinions, journalists persisted, holding fast to 
basic principles, regardless of the spiritual, professional, material, and personal sacrifices entailed, 
so that the truths I cherish remained unshaken, like a great boulder in the rapids.”43  
When Sun sought to break with China’s past, he did not simply deny its past, but rationally 
analysed the underlying causes, persuading citizens to participate autonomously in the process. 
Sun argued that in order to reconstruct China, a clear understanding of China’s own history was 
necessary, along with a new Chinese identity. Calhoun (1995: xxii) also recommends a similar 
methodology to Sun’s, saying that “breaking with the immediate givenness and immediate facticity 
of the social world calls not only for historical knowledge as a precondition of theory but for a 
continual engagement with history and rethinking of historical assumptions.” Thus the concept of 
modernity grew out of the awareness of historical development, and print media played a crucial 
role in the process.  Habermas (1989) also insists that modernity was born out of the acute sense 
of a historical break and a new and heightened sense both of history as tradition from which it was 
necessary to break free, and of history as a break with the past, the understanding of which might 
orient action towards the future. Hence modernity became possible only through a ‘break with the 
past’ as it emancipated itself from the fetters of tradition, since a part of human autonomy was seen 





The journalists equated the politics of public opinion with constitutional politics, and considered 
the free expression of the vox populi to be the key to the strength and power of the “advanced” 
Western nations.44 In the late Qing period, progressive publicists and constitutional reformists such 
as Liang Qichao envisioned public opinion as an ideal of reason and progress that could serve as 
a means to force the Qing dynastic government toward more open politics.45 Strand (2011:182) 
also asserts that the new capacity of public opinion to evaluate, celebrate and denounce what was 
visible in person or in print was palpable in the early 20th century, especially to foreigners who had 
previously viewed China through their own lens as a polity without a public.  
Sun expected the press to have a united role in forming solidarity among citizens by 
producing a single public opinion in cooperation with the government. Sun showed his 
dissatisfaction with a different level of cooperation from the press because he understood that the 
role of the press was to unite public opinion. In his speech given to reporters of Canton Newspapers 
on April 27, 1912, Sun objected to the press’s tendency of not fully supporting the government, 
arguing it was even irrational. Here Sun demonstrated his understanding of modern rationality, 
which was supporting the government with a single truth for the sake of solidarity rather than a 
rationality based on the coexistence of various facts and opinions. He argued that public opinion 
was required for national unity, and it was also the responsibility of the press: “A recent reading 
of various newspapers in Shanghai reveals that the opinions they express lack of unity. On my 
return here to Guangdong, I have seen that the opinions expressed in various newspapers are even 




Fitzgerald (1996:206-15) refers to the political influence on public opinion as the 
‘downgrading’ of political discourses of the 1920s, suggesting that this development occurred after 
Sun decided to reorient Nationalist Party policy away from liberal constitutional politics, and 
designated the latter as unruly in the first quarter of the 20th century, to the politics of a disciplined 
mass party. Previously, newspapers had been agents and beneficiaries of the greater prominence 
of public opinion in the late Qing and early Republic, when national and provincial governments 
conceded a legitimate role for the press, chambers of commerce and philanthropic associations in 
public life. Journalists themselves believed the press to be a central institution in the functioning 
of a democratic polity, and their newspapers reflected the variety of public opinion they professed 
to represent.47  
However, Fitzgerald (ibid:208) emphasises that eventually newspapers and magazines 
became a virtual propaganda machine as the Nationalist Party subsidised major newspapers in 
Shanghai and Guangzhou, as well as dozens of smaller magazines throughout the country. For 
example, from its foundation in 1915, The Shanghai Republican Daily served as a mouthpiece for 
the parliamentary factions associated with the Nationalist movement. Lean (2007:216) also 
explicates that, while the phrase ‘public opinion’ continued to be used in the 1920s and 1930s, it 
lacked the political potential and significance that it had in the late Qing period discussions. Xu 
(2000:16) adds that the mutual need between the journalists and the state shaped the political 
culture of the time and fostered a negotiated mutual tolerance and cooperation between the 
Republican state and professions, from which both sides benefited to some degree. As such, the 
gap between the autonomy of the press and Sun’s plea for cooperative responsibility to the press 
in producing a united public opinion represented the conflict between Sun and the press in shaping 
the modern Chinese nation-state. 
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1.3 Public Speech and Public Sympathy  
Strand (2011:63-4) explains that the phrase ‘public speech’ was originally commonly used for 
oratory (yanshuo in Chinese), including the act of explaining something orally or in writing and, 
alternatively, the practice of storytelling. Even reformers in China suggested that oratory be taught 
as a school subject as a means of quickening the pace of change as it was one of the most visible 
and widespread elements in a leader’s and a citizen’s repertoire. Some scholars have also argued 
that the interdependent relationship among print media, mass culture and public gathering places 
brought forward the ideal of public speech and debate. Sun’s public speech catalysed a different 
effect from that of print media as it was instantaneous, emotionally charged and even responded 
spontaneously to the audience. In fact, on many occasions during popular movements of the 1910s, 
1920s and 1930s, radical young people and others wept and acted out their feelings with highly 
expressive emotionalism when moved by Sun’s speeches (ibid: 63–77). Their reactions were the 
manifestation of emotional compassion to Sun’s speech, similar to Lean’s (1997) description of 
public sympathy.   
While public opinion (yulun) evolved from the exclusionary elite opinion with the help of 
print media in the course of China’s modernisation, Lean (2007) argues that although the advent 
of public sentiment of sympathy (tongqing) indicated the modernising process of China, its more 
prominent aspect bringing women’s presence from the private space of home into the public sphere. 
In reference to the case of Shi Jianqiao’s murder of an enemy, Lean (ibid.) argues that the collective 
public sentiments constituted a powerful, new, and communal form of ethical emotional 
authenticity; it also served as an antidote to an era of inauthenticity generated by slick mass media, 
corrupt factionalism and a lack of justice in the courts. The rawness of tongqing sentiments was 
thus somewhat like what a spectacle would inspire in the audience, signifying a transformation 
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from a communal sentiment of renqing (sympathy between family members) to the relations of 
the larger political order (ibid.:5), thus indicating China’s political modernisation. She further 
asserts that, in the early Republican period, public sympathy was like the public spectacle of 
Shanghai opera, which draws from real life events in contrast to the Beijing opera, which was 
highly stylised.       
While print media reached geographically distant places both in China and overseas, 
helping to transform the premodern nation to a modern nation-state through engendering public 
opinion and political awareness among its citizens, Sun’s public speech appealed to and relied 
upon a live audience for its immediate effect. In fact, speechmaking became a principal campaign 
tactic during the national elections of 1912–13, and Sun’s speech at a welcome reception in Canton 
on April 26, 1912 demonstrates how his selection of words invoked patriotism and personal 
sacrifice for the unity of the nation and the people: “As military men, you must sacrifice your own 
freedom and equality in the pursuit of freedom and equality for our 400 million compatriots. It is 
the divine mission of our military men to enable our 400 million compatriots to enjoy the benefits 
of freedom and equality.”48  
Apart from the instantaneous and interactive nature of public speech and debate, Sun’s 
speech also had what print media lacked – the inclusive membership of the illiterate and 
undereducated. While print media provided literate Chinese with access to participate in a common 
political cause, Sun realised that a great part of the Chinese masses who were illiterate and largely 
excluded from the written communications of print media. Hence, Sun employed public speech in 
order to include and transform the illiterate and undereducated audiences into actively participating 
citizens. Furthermore, to achieve national unity, Sun’s speech often included the topic of universal 
education, particularly for children and women. Sun’s public speech also signified a 
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synchronisation of written and spoken forms of communication, which rationally persuaded both 
literate and illiterate Chinese citizens with great efficacy. This was, in fact, a realisation of his early 
argument that unity in both spoken and written Chinese was essential for the unity of the people: 
he synchronised his written and spoken communication through the combination of print media 
and public speech. 
Sun was a pioneer in public speech for his time as he incorporated print media into an 
integrated form of communication. The combined power of the persuasive rationality of written 
communication and affective appeal of his public speech provided Sun with the crucial tools to 
present a blueprint for China’s future. Sun’s speechmaking was more than just talk in the sense 
that “his purpose was to move the nation forward by seizing the imagination of his fellow citizens 
– creating an imagined society with the help of the media in spoken language.”49 Sun’s particular 
methodology was to portray the future Chinese republic while inviting political participation of 
citizens in debates and argumentations, which were also closely related to the methodology of 
forming modern rationality.   
It is also relevant to observe how Sun’s style and content in his public speeches changed 
before and after the 1911 Revolution. Sun was both authoritative and inspirational in arguing for 
national unity and patriotism, and one can first see Sun’s early pursuit of racially defined 
nationalism in a speech given in Tokyo to celebrate the first anniversary of the Minpao on 
December 2, 1906. Sun advocated nationalism by emphasising the natural construct of the 
consanguine Han race: “A person always recognizes his parents and never confuses them with 
strangers. Nationalism is analogous to this. It has to do with human nature and applies to 
everyone…. Han vs. Manchus…..Even as children we Han would certainly not mistake the 
Manchu for fellow Han. This is the root for nationalism.”50 
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After the successful revolution of 1911, however, Sun’s speech reflected his altered stance 
on nationalism through the ideology of datong, emphasising law and social order along with the 
equality of every citizen. In the speech at the reception by the Rotary Club of Guangdong on May 
6, 1912, Sun argued: “Now that we have entered the era of Grand Unity (datong) and the nation 
has become a republic, of course, there is no longer any need for such secrecy. Self-esteem is a 
valuable thing. It must be recognized that a nation cannot survive without law and that the 
government must use the law to punish all violations of the law… Everyone should know how to 
choose. Everyone should strive to be a patriotic citizen.”51  Five years after the revolution, his 
speech to Xiaoshing Business Association on Aug 23, 1916 was inspirational with his appeal to 
balance citizen rights and duties, which later became a tenet of his minquan principle (democracy): 
“I am a citizen of this republic, and once my goal is fixed, ‘mountains can shift, but my will can 
never change’; now that our nation has become a democratic country, I will fulfil my obligations 
as one of its citizens.”52     
 
Understanding the Agreement  
The topics of Sun’s public speech varied, ranging from Chinese collective identity to the 
industrialisation of China as he presented an outline of how to construct the Chinese republic. 
However, the most pressing task for him was to break with the negative and humiliating past, 
which was most relevant for reconstructing a positive self-image of the Chinese. The 
performativity of Sun’s speech was particularly significant in that it was his act of deconstructing 
China’s past tainted by national division. This was clearly articulated in his speech of January 1923, 
recalling the campaign of 1911: “The results of this campaign have been first, the eradication of 
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more than 260 years of shame and humiliation, according complete equality to all of the nation’s 
ethnic groups, so that no longer will one group lord it over the others, and the second, wiping out 
every trace of a monarchical dictatorship that had lasted for more than four thousand years, so that 
democratic government would hence be introduced.” 53  
His speech worked as collective reasoning for the public, creating a space of 
communicative understanding. Habermas (1984) emphasises that the term “understanding” means, 
at the minimum, that at least two speaking and acting subjects understand a linguistic expression 
in the same way. In the case of Sun’s speech, when the hearer understood and even agreed with 
Sun’s argument, the actual act of breaking with the negative and humiliating past of China was 
successfully achieved. Hewlett (2007:98) aptly introduces the usage of Roman language system 
between patricians and plebeians in terms of understanding each other: the patricians regarded 
utterances made by plebeians as meaningless, and therefore the plebeians were obliged not only to 
argue their case, but also to frame what they were saying in such a way that patricians would 
recognise their words as endowed with meaning in the first place.  
Sun’s speech often reflected the plebeian approach, albeit his pedagogical and elite 
mannerism, in an effort to include and recognise the socially excluded classes of the people such 
as tenant farmers, the overseas Chinese and coolie labourers. In his speech to the Institute for the 
Study of Farmers’ Movement in Canton on August 21, 1924, Sun’s plebeian inclusiveness is 
clearly manifested: “Farmers form the largest majority of the Chinese population. Without their 
participation, our revolution would have no foundation. Farmers are the foundation of the 
revolutionary movement. Since farmers make up the majority of China’s population, they 
constitute the largest class in China.”54      
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Sun’s favourite topic also included universal education, as he felt all Chinese citizens could 
gain political awareness from it. He often shared his own experience of education in Hawaii, 
remembering that Western language and pedagogy inspired him to join the emancipatory cause. In 
a speech made at Ling Nan School on May 7, 1912, Sun recalls, “As a child, I attended a village 
school, where I learned very little. Later, I was able to go to Hawaii, where I attended a Western 
school. Perceiving that the teaching there was far superior to that in our country, I often met in 
spare moments after classes with schoolmates from my own country and we discussed our 
innermost thoughts. Out of this, arose a desire to reform our motherland and rescue our 
compatriots.”55    
Sun’s speech also emphasised the necessity of transnational trade and cultural exchange, 
urging China to open to new opportunities and interact with foreign nations. While not oblivious 
to the negative impact of imperialism in the past, he focused on the pragmatic and rational side of 
China’s national interests and self-reliance, revealing Sun’s cosmopolitan influence toward 
transnational trade and cooperation. Sun (1994:101), in his speech at a meeting of the Chinese 
World Student Association in Shanghai on 10 October 1912, argued, “Traditionally, our country 
has closed its doors and refused to communicate with foreigners. Later, after China began trading 
with foreign countries, people were often misled into continuing to exclude foreigners. Both 
excluding and fearing foreigners are wrong. We ought to know that, whatever may happen, we 
must adhere to the right way (kung li). If we are bold and self-reliant in the observance of this 
principle, we will not have the slightest reason to be afraid.”  
Furthermore, Sun argued for the importance of communication and its infrastructure in a 
speech given on Oct 12, 1912 at the Shanghai Newspaper Guild. He stressed that national 
infrastructure and mobility were an important element in China’s modernisation, emphasising 
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communicational connectivity to overcome geographical barriers: “Without communications, the 
nation will lack the apparatus for dynamism, which will delay every one of the numerous aspects 
of reconstruction. Thus communications are to a nation what hands, feet, and limbs are to a man, 
for a man must have these before he can move or perform tasks.” 56   
The combination of both demonstrative and rational elements in Sun’s speech played an 
important role in emancipating the emotionally distant Chinese subjects; in fact, both elements 
became complementary to each other rather than conflicting. Sun’s rational persuasion was 
enhanced by his affective speech, which evoked and transformed the emotional passion of the 
audience into patriotism. Sun’s persuasive speech also helped reduce psychological distance, 
particularly that of the socially underprivileged. The style of Sun’s speech was raw and 
spontaneous, evoking the dormant patriotism of the audiences, and he was often described as ‘Sun 
the Cannon’57 as his improvised speeches and informal conversations represented performative 
emancipatory communications rather than carefully structured theatrical repetitions. In Strand’s 
(ibid.) expression, Sun “authored his own story, stitching together the episodes of his life by deftly 
turning his many defeated attempts to incite rebellion into a grand revolutionary narrative”.  
Consequently, Sun relied not only upon rational persuasion, but also upon affective 
evocation. Sun believed public debates to help form public opinion, supporting the transparency 
of public communication. Sun often debated with and refuted, for example, the case against the 
Baohuangtang (Protect the Emperor Party) when Liang Qichao took Sun’s loyal followers away 
and influenced them with the idea of constitutional monarchy. Once Sun commented, “Since his 
[Liang’s] knowledge is groundless, I fear that if error is allowed to pass unchallenged, it will 
confuse people and do serious harm…Today I deliberately expose all this so as to submit it to the 
opinion of the nation.”58 Sun was concerned about the disunity of the nation as he demonstrated 
119 
 
his pedagogical paternalism to shield the people from the “variety of wrong information”.  
 
Persuasion 
Rancière (2009:4) suggests that there are two strategies for emancipating passive spectators: first, 
they must be roused from the stupefaction of spectators enthralled by appearances in favour of the 
empathy that makes them identify with the characters on the stage; second, the spectator’s rational 
distance must be abolished. Sun’s approach to the emancipating aspects of public speech combined 
both of these: it was affective, and at the same time, it used rational persuasion, reaching an optimal 
level of cognitive negotiation to ultimately transform the Chinese audience into a participatory 
actor. Sun reconciled the elements for effective praxis of communication: rationality and affect.  
Sun in fact employed three strategies in his communication: rational persuasion through 
print media, patriotic affects through his public speech and the combination of both rational 
persuasion and emotion by utilising both print media and speech. This effectively produced what 
Rancière (2009:5) would call ‘the logic of the pedagogical relationship’ between Sun and the 
Chinese audience, helping to replace the latter’s emotional distance and fear with the former’s 
persuasive guidance and emotional appeal to their political participation for national unity. Sun’s 
approach to public speech signified China’s shift to a more inclusive and open space of 
intersubjective communication by persuasion.  
Sun’s communicational praxis also contained three fundamental elements that catalysed 
communicative rationality: First, it encompassed communicative reconciliation; for instance, Sun 
supported and maintained a reconciliatory approach emphasising cooperation. Second, it included 
communicative performativity; Sun emphasised the importance of argumentation and debate in 
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the inclusive space of communication. Third, the combination of print media and public speech 
were an effective mode of synchronised communication. Habermas (1984) argues that the 
performative attitude that participants in communicative action must adopt regulates the transition 
between different political phases while retaining a consistency of meaning. Strand (2011) also 
claims that social actions, such as producing and performing in the public space, are effectively 
present in different geographical locations and classes in the form of mass media and public speech. 
Rancière (2009:13) claims that emancipation begins when we challenge the opposition 
between viewing and acting; that is, when we understand that the self-evident facts that structure 
the relations between saying, seeing and doing themselves belong to the structure of domination 
and subjection. What matters the most in an emancipatory communication is therefore encouraging 
the formation of autonomy among the participants, who would eventually develop a critical mind 
to analyse and bring up different opinions concerning what they see and experience. Through this 
process, the exchange of positionality between the performer and the viewer would result in an 
intersubjective identification.  
Although Sun’s speech transformed the silent and distant viewers into participating 
political actors by ‘abolishing exteriority’, which represented a shift from purely insisting on 
subjectivity to accepting intersubjective understanding, the pedagogical relationship based on the 
hierarchy of, for example, teacher and students, father and son or governor and the masses 
continued. However, intersubjectivity refers to a commonly understood point of view between 
equal communicators with a common aim of, for instance, constructing the Chinese republic. The 
purpose of an emancipatory communication must lie in the transformation of the Chinese people 




1.4 Public Pledging 
Another type of communicational public performance that demonstrated mutual understanding and 
agreement between the communicators was that of taking an oath, which also represented an act 
of allegiance. Tsao (1947:71-2) asserts one of the most important duties of the citizen is allegiance 
to the state and it implies that every citizen of the republic has a positive duty to defend the country 
against foreign invasion. In Sun’s Outline of the Fundamentals of National Reconstruction, Article 
8 stipulates that, during the transitional period of political tutelage, the average citizen must pledge 
himself to carry out the revolutionary principles; only then is he or she entitled to exercise political 
rights.59 Sun argued that taking an oath stressed the allegiance to the state and adherence to his 
three principles; those who joined the army were required to take an oath that pledged allegiance 
to the four goals of driving out the Manchus, restoring Chinese society, establishing a republic and 
equalising land ownership. For example, the secret society members put their left hands on a 
Christian bible and raised their right hands to say “earnestly ask God to be my witness” before 
taking the oath.60  
To swear an oath in public was to perform patriotism by synchronising written and spoken 
communication; at the same time, it was an utterance of allegiance and commitment to the core 
element of both the rights and duties of a citizen. Sun (1927:140) emphasised the effect of uniting 
the people by swearing an oath: “If we desire to collect these 400 millions of scattered individual 
grains, and create out of them a united State, strong in its unity, we cannot reject the idea of an 
oath… the answer depends entirely on whether our fellow-countrymen willingly or unwillingly 
perform the ceremony of an oath of allegiance to the Chinese Republic. Chinese patriots, follow 
my example!” Sun regarded swearing an oath as a patriotic commitment to the establishment of 
the new republic. He argued that every official and new citizen must take an oath, thereby declaring 
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their resolve to defend the rights of the people and to advance the people’s livelihood. He 
emphasised that all those who took this ceremonial oath would be able to enjoy all the rights due 
to a citizen of the republic, otherwise, they would be regarded as still servants and subjects of the 
Qing dynasty.61    
For Sun, taking an oath to the new republic implied defying the absolute power of 
monarchical hierarchy; as such, Sun (1994:213) stressed that taking an oath was to realise the 
modern Chinese nation-state: ‘Thus, servants and subjects of the Qing dynasty who transfer their 
loyalty to the Republic should first demonstrate their “straight heart” (zhongxin) and “sincere mind” 
(zhongyi) by taking an oath”. For Sun, swearing an oath was both a demonstration of sincerity and 
a performance of patriotism, and he argued that the absence of an oath would be directly related to 
the failure of a new republic: “Now, when our party was created, we solemnly practiced the ritual 
of swearing an oath. This ceremony, which is at the root of the rule of law, was abolished with the 
founding of the Republic. This is the major reason for the failure of our revolutionary 
construction.”62 The success of speech is judged upon whether the intended act is successfully 
achieved, and Sun’s argument for taking an oath in order to deliver a truthful utterance contributed 
to the solidarity of the people. And, an oath had to come from the own volition of the articulator.  
Sun recognised that patriotism must be performed first by articulation, arguing that words 
and acts must be in agreement in fulfilling both the rights and duties of a citizen. Sun’s (1927:140) 
articulation of these thoughts also demonstrates his idea of performative citizenship: “It is 
necessary to express by means of an oath, one’s loyalty to and respect for the State into which one 
is entering, and to express recognition of its constitution and readiness to bear all the obligations 
arising there from.” Sun’s concept of participatory citizenship also required taking an oath and 
pledging allegiance publicly to demonstrate one’s commitment to patriotism. Accordingly, by 
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taking an oath during his presidential inauguration, Sun performed his own citizenship. Sun 
reiterated his declaration as an act of patriotism: “I, Sun Yat-sen, truthfully and sincerely take this 
public oath that from this moment, I will destroy the old and build the new, and fight for the self-
determination of the people, and will apply all my strength to the support of the Chinese Republic, 
the realisation of democracy through ‘the three principles’, and to carry into effect ‘the Fivefold 
Constitution’ for the progress of good government, the happiness and perpetual peace of the people, 
and for the strengthening of the foundations of the State, in the name of peace throughout the 
world.”63   
Patriotism is thus performed through the articulation of allegiance. Sun’s concept of 
participatory citizenship required an inclusive and intersubjective communication, and to perform 
autonomous citizenship, it was necessary to reject the passive identity of the oppressed self as the 
two – autonomous citizenship in the modern nation-state and subjugated identity under the 
monarchy – were antithetical. Participatory citizenship was achieved by the act of articulating 
one’s allegiance in a political community where mutual understanding between communicators 
was its fundamental objective and interest. Unity in the written communication of pledged 
patriotism and the articulation of one’s allegiance represented Sun’s intention to synchronise 
words and deeds for an intersubjective understanding among the citizens of a new Chinese republic. 
However, the act of articulating one’s allegiance had to be on a voluntary basis, not by coercion. 
Sun’s concept of participatory citizenship required an inclusive and intersubjective 
communication. However, performing citizenship has to be a voluntary act of an autonomous 
social actor, and just as it was necessary to reject the passive identity of the oppressed self under 
the monarchy, it was necessary to perform an autonomous citizenship of the modern nation-state 
because volition and coercion in terms of announcing ones’ allegiance were intrinsically 
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antithetical. Voluntary participatory citizenship was to be achieved by the act of articulating one’s 
allegiance in a political community where mutual understanding between communicators was its 
fundamental objective and interest. After all, unity in the communication of pledged patriotism 
and the articulation of one’s allegiance represented Sun’s intention to synchronise words and deeds 
for an intersubjective understanding among the citizens of a new Chinese republic. And, the act of 
























CHAPTER II  
The minzu principle (Nationalism)  
 INTRODUCTION  
Sun argued that common blood, language, custom, religion, and livelihood were the five essential 
elements that constituted a nation, insisting that the greatest among all was common blood because 
it was formed by natural forces. Under the influence of social Darwinism, Sun reckoned the social 
and cultural forces could possibly override the innate characteristics of race and he was concerned 
about the possible extinguishment of the Chinese race and the partition of its territory by foreign 
encroachment. Accordingly, Sun emphasised the importance of growth in population, believing 
that the strength of consanguine Han race produced by natural forces would counter the coercive 
forces of foreign imperialism. Sun employed racially defined nationalism by invoking anti-
monarchism and anti-Manchuism in support of political efficacy and efficiency in overthrowing 
the Qing dynasty.  
In this chapter, I argue that Sun’s insistence on the consanguine Han race produced a 
dilemma in his own emancipatory communication as Sun’s racially defined nationalism and the 
principle of republicanism were mutually exclusive since the latter was based on the equal political 
rights of all citizens regardless of their ethnic background. This is significant because a modern 
nation-state is constituted by both naturally inherited and culturally acquired qualities of the people 
rather than consanguinity in race alone, and by the coexistence of ethnic minorities and majorities, 
not by the assimilation or exclusion of the other. In fact, even after the 1911 Revolution and the 
establishment of the first Chinese Republic, Chinese people were still divided as Sun’s racially 
defined nationalism in support of the ethnic majority Han caused racial conflict with ethnic 
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minorities. Consequently, Sun had to resort to the argument that the absence of national unity was 
due to the culturally rooted Chinese loyalty to family and clan in an effort to transfer the people’s 























2.1 Race and Nation  
In his minzu principle, Sun explained the origin of the word minzu: “The English word for minzu 
is "nation"; the word "nation" has two meanings, race and state. Although this word has two 
meanings, they are very distinct and must not be confused. Many Chinese words have double 
meanings.”1 Accordingly, Sun’s concept of minzu carried etymologically binary meanings of race 
and state. Price (in Sun 1930), who first translated Sun’s work, explains that the word minzu had 
multiple meanings in that Sun used the word minzu in the sense of nation, nationality or race, 
depending upon context. Elaborating upon the principle of nationalism, Sun acknowledged that 
the concept of nationalism was particular to China, since it concerned both the nation and the state: 
“What is the Principle of Nationalism? Looking back over the history of China's social life and 
customs, I would say briefly that the Principle of Nationalism is equivalent to the doctrine of the 
state. My statement that the principle of nationalism is equivalent to the doctrine of the state, is 
applicable in China but not in the West. Foreigners make a distinction between the nation and the 
state.”2 Therefore, Sun clarified that the word minzu was etymologically derived from a foreign 
language, but its meaning was particular to China. 
The word minzu is etymologically derived from the Japanese word minzoku, which was 
originally translated from the German term Volk in the late 19th century.3 The German term Volk 
connoted a premodern form of society composed of mainly consanguine people; later, the word 
Bürger, a contemporary equivalent of citizenry, appeared along with the advent of modern nation-
state. According to Habermas (1996a, 1996b, 1997), the Bürgernation (nation of citizenry), was 
formed mainly by the voluntary participation of citizens who strove for the common political cause 
of establishing a modern nation-state. Dikötter (1992:108-10) highlights that, when the word minzu 
first entered the Chinese lexicon in the late 1890s, it initially referred to the people of foreign 
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countries, and only after the first decade of the 1900s did the idiom become commonplace within 
Chinese writings to refer to the people of China. This also indicates that the concept of race was 
not frequently discussed among Chinese people until the political and economic opening of China, 
which increased their exposure to foreigners. The word also delineated the political structure and 
territory of a nation.  
In its composition, the word minzu was a combination of min (people or nation) and zu 
(race), signifying national race and comparable to other words such as guojia (state) or guozu 
(racial nation).4   Sun (1930:5) clarified the difference between nation and the state, saying, “How 
shall we distinguish clearly between the two? The most suitable method is by a study of the forces 
which moulded each. In simple terms, the race or nationality has developed through natural forces, 
while the state has developed through force of arms.” Hence, according to Sun, the distinctive 
difference between minzu (nation) and guojia (state) lies in that the former was produced by natural 
forces while the latter by force of arms. 
For Sun, people and territory were the two main constituents of a modern nation-state, and 
his choice of the word minzu highlighted the importance of the people. Fitzgerald (in Unger 
1996:66) explains that terms such as ‘Han race’ (Hanzu) and ‘Chinese race’ (Zhonghua minzu) 
connoted that the nation was neither more nor less than those people who would be represented 
when the state was established. Therefore, minzu mainly signified the people of a nation-state. 
Rowe (2009:253) also emphasises that the state in the early 20th century referred not to a place, 
but to a deliberately created organisation that claimed ultimate control over a particular territory, 
while “nation” denoted a group of people, defined variously depending on circumstances. Thus 
members of a nation may be identified as persons sharing a common “race” or gene pool, a 
common language, a common delimited territory or a common history, and he emphasised  both 
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naturally inherited and culturally acquired qualities in the people of a nation. In comparison, the 
state referred to political structure and territory.  
 
 
Natural Race  
In terms of what constitutes the race, Sun argued that bloodline was the most important element, 
followed by the cultural elements of livelihood, language, religion and customs: “The forces which 
developed these races were, in general, natural forces, but when we try to analyse them, we find 
they are very complex. The greatest force is common blood. Chinese belong to the yellow race 
because they come from the blood stock of the yellow race. The blood of ancestors is transmitted 
by heredity down through the race, making blood kinship a powerful force.”5 Sun’s concept of 
minzu thus corresponded to the nation based on consanguine race, which was created by natural 
forces, in opposition to the state produced by coercive forces, such as the Manchus and Western 
imperial powers.  
Coercive powers represented political power and armed forces, which were diametrically 
opposed to what Sun believed to be the natural forces that created race: “The development of a 
race or nationality is quite different: it grows entirely by nature, in no way subject to force…  
Therefore, we say that a group united and developed in the royal way, by forces of nature, is a race; 
a group united and developed by the way of might, by human forces, is a state. This, then, is the 
difference between a race or nationality and a state.”6 In Sun’s understanding, race was naturally 
produced and a state was politically created by coercive forces, which revealed his belief in the 
juxtaposition of natural and armed forces. Sun also assigned a political value to both, conceiving 
of the supreme eminence of natural forces in comparison with the condemnable armed forces.   
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With regard to race and its natural qualities, Sun often discussed the human body in relation 
to a nation-state. For Sun, who was a physician, the function and structure of the human body 
corresponded to those of a nation-state: “The ancient sages used to say that man is ‘the universe in 
miniature’ but we should rather say that one is a ‘little State’, since the stomach and intestines with 
their appropriate functions, really resemble State institutions transacting the affairs of their 
country…As for the various parts of the body, the perfection of their organism and the rapidity of 
their action are quite unattainable by State institutions.”7 Sun’s admiration of the human body was, 
in fact, his admiration of natural forces, which, he believed, created consanguine race. 
Furthermore, regarding the means of curing China’s ailments, Sun insisted that the 
treatment should be based on China’s particularities, since the treatment had to differ with each 
patient’s particular symptom: “Different people have different natures, and this, of course, must 
be taken into consideration before prescribing for anyone a specific diet. A thing which is suitable 
for one man may not suit another. In the same way, the method of curing various illness cannot be 
uniform or generalised.”8 In Sun’s view, the human body and the nation corresponded to each 
other. Accordingly, he insisted that in the case of China, the particular prescription was to 
overthrow the Qing dynasty by revolution, and any other remedy would not be effective: “It is like 
applying electrotherapy to a paralyzed patient and making his hands and feet jump up and down a 
bit. By no means is the patient thereby restored to health…. Do not let what the Manchus are doing 
misguide your judgment of world affairs or delude you into thinking there is still hope of rescuing 
the Qing dynasty.” 9  
Sun argued that the Chinese nation, which was produced by natural forces, was 
unfortunately conquered by coercive forces; and he emphasised the importance of regaining 
China’s sovereign autonomy from monarchical despotism and foreign imperialism. Sun also 
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implied that ailing Chinese race was caused by the coercive force of arms: “To study the cause is 
like diagnosing a sick man. Whatever disease a man contracts can be traced back either to a poor 
constitution or to some weakness before he was taken sick. Before China lost her sovereignty, 
these were already roots of disease in her system which, as soon as she suffered conquest, caused 
her national mind to decay.”10 In Sun’s conception, the formation and preservation of the nation 
were inextricably connected to the innate (xiantian) qualities of race, such as consanguinity. 
Meanwhile, cultural constituents such as language, religion and social customs were acquired 
(houtian) in a common social environment and complemented the innate qualities of race. Sun 
highlighted the effects of the innate qualities of race by negating the coercive forces of despotism 
and imperialism in order to regain China’s autonomy. 
 
 
Cultural Race  
Culture was one of the most essential elements that produced racial identity in Chinese tradition, 
and the Chinese often considered that it was the absence or lack of culture that made the barbarian 
race. This was in contrast to Sun’s argument that innate qualities, such as consanguinity, were the 
most important elements in race because they were produced only by natural forces. Furthermore, 
culture was what enabled the Chinese to imagine the physical body of other races, and the Chinese 
perspective of race was established on the basis of a cultural pecking order: those who had the 
most civilisation at the top, and those who were considered to have none – ‘primitives’ – at the 
bottom. Cultural qualities were thus closely related to the formation of the Chinese concept of the 
bodies of other races rather than naturally inherited qualities.11 The innately received physical 
differences of racial body were thus also defined by culture in the Chinese tradition.  
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Dikötter (1992:5–6) stresses that cultural intolerance of outsiders was associated with a 
feeling of physical discontinuity, as with the colour and shape of the body. Even geographical 
territory was defined by culture, with China representing the geographical centre, and the 
barbarians living beyond the realm of Chinese civilisation; they were even portrayed as 
dehumanised. Therefore, in contrast to Sun’s argument of natural forces as the primary producer 
of race, Chinese tradition emphasised culture as the supreme element in the production of race and 
territory. Cultural construction drew a racial boundary between the Chinese and the uncultured: 
the latter were imagined to have colours and bodies radically different from those of the Chinese, 
and the only way to become racially Chinese was to become culturally assimilated. Leibold 
(2007:133) argues that the idea that “pure races” exist is a myth because all human races have been 
melding for hundreds of thousands of years, expounding the interrelated connection between the 
natural and sociocultural components of a race. Leibold (ibid.) asserts that although humans 
descended from the same pair of primate ancestors, environmental differences have produced 
innumerable differences in culture and habits.  
On the other hand, Duara (in Unger 1996:34) views Chinese culturalism not as a form of 
cultural consciousness per se, but rather as a specific culture of the imperial state and Confucian 
orthodoxy, serving as a criterion that defines a community. Membership in this community was 
thus defined by participation in the rituals that embodied allegiance to Chinese ideas and ethics. 
Thus cultural performance was the vehicle in forming Chinese people and their collective identity; 
furthermore, beliefs and myths were also synthesised in the process of producing the concept of 
the Chinese race as well as other races.  According to Yao (1997), in the Chinese cultural concept 
of humans, there is only one origin or source from which all beings and humans come, which is 
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Heaven (Tian). This kind of cultural concept of the human race and its origin, based on conflated 
beliefs and philosophy, established a kinship lineage among the Chinese.  
Dikötter (1992:3) also points out that physical composition and cultural disposition were 
conflated in Chinese antiquity: physical composition was thus subject to cultural disposition, and 
barbarians were sometimes compared with animals not because of their physical appearance, but 
because of their lack of culture. Accordingly, culture became a racial barometer for inclusion or 
exclusion in relation to the Chinese racial identity, drawing a strict spatial distinction between the 
barbarians and the Chinese on Chinese cultural soil. The cultural boundary was therefore identified 
with the territorial boundary between the Chinese and others (ibid:4).  Culture therefore not only 
produced race, but also formed a nation with its territorial boundary from the Chinese perspective. 
Crossley (2006:20) also comments upon the malleability of boundaries in the process of 
constructing race, arguing that the range of ways in which actors reinforced or subverted these 
boundaries, whether in the ideological, economic, social or political realms, is striking. Racial 
identity was therefore malleable, based on particular needs and methods of the time, in terms of 
natural, cultural and even spatial boundaries.  
Leibold (2007:133), on the other hand, explains the Chinese concept of race from the 
perspective of evolution: race has to do with the “innate” (xiantian) characteristics of skin colour, 
physical makeup, bone structure, etc., while the characteristics of language, religion, customs, etc. 
are acquired (houtian). Thus both naturally inherited and culturally acquired elements are 
important in “constructing” the race. In addition, the cultural influence of religions such as Taoism 
played an important part in the Chinese understanding of the physical construct of the body in 
connection to the imagining of a race, contributing to the conflation of cultural and natural 
constructions of race. The division between natural and cultural was therefore blurred, however, 
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in Sun’s view, there was a clear hierarchy: natural power was most prominent in constructing race, 
followed by cultural elements. 
 
 
Social Darwinism and Race 
Banton (1988) asserts that different eras employed different discursive concepts to explain and 
validate differences in ancestry, blood or genetics, implying that race is also influenced and 
constructed socially and culturally. For example, in 18th-century Europe, race was implicated with 
lineage and was used primarily to identify a common descent of people; in  England, for example, 
the word ‘race’ was first used as a folk concept, and began to acquire an analytical or scientific 
characteristic only in the 19th century. Duara (1995:21) points out that by the end of the century, 
when social Darwinism began to make an impact on the non-Western world, it represented the 
underside of Enlightenment rationality or, more appropriately, its monster child by which racial 
hierarchy was sustained and imperialist exploitation justified.  
However, what Darwin fundamentally emphasised in his Origin of Species or the 
Preservation of Favoured Races in the Struggle for Life (1859) was that there were no permanent 
forms of nature and with regard to race, scientific evidence indicated that socially significant group 
differences were culturally, not genetically, transmitted. In a lecture to educational circles at Hu 
Kuang Clubhouse on Aug 30, 1912, Sun showed his disapproval of Darwin’s original theory due 
to the lack of civilisation in theorising the evolution of human beings: “Under its influence, every 
nation rested for a time on the concept of superiors dominating inferiors and the strong devouring 
the weak, to the point that naked force replaced universal law. To be sure, this theory was 
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appropriate during the first stage of the advancement of European civilization, but by today’s 
standards, it is tantamount to barbarianism.”12 
Meanwhile, Western scientific discourse played an essential role in the production of the 
modern construct of race, and Duara (ibid.) claims that race could also refer to a categorical 
difference of people engendered by perceived physical and attendant sociocultural differences, 
including “blood” or “species”. Consequently, social Darwinism was broadly interpreted as 
claiming that social and cultural elements could also produce race along with natural elements. In 
Sun’s terms, this could be also interpreted as saying that social and cultural elements such as 
coercive forces could collaborate with natural forces, and that the acquired social and cultural 
forces could possibly override the innate characteristics of race.  
Sun’s firm belief in the superiority of natural forces that produce consanguine race would 
be threatened if the relationship between consanguine race and natural forces in constituting a 
nation were to be dominated by the political and cultural forces. Initially Sun did not seem to be 
content with social Darwinism, particularly because it compared the evolution of animals with that 
of humans; this interfered with Confucian teachings that placed human beings higher than animals. 
Sun (1953a:73) insisted on the superiority of human evolution: “They even want to apply these 
laws of the animal world to mankind but they do not understand that it only applied to a transitional 
period in the history of mankind that the evolution of man has outgrown this principle which 
governs the world of animals”. However, Sun’s pride in the superiority of human evolution was 
based on their socially and culturally acquired qualities rather than naturally inherited ones.    
Social Darwinism also coincided with a newly emerging trend of nationalism in the late 
Qing period. When Kang Youwei initiated his modern ideology of Chinese nationalism and the 
nation-state, the national community he had in mind was established on Confucian cultural 
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principles that would include ethnically non-Han peoples such as the Manchus as long as they had 
accepted Chinese cultural principles.13 On the other hand, Zarrow (in Fogel and Zarrow 1997:18) 
points out that Liang Qichao accepted the social Darwinist vision of ruthless competition at the 
level of nations, which he believed would result in a dynamic system of autonomous states rather 
than the domination of the many by one victor. Rhoads (2000:5) further argues that Liang Qichao 
not only helped introduce the concepts and terminology of social Darwinism to the Chinese 
reading public, but also wrote the first reasoned critique on it.  
While many Chinese writers constructed their understanding of human evolution and the 
birth of modern nation from the perspectives of racial taxonomy and competition under the 
influence of social Darwinism, Sun’s reaction to social Darwinism was directed toward how to 
prevent the possible termination of the Chinese race and the partition of the Chinese territory by 
foreign powers. This led him to emphasise the importance of population. For Sun, a large 
population stood for strong racial power, and a rapid growth in population in the West alarmed 
him: “When I compare their increase with that of China's, I tremble. Look at the United States: a 
hundred years ago it had a population of only nine millions, now it has over one hundred millions; 
at the same rate it will have one thousand millions at the end of another century.”14  
Sun believed that an increase in the Chinese population would counter the power of 
Western nations and, furthermore, the threat of social Darwinism. Sun took the example of 
America, insisting on the importance of race and population in maintaining a nation: “Although 
natural forces work slowly, yet they can exterminate great races. …Two or three hundred years 
ago, the American continent was entirely the land of the red aborigines. They were scattered 
everywhere in large numbers, but after the arrival of the white man on the continent they slowly 
disappeared until now they are almost extinct. Here we see natural selection exterminating a great 
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race.”15 Sun’s focus on population still reflected his belief in natural forces that produce race in 
comparison with armed forces, which could be regarded as part of social and cultural power.  
For Sun, the growth of the Chinese population mattered in order to preserve the Chinese 
race. However, after a series of natural disasters such as flooding and droughts, the growth of the 
Chinese population had been stagnant. Sun then emphasised the importance of science, arguing 
that its development was directly related to the growth of population in the West: “The large gain 
[in population in the West] has been due to the advance of science, the progress of medicine, and 
yearly improvement of hygienic conditions, all of which tend to reduce the death rate and augment 
the birth rate. What is the significance for China of this rapid growth of other populations?” 16 To 
preserve the Chinese race, Sun concluded that China needed modern science to maintain the 
growth in the Chinese population. However, Sun’s argument revealed a gap in his logic with regard 
to science and population: science, such as agricultural technology, medicine and hygiene, 
highlighted human beings’ social and cultural achievements rather than the naturally inherited 
qualities. Hence, science, which represented social and cultural forces rather than natural forces, 
was closely associated with the innate qualities of human race.  
At this point, it is pertinent to explore what influenced Sun in his relentless argument for 
natural forces in relation to race, and how this inspired Sun to advocate racially defined nationalism. 
Sun’s insistence on consanguine race was closely related to his belief that only the innate qualities 
of race produced by natural forces could counter the armed forces, such as foreign imperialism, 
and thereby preserve the Chinese race and nation. Sun believed natural forces to be superior to 
armed forces; thus when the existence of naturally produced race was challenged by social forces, 
as in the case of social Darwinism’s acknowledgment of the validity of coercive forces, Sun’s 
belief in consanguine race and natural forces was threatened. Accordingly, Sun felt compelled to 
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argue for the authenticity of natural forces, and population symbolised a direct manifestation of 
the strength of natural forces that would preserve the Chinese race and nation against the 
sociocultural forces of the West. Sun argued, “A hundred years hence, if their population increases 
and ours does not, the more will subjugate the less, and China will inevitably be swallowed up. 
Then China will not only lose her sovereignty, but she will perish, the Chinese people will be 
assimilated, and the race will disappear.”17   
On the other hand, Sun also demonstrated his trust in cooperation among humans, believing 
that humanistic virtues would bring about civilised human evolution. He expressed his criticism 
of social Darwinism, which ignored positive human qualities but instead emphasised on fierce 
competition: “From the time that Darwin discovered the principles of evolution, the survival of 
the fittest-scientists began to treat morality, love, justice and friendship as a mirage, and to regard 
the law of the struggle for existence as the reality.”18 Sun’s belief in human cooperation would 
become a core tenet in his emancipatory communication, resonating in the minquan and minsheng 
principles. However, the contrast between Sun’s belief in the cultural qualities of human beings, 
such as morality and love, and his argument for natural qualities in consanguine population in 
order to compete for survival among different races formed a conflict within his minzu principle. 
The binary aspects of natural and cultural forces further complicated Sun’s argument for 









2.2 Nationalism and Race 
Unger (1996) posits that Chinese nationalism was initially anti-imperialist until the early years of 
the 20th century, emphasising that 19th-century xenophobia and turn of the century anti-Manchuism 
blended into the more fully developed ideas and movements of the May Fourth era.  Both Chinese 
revolutionaries and reformists sought to mobilize the nation through the discourse of nationalism; 
and around 1905, anti-Manchuism was to become the central tenet of Chinese nationalism. Sun 
also initially instigated nationalism along with anti-imperialism to counter the threat of the possible 
end of the Chinese race and the partition of its territory. 
Sun’s initial propagation of anti-imperialism was influenced by the historical events such 
as the Opium Wars and the unequal treaties, wherein the coercive forces of Western imperialism 
profited from China’s woe. Callinicos (1994) stresses that racism in modern history first developed 
in order to justify the systematic use of slave labour in the great plantations of the New World, 
which were central to the original emergence of capitalism as a world system. Racism thus formed 
as part of the process through which capitalism became the dominant social and economic system, 
underscoring a close relationship between capitalism and racism. Countering imperialism, Sun 
(1930:11) expounded, “Our position now is extremely perilous; if we do not earnestly promote 
nationalism and weld together our four hundred millions into a strong nation, we face a tragedy— 
the loss of our country and the destruction of our race. To ward off this danger, we must espouse 
nationalism and employ the national spirit to save the country. If we are to do this, it is essential 
first to know wherein the danger to our nation lies, and the best way to make this danger clear is 
to compare the Chinese people with the peoples of the Great Powers.” 
The initial stage of Sun’s anti-imperialism reflected Sun’s intention to preserve the Chinse 
race against the imperial powers and the colonialisation of China. Sun evaluated the conflict 
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between natural and coercive forces under the influence of social Darwinism, saying, “But political 
and economic forces work more rapidly than the forces of natural selection and can more easily 
extirpate a great race. China, if she were affected only by natural selection, might hold together 
another century; but if she is to be crushed by political and economic power, she will hardly last 
ten more years.”19  
Sun also expressed his disapproval of imperialism and capitalism by showing his support 
for the Russian movement: “Russia's new policy aims not only at the destruction of Russian 
imperialism but also at the overthrow of imperialism in the whole world. Furthermore, it aims at 
the overthrow of the capitalism of the world. For, in every country, although the apparent power 
is in the hands of the government, real control is with the capitalists; the new Russian policy would 
smash this control, and so the capitalists of the world are panic-stricken.”20 Sun’s comment 
demonstrates his denunciation of the coercive forces of imperialism, which conquered and 
threatened the existence of the Chinese race in the form of capitalism.  
Nationalism was pursued through various approaches during the years before the 1911 
revolution. Jenco (2010:33) points out that not all parties articulated nationalism in ethnic terms: 
Zhang Shizhao, for example, opposed race-based nationalism. On the other hand, revolutionists 
such as Zhang Taiyan, a supporter of anti-Manchuism, articulated an image of a new community 
that was persuasive and modern.21 With regard to Zhang Taiyan’s exclusivist position in the future 
Chinese state, Crossely (1999:344) asserts that, since Sun seemed to have been sympathetic to 
exclusivist views in his own early days as a nationalist leader, geopolitical factors ultimately led 
Sun to accommodate a conciliatory plan of the Five Race Republic after the 1911 revolution, which 
Zhang abhorred.  
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Kang Youwei, on the other hand, inherited the Confucian culturalist notion of community 
even though he was influenced by Western ideas. Traditionally, the Confucian concept of great 
unity (datong) represented the most fundamental ideology in China, and Kang Youwei justified 
nationalism as a necessary stage in the ultimate achievement of the “great unity (datong)” of all 
the peoples of the world. Datong was also an ideal that Sun would later emphasise in his land 
equalisation plan as expressed in the minsheng principle. In the Qing dynasty, where new 
definitions of loyalties and identities were constantly produced, the Confucian concept of datong 
served as an ideal principle for the foundation of nationalism as well.  
In the process of propagating his anti-imperialism, Sun also brought up the necessity to 
overthrow the Manchu monarchy, blaming it for not having protected China and the Chinese 
people from foreign encroachment. Consequently, Sun concluded that his ideal of establishing a 
republic was in direct conflict with the monarchical system of the Qing Dynasty; the principle of 
a republic was the equality of every citizen, while the monarchy was based on a system of class 
hierarchy. Sun thus regarded monarchism as directly antithetical to republicanism, and the 
establishment of a republic presupposed the overthrow of the Qing dynasty. Consequently, Sun’s 
nationalism shifted from anti-imperialism to anti-monarchism and anti-Manchuism. Sun defied 
monarchism in favour of republicanism, yet he relied on support from the ethnic majority of the 
population, the Han race. Sun insisted that nationalism had to be defined on the basis of the 
majority of the population. 
In Liang Qichao’s view, however, the Chinese people had to make a choice in committing 
to nationalism of either aiming to build up China as a modern state or allowing themselves to be 
carried away by a narrow revengeful spirit against the Manchus. Liang’s stance on nationalism 
was in favour of the construction of a Chinese modern nation; however, Liang also felt that 
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nationalism, while important, was not the only way to achieve statehood. In Liang’s vision, it was 
the citizenry that was the essential condition for China as a modern state, which would also include 
the Manchus and other ethnic minority groups. 22   
Underlying Sun’s propagation of nationalism were dual motives: to protect Chinese race 
from coercive powers of Western imperialism, and to subvert Manchu monarchy to establish a 
republic. However, Sun expressed that the core intention was not about revenge against the 
Manchus, but rather maintaining Chinese autonomy and its culture: “My principle of Nationalism 
takes our ancestral legacy and develops it to greater brilliance. Toward the Manchus, I do not seek 
revenge, urging rather that we coexist with them within China on terms of equality…Toward the 
other peoples of the world, I have urged that we preserve our independence, develop our traditional 
culture, and at the same time, absorb and further develop the culture of the world to greater 
brilliance, in the hope of advancing in step with other nations and of eventually achieving world 
unity. This is how the Principle of Nationalism will be used to deal with the various nations of the 
world.”23 Here Sun indicated that the principle of nationalism was to maintain coexistence with 
the Manchus as well as to preserve Chinese culture, thus implying a symbiotic relation between 
culture and race. 
However, given that China consisted of many ethnic groups, Sun’s racially defined 
nationalism in support of the ethnic majority Han caused racial conflict with ethnic minorities. 
Crossley (1999:342) suggests that ethnicity had not been a primary cause of political or social 
unrest before, and “racial invective was typically appended to the rhetoric of troubles that had 
decipherable proximate causes”, arguing that even the Taipings did not unequivocally hypothesize 
racial qualities. Sun’s racially defined nationalism, however, destabilised the existing cohesion 
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between the ethnic majority and minorities, and Sun’s main purpose of nationalism to unite the 
nation was defeating its purpose. 
Bol (2008:13) notes that the ethnic difference of the Han race was originally made when a 
few Song documents distinguished between peoples who lived intermingled along the frontiers by 
referring to them as “Han people” (hanren) and to other tribal peoples as border (fan). On the other 
hand, Leibold (2007) posits that Sun dismissed ethnic minorities as numerically insignificant and 
evolutionarily unfit, arguing that the vast majority of China’s 400 million people were entirely 
Hanzu when compared with the fewer than 10 million non-natives (wailai). Sun’s argument for 
nationalism hence largely reflected his insistence on the scale of population as well as his belief in 
the superiority of naturally produced power of race in opposition to coercive forces. However, 
Leibold (ibid.) asserts that Sun’s appeal to racially defined nationalism might very well have turned 
out to be a barrier rather than a catalyst for the unity of a multi-ethnic China, putting Sun in a 
dilemma.    
Laitinen (1990), on the other hand, argues anti-Manchuism was not simply a sign of the 
discontentment with the present government, but was rather a modern phenomenon and a 
reflection of modern national ideas. By analysing the historical roots of anti-Manchuism from the 
perspective of cultural prejudice and anti-barbarism, she points to the late Qing revolutionaries’ 
claim that anti-Manchuism was inherited from the late Ming Chinese literati and gentry, who 
opposed the invading Manchus and refused to serve the alien Qing Dynasty. Laitinen (ibid.) asserts 
that modern nationalism in China was born as a result of military, commercial and cultural 
penetration by the West; moreover, anti-Manchuism became a demarcation line between 
revolutionaries and reformers, meaning that anti-Manchu propaganda had little to do with the 
Manchus but rather with the Chinese. In her analysis of Zhang Taiyan’s nationalism, Laitinen 
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(ibid.) claims that Zhang’s anti-Manchuism, for example, was a practical means for strengthening 
nationalist spirit, pointing out that anti-Manchuism faded while anti-imperialism became stronger 
after the 1911 Revolution.  
Sun’s support of the Han ethnic majority in establishing a modern nation-state could be 
explained partly by time constraints given Sun diagnosed of China’s condition of political illness 
facing foreign encroachment and domestic despotism. Sun thus wanted to leverage the collective 
power of the majority ethnic groups. Duara (1995:140), however, does not think that these 
arguments should be allowed to conceal the extent to which the racism of social Darwinist global 
discourse formed intellectuals’ view of the world, arguing that Sun’s racially defined nationalism 
was a racist one and a product of the constitutive discourse of the survival of the fittest races, in 
which race was the principal source of value as much as it was a historical inheritance or political 
expediency. Thus Duara (ibid.) strongly argues against the notion of time constraint that Sun faced 
to explain the fact that he turned to the racial majority in building nationalism.  
Sun (1994:42) clarified that his logic of his nationalism was for political autonomy, saying, 
“On the other hand, we should recognize that nationalism does not mean discriminating against 
people of a different nationality. It simply means not allowing such people to seize our political 
power, for only when we Han are in control politically we have a nation. If that political control is 
in the hands of people of another nationality, then there is no Han nation.” At issue for Sun was 
the idea the nation had to be in control of the majority of the population, which, he believed, was 
produced by natural forces, and the Han race was the ethnic majority of the population. 
Nonetheless, the conflict of his proposition was based on the exclusion of the ethnic minority 
groups, who also had equal rights in the modern nation-state of the Chinese republic that Sun 
strove to establish.  
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Cultural Loyalty and Nationalism 
Initially, Sun believed that employing anti-Manchuism would facilitate the transfer of deeply 
rooted people’s loyalty from the emperor to the new Chinese republic. In fact, Sun’s employment 
of anti-Manchuism was to mobilise the ethnic majority for political efficacy; Sun believed the 
ethnic majority of the people were produced by natural forces while monarchism by coercive 
forces.  Sun also regarded the Qing monarchy was based on social hierarchy, which caused the 
people’s submissive attitude toward the authorities, impeding their equality and autonomy.  
At the same time, Sun argued for the necessity of cultural loyalty among Chinese people 
in order to fend off the influence of foreign culture, which, Sun believed, entered China through 
coercive forces. Sun thus wanted to leverage the cultural power of loyalty, which he regarded as 
particular to China, to counter the external power of armed forces, saying, “Since our domination 
by alien races, and since the invasion of foreign culture which has spread its influence all over 
China, a group intoxicated with the new culture have begun to reject the old morality, saying that 
the former makes the latter unnecessary. They do not understand that we ought to preserve what 
is good in our past and throw away only the bad.”24 Sun’s comment also represented his modern 
rationality in selectively maintaining the positive while discarding negative elements in Chinese 
traditions.   
Harrison (2000) posits that understanding the invented nature of many of the traditions of 
nationalism began to influence the way we think about ethnicity, connecting race and nationalism 
with cultural identity. She claims that if ethnicity and nationalism are to be examined together, 
then rituals and ceremonies should be examined to look at the changing nature of Chinese identity. 
She stresses that cultural influence such as ritual is not just a means of social integration but also 
a means of biasing power, creating hierarchies of power between communities. The tradition of 
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loyalty to the emperor and filial piety to the father had a strong influence on Chinese cultural 
identity, and Chinese cultural loyalty was cultivated through rituals and ceremonies.    
In contrast to his opinion against Chinese loyalty to the monarchy, Sun asserted that the 
tradition of filial piety was a unique characteristic of Chinese culture, and recommended that the 
Chinese keep this positive tradition in order to maintain their cultural identity. However, Sun also 
indicated the desirability of collectivising and “regulating” Chinese loyalty to family and clan on 
a national level, foreshadowing his future endeavour to promote the transfer of the people’s 
individual loyalty toward the nation. In examining the implications of filial piety in terms of 
Chinese cultural identity, Sun (1930:115) also assessed the negative implication of family and clan 
in relation to national unity, saying, “Because China lays emphasis upon the family as well as upon 
the individual, the family head has to be consulted on all matters, a system which some approve 
and some criticise. But I think that in the relation between the citizens of China and their state, 
there must first be family loyalty. Such a system, expanding step by step, will be orderly and well-
regulated and the relationship between the small and large social groups will be a real one”. Sun 
asserted that only voluntary loyalty to the nation could produce national unity as well as a 
collective Chinese identity. Sun thus insisted on preserving the positive culture of filial piety in the 
private space of the home in order to maintain Chinese moral values. On the other hand, Sun 
insisted on transferring the loyalty to the nation: “Loyalty to the nation is namely loyalty to the 
people and it is the Chinese responsibility toward the nation.” 25   
Sun realised that his task was to maintain the people’s loyalty while trying to shift it toward 
the new republic. Sun spoke about his observation of the people’s loyalty at an ancestral temple, 
expressing his concern about that Chinese loyalty was disappearing. Sun emphasised on the 
importance of maintaining both kinds of Chinese loyalty, filial piety and loyalty to the nation: “I 
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saw on the right hand side that character for “Filial Devotion” but on the left side, [there was] a 
blank where there must have been previously, I think, the character for “Loyalty” (to the emperor, 
or to nation). This shows the thinking of a certain type of people today: because we have a republic, 
we need not to talk about loyalty.”26  Sun argued that, just like filial piety, the people’s loyalty 
must be preserved, not for the emperor, but for the nation; at the same time, he noted that Chinese 
cultural identity based on the family and clan represented solely a closely knit collective, not the 
nation. Sun felt that it was necessary to maintain the Chinese tradition of loyalty for the sake of 
national unity: “But the Chinese people have only family and clan groups; there is no national 
spirit. Consequently, in spite of four hundred million people gathered together in one China, we 
are in fact, but a sheet of loose sand.” 27  
Sun (1930:4) accordingly observed that the loyalty of Chinese people was overly 
committed to family and clan, arguing that it impeded national unity: “The family and the clan 
have been powerful unifying forces; again and again Chinese have sacrificed themselves, their 
families, their lives in defence of their clan….But for the nation, there has never been an instance 
of the supreme spirit of sacrifice. The unity of the Chinese people has stopped short at the clan and 
has not extended to the nation.” Furthermore, Sun debated the reasons why loyalty had to be 
utilised in order to build a new Chinese republic for the nation of 400 million Chinese people 
instead of one monarch. Sun argued that it was much nobler to be loyal to one nation than to one 
person, stressing the collective purpose of a nation. His message was that the Chinese republic still 
required loyalty, not to the emperor and family but rather to the new nation and its people, which 
also supported the equality of all citizens: “They say that in former days, loyalty was shown to 
princes, and in a democracy, loyalty is not needed and can be cast aside. Such an argument is 
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certainly due to misunderstanding: we do not want princes in the country, but we cannot do without 
loyalty. If we say that loyalty is outworn today, what about the nation?” 28   
To Sun, the nation was a greater cause than family and clan; the latter could be sacrificed 
for national unity, as he argued, “We must utilize China’s ancient social groups, as the family and 
the clan, and consolidate them to form a great national body.”29 Sun concluded that loyalty to 
family and clan in the private space of home interfered with the formation of nationalism since 
these two competing objects of loyalty threatened to undermine the building of China’s nation-
state. Sun urged that they transfer their loyalty to the nation because China required nationalism 
for national unity: “China is the oldest, the largest and the most civilized of the nations and the one 
with the greatest powers of assimilation. But although there is a vast nation, there is no 
nationalism.”30 
Sun argued that Chinese cultural loyalty to national unity was necessary in order to avoid 
fragmentation, like scattered sands, and to preserve the Chinese race: “Where the individual is the 
unit, there will be at least millions of units in a country, four hundred millions in China; the knitting 
together of such as huge number of separate units would naturally be very difficult.”31 Sun’s argued 
that loyalty to individual families and clans, which represented an individual cause, had to be 
sacrificed for the collective purpose of the nation by cementing the sheet of loose sand into a solid 
national unit.  
In directing the people’s loyalty to the nation, however, Sun realised that family and clan 
also served as a core foundation of Chinese cultural identity, and that the Chinese people’s concept 
of nation was shaped around the concept of family and clan. Family was thus the origin of the 
nation from the perspective of Chinese culture. Even though Sun tried to govern family and clan 
under the umbrella of the nation, family was the foundation of Chinese cultural identity. Linebarger 
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(1937:39) aptly asserts that family consciousness played an important part in sustaining certain 
elements of Confucian culture because it oriented the individual not only philosophically but also 
socially, arguing that family was therefore synonymous with concepts such as nation and human 
beings. As such, to Chinese people, the nation was a cultural extension of family and clan. 
Sun thus faced a dilemma in his attempt to persuade people to transfer their loyalty from 
family to nation because it was analogous to arguing for establishing the political framework of a 
nation without the cultural content of the people. Sun asserted, “If we all combined, we could 
become a great national union – the Republic of China – and that with such a union we need not 
fear outside adversaries or our inability to revive the state.”32 Regarding the logic of shifting loyalty 
from family and clan to a national level, Sun argued for the benefits of collectivity over 
individuality. This was the same logic that Sun employed when he supported the ethnic majority 
over minority groups for political efficacy. However, individual families were the foundation of 











2.3  National Unity and the Five Race Republic 
Sun’s propagation of racially defined nationalism resulted in excluding the ethnic minority in the 
process of building the modern nation-state. Consequently, even after Sun’s nationalism brought 
forth the 1911 Revolution and ultimately the Chinese republic, the nation remained fragmented. 
Eventually, Chinese revolutionaries promptly announced the establishment of a new Republic of 
China and declared their intention to assert sovereignty over all the former subjects and territories 
of the Qing Empire. However, Sun’s ethnically defined nationalism remained antithetical to the 
principle of a republic, which Sun was trying to build.  
Sun thus shifted to employ a more ethnically inclusive policy encompassing the 
autonomous rights of ethnic minorities by altering his earlier argument. Sun realised that an all-
inclusive sociocultural identity for the Chinese people was requisite for the solidarity of the 
Chinese republic; furthermore, racially defined nationalism and republicanism were mutually 
exclusive. Ultimately, Sun proposed the Five Race Republic, shifting from the previous ethnic 
majority Han-led nationalism by acknowledging the autonomy of diverse ethnic constituents. This 
symbolised a unity in national identity inclusive of ethnic diversity as well as a change in Sun’s 
insistence on a nation that is based on, from a naturally produced race to a more culturally 
constructed race. Sun thus admitted the possibility of national unity between the ethnic majority 
and minority of population through cultural coexistence.  
On the other hand, See Sin Heng (in Lee, L. T., H. G. Lee, et al. 2011:35) points to Sun’s 
methodology of consolidating China into a one nation from the multi-ethnic groups, 
problematising Sun’s reduction of the 56 different ethnic groups into five major ones. Heng argues 
that Sun’s declaration that all of these Chinese people could be considered to be Han Chinese 
showed his intention of unifying the Chinese by assimilation. Heng (ibid.) further asserts that the 
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five ethnic groups were chosen based on numbers representing the majority of population, which 
may have also implied absorbing the minorities into the majority rather than maintaining ethnic 
diversity. Even though Sun’s intention was to include ethnic minorities in the project of national 
unity, Sun also acknowledged that the logic of inclusion was from the perspective of the Han 
people, the majority of the nation: “It is for the Han people to sacrifice the separate nationality, 
history, and identity that they are so proud of and to merge in all sincerity with the Manchus, 
Mongols, Muslims and Tibetans in one melting pot to create a new order of Chinese 
nationalism…”33  
Ultimately, Sun shifted his argument from a racially defined nation (guozu) to a multi-
ethnic republic (daminzu gongheguo) by advocating for the equal citizenship of all ethnic groups 
in the new republic. Taking from the example of the multi-ethnic republics of America and Europe, 
Sun realised that the ethnically inclusive republic was the way not only to survive, but also to 
prosper. Sun recognised an all-inclusive political nation-state constituted by different ethnic 
groups with their distinctive lifestyles, languages, religions and economic ways of life. Sun 
explained the essence of his revised aim of the nation and its government in terms of race and 
national unity: “The government should undertake to render assistance and protection to the racial 
minorities in the country so that they may be able to exercise their right of self-determination and 
self-government, while resisting oppression and invasion from foreign countries. The government 
should, at the same time, revise the treaties with foreign countries in order to secure national 
independence and international equality.”34  
Pye (in Unger 1996:89) aptly maintains that developing a coherent and inspiring form of 
nationalism from the all-embracing concept of Chinese ethnicity has not been easy; however, he 
also posits that although Sun sought to articulate an early version of Chinese nationalism, The 
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Three Principles of the People soon became merely the orthodoxy of a partisan political party.  
Pye (ibid.) insists that nationalism must also respond to different times as he evaluates the 
implications of revolution and modernisation: the former produced confusion and disillusion while 
nationalism and modernisation called for a heightened level of consciousness, a capacity for 
empathy and a break from the rigidities of traditional orthodoxy.  
Sun had previously encouraged modern rationality and political consciousness among the 
people for their political participation, trying to shift the people’s cultural loyalty to the nation for 
the solidarity of the people. However, it was not until Sun realised that a nation based solely on 
racial exclusion could not consolidate collective identity nor culturally rooted loyalty for national 
unity, thus he decided to recognise diversity in ethnic backgrounds. Jiang (in Chang 1988) rightly 
suggests that while the people of a country must cherish a common loyalty to the nation, this does 
not mean excluding identification with any other sub-groups such as ethnic, religious, regional or 
economic ones; rather, loyalty to the nation-state must be regarded as paramount and be able to 
provide a common ground for the resolution of the differences that may arise among these 
subgroups. 
In shifting his approach to a more culturally and politically inclusive Five Race Republic, 
Sun acknowledged the autonomy of the ethnic minority groups and demonstrated a more inclusive 
stance toward national unity: “The basis for nationalism has been sometimes a common ethnicity 
and religion, sometimes a shared history and tradition, or, more rarely, a common language and 
literature. But the loftiest and most civilized nationalism of all is rooted in common aspirations.”35 
Sun’s comment also reflected his acknowledgement that racially defined nationalism was 
antithetical to republicanism, and that it risked to reverse the trajectory of China’s modernisation 
from a modern nation-state led by political citizens (Bürgernation) back to the premodern 
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community composed of common descendants (Volksnation). Furthermore, the individual unit of 
family did not have to be sacrificed for the sake of the nation but; both were instead mutually 
dependent for their coexistence, and together they formed national unity. 
As a result, Sun’s reconciliatory approach to the conflicts of exclusionary and inclusive 
nationalism catalysed a broad nationalism (da minzu zhuyi) rather than the narrowly defined anti-
Manchuism. Sun realised that the key to the national unity was to maintain the coexistence of the 
people by acknowledging their ethnic diversity and autonomy rather than excluding or coercively 
assimilating them. Sun also reconciled the cultural and the natural construction of race by 
accepting that a nation was established on an interdependent relationship between naturally 
produced and culturally developed elements as well as between individuals and collective. As a 
result, equal citizenship among the members of different ethnic groups was granted by 
empowering them with participatory citizen rights, which Sun later advocated in his minquan 
principle. Finally, national unity was defined not by racial qualities, but for the coexistence of all 














CHAPTER III  
The Minquan Principle (Democracy)  
 INTRODUCTION   
Sun argued for the equal rights and freedom of the people as the two main tenets in his minquan 
principle, identifying the absolute power of the Qing monarchy as the main enemy of democracy. 
In an effort to shift the monarchy’s imposed duties to the rights of the people, Sun advocated 
constitutionalism in order to maintain a balance between the power of the people and of the 
government, and between citizens’ duties and rights. Sun proposed the Fivefold Constitution, a 
hybrid of China’s traditional court departments and Western constitutional system to protect the 
people’s rights. 
In this chapter, I argue that the fundamental principle of democracy to protect citizens’ 
rights and freedom was threatened when Sun imposed the three-phase national reconstruction plan, 
which included periods of military operation and political tutelage, and this was closely related to 
Sun’s paternalistic elitism. This is significant because the political modernisation of China was 
delayed as individual rights and citizens’ freedom were infringed upon by overwhelming 
government power, and the citizens’ equality was disrupted by elitism, destabilising the 
fundamental tenets of constitutionalism as well as Sun’s own minquan principle.  
Beneath the conflict between citizens’ freedom and Sun’s pedagogical politics, the equality 
of citizen was in direct conflict with elitism. Paternalistic elitism was present in the form of 
political hierarchy between the tutoring officials and the masses. During the process of establishing 
a Chinese modern nation-state, even though Sun and the reformist Liang Qichao agreed on the 
necessity of constitutionalism, their main differences were in the form of government and the 
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bearer of rights. Sun argued for republicanism and collective citizens’ rights, while Liang argued 
for constitutional monarchy and balanced individual and collective citizens’ rights. Sun 
emphasised participatory citizenship, proposing the inclusion of women in the military service and 
voting rights. In effect, Sun’s argument for constitutionalism and participatory citizenship 
symbolised China’s political transformation from a premodern community (Volksnation) to a 
















3.1 Loyal Duties and Citizens’ Rights 
The Chinese traditional notion of loyalty included various interpretations such as hierarchical 
duties between monarchs and subjects, rulers and ministers and even fathers and sons. Dennerline 
(1981:14) points out the that two major Chinese words used to convey loyalty were zhong (忠) 
and xiao (孝), loyalty to ruler and to father respectively, both of which carried an equation of 
absolute authority on the part of the ruler and the total submission of the subject. On a state level, 
imperial loyalty was literally ‘loyal obligation’ (zhongyi) or ‘great obligation’ (dayi). Confucius 
commented on the reciprocating relations of loyalty, writing, “The ruler should employ his subject 
according to the rules of propriety (li); the subject should serve his ruler with loyalty (zhong).”1 
Thus loyalty was mainly associated with performing a duty on the part of the subject. On the other 
hand, Sun regarded loyalty as a moral standard rather than the obligation to perform: “As for 
China’s old moral standards, they are not yet lost sight of by the people of China. First come 
Loyalty and Filial Devotion, then Kindness and Love, then Faithfulness and Justice, Harmony and 
Peace.”2  
Santangelo (2012:299) refers to the original meaning of loyalty in the word zhonghou (忠
厚), which is one of many expressions that can be rendered as ‘honest and upright’, while Standen 
(2007:32–3) emphasizes that changing political allegiance implied automatic moral failing and 
disloyalty. Thus the structure of hierarchical loyalty was established through propriety, which was 
to be the ruler’s quality in response to the absolute loyalty of the subject.  On a family level, loyalty 
stressed the importance of performing familial duties based on parental virtue and filial piety. The 




Regarding the obligation associated with loyalty, Wang (2003:20) stresses that the word 
for duty was translated as yiwu (義务), combining the character yi, meaning righteous, with wu, 
meaning essential action or task. He also points out that the conventional connotation of yi (duty) 
probably explains why, in modern times, less attention has been paid to the concept of duty in 
comparison with the concept of right; the latter has been often used to “encourage a new public-
spiritedness or civic consciousness” with the rise of modern citizenship and, subsequently, the 
modern nation-state. As such, performing one’s duty was an essential part of loyalty before it 
became associated with the acknowledgment of citizens’ rights in modern times. Instead of 
hierarchical loyalty, which represented submission of the subject by duty, Sun argued that it was 
necessary to empower the people with equal rights: “Minquan is the second watchword of our 
Revolutionary Party, and corresponds with the watchword ‘Equality’ of the French 
Revolution…The term of equality is generally used interchangeably with the term Liberty. The 
truth is that men are born equal; the inequality caused by oppressive rulers is an artificial 
inequality.”3     
However, the absence of written stipulations with regard to protecting legally the rights of 
the people allowed the Qing monarchy to govern the people with absolute power (qiangquan). Sun 
stressed that absolute power was an exclusionary right of the monarchy, while democracy 
(minquan) was the inclusive right of citizenry. Judge (1996:63) emphasises that some journalists 
in the late Qing period did not use the word minquan (the people’s power in direct translation) in 
its original radical sense as equivalent to minzhu (democracy); instead, they redefined it as the 
power or authority of the people (renmin de quanli), distinct from minzhu or popular sovereignty 
(renmin zuozhu). Wang (2003:28) qualifies that the word quanli connotes a particular attitude 
towards the idea of rights, even though Chinese legalists used the idea of quan as the standards 
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fixed by the ruler alone. Consequently, the concept of rights tended to belong to the rulers and 
governors, while performing duties was relegated mainly to the subject. Sun reconfirmed the 
principle of democracy in light of people‘s rights: “The foundation of the government of a nation 
must be built upon the rights of the people.” 4 Sun’s comment also reflected his will to bring about 
political modernisation of China by balancing the duty and right of the people.  
However, performing duty was a complex process of maintaining hierarchical loyalty. De 
Bary (1991:68) outlines the moral quality of reciprocity in performing duties: “Filiality, 
brotherliness and commiseration are common principles of what is right and proper; to be loyal is 
to perform duties well.” Confucius also commented on the role of ruling figures in office and at 
home: “When the ruler is ruler and the subject is subject, when the father is father and the son is 
son, there is government.”5 Consequently, the means of reciprocating loyalty often resulted in 
inequality on the rights of the governor and the duties of the people. Wang (2003:22-3) adds that, 
even though the subject had the right to expect his or her ruler to perform the duty of being 
benevolent, enlightened, righteous and observing the proper rites, the notion of reciprocity still 
revealed an unequal obligation. Additionally, similar qualities of reciprocity in hierarchical 
relationships were observed in the mechanism of patronage. Porter (in Wakeman, Esherick, et al. 
2006) points out that the culture of patronage was an intrinsic part of the Confucian social order 
of hierarchical relationships, which was performed with particular moral obligations associated 
with relative positions in society. 6   
Even though Sun rebuked the premodern practice of hierarchical loyalty to the monarchy, 
he still argued for the necessity of selectively maintaining the positive elements of loyalty to the 
nation and to the people: “The ancient teaching of loyalty pushed to its limit meant death. To say 
that ancient loyalty was due to kings and, since now we have no kings, we do not need loyalty and 
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as can do as we please, is absolutely wrong.”7 Sun believed that while loyalty to the monarchs 
supported class hierarchy, it could also produce solidarity among the people if properly transferred 
to the nation. Furthermore, Sun discovered that class hierarchy originated not only from the 
monarchical structure, but also from culturally rooted occupational taxonomy. The traditional 
order of shi, nong, gong and shang (warrior, peasant, artisan and merchant) was understood in 
descending order of social respect, and class hierarchy was inculcated as natural and essential to 
social order under the influence of Confucianism.  
In his defiance of class hierarchy, Sun demonstrated his intention to challenge the 
traditional occupational taxonomy as well. Sun recognised both monarchy and occupational 
taxonomy as pillars supporting class hierarchy, and he argued passionately for the equal rights and 
freedom of citizens, which were the essential elements of a republic: “We must not look upon these 
experts as stately and grand presidents and ministers, but simply as our chauffeurs, as guards at 
the gate, as cooks, physicians, carpenters, or tailors...Professionals should not be considered as 
honourable and respectable as a president of a nation; they should be treated equally with a car 
driver, a policeman, a cook who prepares meals in the kitchen, a medical doctor, a carpenter or a 
tailor; it does not make any difference that one is a (simple and manual) worker, as all occupations 
are equal.”8 Sun argued for the equality of all human beings regardless of their occupation and for 
their valuable contributions to the nation, demonstrating the influence of Western rationality and 
pragmatism. Moreover, the equality of every member of society regardless of his or her occupation 
inspired Sun to see the necessity of a legal system that would protect the equal rights of the people.  
Sun identified despotic monarchy as the main enemy of a republic and he argued for the 
need to raise the Chinese people’s political awareness, stressing the importance of resistance and 
struggle against the absolute power of monarchism. Sun criticised inactive political participation, 
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arguing that the monarchy’s absolute power had to be challenged to gain power for the people: 
“The Chinese have two proverbs; one is ‘He who is not in power does not trouble about 
government’; the other is ‘the common people do not deliberate’. This indicates in the past all 
power was in the hands of the Emperor. Today our advocacy of democratic rule means that the 
authority is in the hands of the people.”9 Sun’s argument demonstrates his emphasis on citizens’ 
rights through political participation, implying the need for the Chinese constitution to counter the 




3.2  Constitutionalism 
Wang (2000) points out that the constitutional movement was a shared product of the Qing court 
and exiled intellectuals during the reform era. By the early 20th century, foreign political ideologies 
had risen to prominence, and the Qing court eventually acknowledged the need to study the 
feasibility of implementing its own constitution.10 Zarrow (in Fogel and Zarrow 1997:22) 
maintains that the constitutionalists (lixianpai) favoured retaining the Qing monarchy in order to 
avoid revolutionary chaos, but wanted the dynasty to become a genuinely constitutional monarchy. 
On the other hand, Sun and the revolutionaries (gemingpai) favoured the expulsion of the Manchus 
to establish a republic. A proposal of the first Chinese constitution was approved by the royal 
commission of the Qing dynasty and endorsed by the Empress Dowager Cixi on September 1, 
1906. However, the Qing court announced it would promulgate it in 1917, more than a decade 
later. Sun as well as other reformers were equally frustrated with the delay, which showed the 
reluctance of the Qing monarchy to put the constitution into effect. Shortly after the 1911 
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revolution, a very brief constitution titled ‘General Plan for the Organisation of the Provisional 
Government’ was promulgated on December 3, 1911 with 21 articles. 
Sun and the reformist Liang Qichao, both exiles, first met in the early spring of 1899 in 
Japan. Sun had been in Japan since his failed first uprising in 1895, while Liang, who arrived in 
Japan after the failure of the One Hundred Days’ Reform in 1898, was in contact with Japanese 
modernisers and widely read translations of Western philosophy and political thought. Especially 
after Kang Youwei had been forced to leave Japan, Liang maintained close contact with Sun. Liang 
fervently embraced nationalism and also advocated such concepts as liberty and equality as the 
essential rights of the people. Sun and Liang were said to have joined in publishing two issues of 
a journal entitled Secret History of China (中国密史), and had begun to develop plans for a merger 
of the revolutionary party and the reformist party, in which Liang was to be second-in-command 
to Sun. However, the plan was not carried out, as Kang ordered Liang to leave for Hawaii to 
strengthen the foothold of the Baohuanghui (Protect the Emperor Party) toward the end of 1899.11  
Judge (1996:151) points out that Qing government officials not only resisted implementing 
true constitutional reform that would expand popular power, but also attempted to obstruct the 
dissemination of the new teachings, which threatened Confucian intellectual hegemony. As 
discussed earlier, the Qing court censored the press and prohibited public gatherings in order to 
obstruct public communication, while Sun defied its censorship by urging scholars to include the 
undereducated and illiterate in their pedagogy so that they could understand and perform the 
political rights of citizens. Sun stressed the balance of power between sovereignty and the people, 
but the absence of constitution meant the right of the people was not protected: “When people and 
sovereignty are linked together, we have the political power of the people. Government is a thing 
of the people and by the people; it is control of the affairs of all the people. The power of control 
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is political sovereignty and where the people control the government we speak of the people’s 
sovereignty.”12 Tsao (1947:50-3) argues that constitutional rights of the citizen correlate with the 
duties incumbent upon the state, and, if it is constitutionally provided, the citizen shall enjoy 
freedom, while the state is bound by law to abstain from encroaching upon such freedom. Thus, in 
those democratic countries where a written constitution is adopted, the term fundamental rights of 
citizen generally refers to those rights enjoyed by the citizen as envisaged by the constitutional 
law. 
While there are similarities as well as differences between Sun and Liang with regard to 
their thoughts on constitutionalism for a modern Chinese nation-state, the most distinctive 
difference between them was regarding the time frame and political structure. In terms of the time 
frame, Sun felt that China was in urgent need of an immediate revolution to establish a Chinese 
republic, while Liang insisted that China had to first accept the prerequisite of equality and liberty 
of the citizens as part of a gradual process of reform. The primacy of establishing the structure of 
a republic mattered the most for Sun, while, for Liang, the fundamental principle of a modern 
nation-state had to be attained first before the Chinese modern nation-state could be established. 
Thus their difference represented the juxtaposition of pragmatic approaches and principles, yet 
both also shared part of each other’s political particularities. 
Most significantly, Liang believed China was not ready for a truly democratic and 
representative government, making constitutional monarchy a more feasible goal. Liang even 
showed his doubts about implementing democratic practices in China by saying, “Freedom, 
constitutionalism, republicanism, these would be like wearing summer garb in winter, or furs in 
summer; beautiful to be sure but unsuitable.”13 While Liang’s gradualism represented his political 
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prudence, Sun’s political urgency to establish a republic reflected his concern about foreign 
encroachment and the necessity of national unity facing the possible partition of China.  
On the other hand, Liang was fascinated by Western constitutionalism as an effective 
antidote to traditional despotism, believing that a constitutional government could ensure political 
participation most people. Accordingly, Liang’s ultimate concern was the formation of a cohesive 
and strong nation-state as he expounded his ideas on constitutionalism in his journals such The 
Public Opinion (Chingpao) in 1898-1902 and in The New People’s Miscellany (xinmin zhongpao) 
in 1902-07.14 On the other hand, Sun opposed the constitutional monarchy, pointing out that it 
embodied a remnant of class hierarchy and despotism and failed to reflect the Chinese political 
particularity of the time: “Thus constitutional monarchy may be temporarily viable in other nations, 
where the animosity between the people and their rulers is not so intense, but it is out of the 
question in China.”15   
In addition to their approaches to constitutionalism, Sun and Liang also differed 
conceptually in their stances on nationalism. In Liang’s mind, nationalism was inseparable from 
democratisation, so freedom of participation and national independence were essentially two 
equivalent elements.16 However, for Sun, nationalism was crucial for the unity of the people and 
the autonomy of China against foreign encroachment and its threat of partition of Chinese territory; 
the political rights of the people would be granted through the constitution only after these two 
propositions were achieved. For Liang, however, a constitutionalist government was pre-
eminently a limited government with two essential ingredients from the outset: the promulgation 
of a written constitution and the primacy of the legislative organ. Furthermore, by citizenry, Liang 
meant a group of people who were not only a political body, but also had an organic and corporate 
capacity to express their own will and perform their own rights.  
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Sun regarded the establishment of a republic as not a mere matter of the form of 
government, but rather the core element of his minquan principle, which was intended to empower 
Chinese citizens by expelling the absolute power of the Qing monarchy and bring about the 
people’s freedom and equal rights in a modern nation-state. On the other hand, to Liang, 
constitutional monarchy was a matter of pragmatic political structure with an optimal solution. 
Ogden (2002:64) suggests that Liang harboured serious doubts about implementing democratic 
practices in China, maintaining his stance that, even though Sun’s thought of freedom, 
constitutionalism and republicanism were ideal, it was unsuitable for China. Liang argued that the 
Chinese people had to accept authoritarian rule for the time being, since they could not enjoy 
freedom. Compared with Liang’s pragmatic assessment, Sun’s opposition to constitutional 
monarchy reflected his personal distrust of the Qing monarchy.  
In terms of empowering the citizens, the right to vote represented the participatory 
citizenship of a modern nation-state. However, Liang opposed universal suffrage, arguing that the 
right to vote should be limited to the small percentage of the adult population who were literate. 
Liang’s stance was based on political elitism and pragmatism in contrast to Sun’s insistence in 
principle on equality in terms of citizens’ rights. It also demonstrated Sun’s intention to selectively 
adopt Western political advancements such as universal suffrage; Sun also intended to include 
women in the right to vote: “What are the newest usages in the world for the exercise of democratic 
rule? First there is the right of suffrage. Apart from the right to elect, the second newest thing is to 
recall the vote. When people have this right, then they have the power to recall. These two rights 
give control over the officials.”17 Sun’s pursuit of equal and inclusive political citizenship 




Sun was inspired by the models of constitutions in America and France. However, Sun 
insisted that China should not entirely abandon its own political traditions, proudly discussing to 
adopt the Chinese traditional court systems, in particular, the unique merits of ancient Chinese 
civil service examination and censorial departments. Instead of an outright imitation of the 
Western constitutional system, he insisted on amalgamating both Chinese and Western features in 
his proposal of a reconciled Chinese constitution. By adopting the structure of the separate 
executive, legislative and judicial powers, Sun argued that both the Chinese traditional court 
departments and the Western constitutional system should be combined to create a five-power 
Chinese constitutional system: “The principle of the People’s Rights (minquan) has democracy as 
its primary element and as its second element the idea that a dictatorship cannot work and a 
constitution is necessary for a good government…Therefore I proposed that the legislative, judicial, 
and executive powers be complemented by branches charged with the powers of examination and 
censorship, all combining into a five power constitution.”18   
Sun accordingly proposed the Fivefold Constitution, in which the traditional Chinese 
departments of civil service examination and censorial departments were combined with the three 
Western constitutional departments. Sun explained that the amalgamated structure of the newly 
proposed Chinese constitution was intended to maintain the balance of power between the people 
and the state: “With regard to the government, there must be five phases of authority. … with this 
kind of government system, the power of the people and that of the government is equally 
balanced.”19  
The Fivefold Constitution or, as Sun fondly referred to it, the Five Brothers Constitution, 
was a conflation of the Chinese and Western systems, demonstrating Sun’s view of the foundations 
of the Chinese constitution. Sun’s vision of the Chinese modern nation-state was of a republic in 
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which citizens were legally protected and empowered by the constitution to perform their 
citizenship. Habermas (1996a, 1996b, 1997) claims that the difference between the premodern 
community of Volksnation and the modern state of Bürgernation lies in the latter’s acts of voluntary 
participation of citizens for a common political cause. Furthermore, the modern nation-state 
follows the logic of inclusion that every citizen can join as long as they accept certain standards of 
tolerance and recognize the rights of others. For Sun, the common political cause was to attain the 
autonomy of China by establishing the first Chinese republic. Sun’s conceptualisation of the 
Chinese constitution was to protect the rights of Chinese citizens in countering the absolute power 
of the monarchy. Sun empowered them with participatory citizenship, which was eventually 
extended to the overseas Chinese as well as to ethnic minority groups. Citizenship had to be 
protected by constitutionalism.  
 
Individual and Collective Rights  
Marshall and Bottomore (1992:20) explain that citizenship in its early forms was based on the 
principle of equality and that citizenship grew by enriching the body of rights.  The core of 
citizenship at this stage was composed of civic rights, and citizenship represented the notion of 
participation in public life as it involved not only autonomy, but also judgment, loyalty, 
entitlements and obligations. Thus citizenship implied the concepts of both citizens’ rights and 
duties. In particular, Marshall and Bottomore (ibid.) emphasise that the civil element is composed 
of the rights necessary for the individual freedom of the person, freedom of speech, thought and 
faith, the right to own property and to conclude valid contracts and the right to justice. Individual 
rights are thus stressed in comparison to collective rights; and in relation to collective power and 
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citizenship, civil rights gave each citizen the power to engage as an independent unit in the 
economic struggle as part of his or her individual status.  
For Sun, civil rights were understood in the context of citizens’ collective rights rather than 
those of the individual. Accordingly, See Sin Heng (in Lee and Lee, et al. 2011:36-37) points out 
that even though Sun consistently pushed for a republican mode of political order, Sun’s analysis 
of democracy was about “people’s rights”, and the liberal conception of politics was about the 
equality of all citizens. Sun (1994:125) explained, “Right is a concept possessed by all men, and 
since I cannot exclude myself from mankind, how can I alone forget rights? So rather than praise 
me for sacrificing my rights, it would be close to the truth to praise me as one who has thought 
deeply and broadly about the concept of rights and in whom the concept of rights is of the deepest, 
greatest concern…I am confident that I can still see in the two words quanli [rights] the highest 
measure of common good and the highest degree of greatness.” Sun’s concept of democracy and 
people’s rights (quanli) was therefore understood in terms of the rights of the people (minquan) 
rather than individual rights; furthermore, in Sun’s opinion, the rights of the people also 
corresponded directly to the rights of the state.  
Liang Qichao, in his 1902 document “Lun quanli sixiang”, insisted on the interaction 
between individuals and the collective, arguing that the consciousness of rights was also concerned 
with the duties that an individual ought to exercise for a general group. He further argued that 
rights are continuously disturbed and harmed from without (external threat) and that one must 
continuously exert one’s inner strength in resistance, emphasising the balance between the internal 
and external strengths of the self.20  The contrast between Sun and Liang with regard to the concept 
of citizens’ rights seemed to be due to the modern influence on the relationship between an 
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individual and society regarding whether the former was a component of the latter, or if each 
coexists interdependently in a modern nation-state.   
Jenco, (2010) points to Chinese intellectuals, such as Zhang Shizhao, who emphasised on 
the rights of individual citizens: Zhang argued that self-awareness, the use of one’s own talent and 
the accommodation of differences could be undertaken by all individual citizens to craft not only 
their own citizenship, but the polity itself. 21 Moreover, Weatherley (2014:13-5) argues that since 
human rights refer to the rights of human beings and only individual persons are human beings, 
human rights can only be the rights of individuals; if we accept the idea that human rights are 
grounded in our human dignity and moral worth, then this too is consistent with the belief that 
human rights are possessed exclusively by individuals.  
From the Confucian perspective, however, Fitzgerald (1996:7-8) emphasizes that in one of 
Sun’s frequently used maxims, “tianxia weigong”, and the term weigong  had not yet lost this sense 
of collective ownership for most people. In the Republic, the word “for all” (weigong) was 
frequently used to denote organisations or functions poised, as it were, between the individual and 
the state.  However, Fitzgerald (ibid.) claims that communal ownership was not quite what Sun 
had in mind when he used the term: Sun was making a competing claim on the term by conflating 
the concepts of government and public in the idea of a world in which the people would rule, or a 
democratic state. On the other hand, Sun was conflating the relationship between individuals and 
communities with that between citizens and the national state.  
In fact, Sun’s understanding of political rights signified the collective power of the state. 
Wang (2003) emphasises that Sun even described family and clan as rivals to a collective Chinese 
identity as Sun urged that China desperately needed national unity and collective freedom. Sun’s 
idea of the minquan principle was therefore ultimately based on the collective rights of the people 
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in society and of the nation. Sun explained: “When men gather, they constitute a group; that 
group’s prosperity or decline often depends on the progress or deterioration of the men who 
compose it. Although larger than a tribe, the group that constitutes a nation is nonetheless a 
group.”22 In contrast to Liang’s concept of balanced rights between individuals and the collective, 
Sun’s concept of citizens’ rights was of the collective rights of the people and the state rather than 
individual citizens.  
Sun insisted that the Chinese people historically enjoyed, to an extent, an excessive level 
of individual liberty, which resulted in the absence of national unity: “On no account must we give 
more liberty to the individuals; let us secure liberty instead for the nation. The individual should 
not have too much liberty, but the nation should have complete liberty. When the nation can act 
freely, then China may be called strong. To make the nation free, we must each sacrifice his 
personal freedom.”23 Gregor (2000:60) asserts that Sun clearly rejected any contract theory of the 
state that sought to interpret a nation as a voluntary association of individuals, as Sun argued that 
such a concept of rights would weaken the integrity of a nation, undermine its viability and leave 
the Chinese exposed to every threat. He pedagogically insisted that just as each grain of sand must 
lose its freedom if the sand were to be solidified in cement, the Chinese individual must also give 
up his or her freedom if Chinese society was to become strongly organised. In his judgment, China 
required organisation, discipline, loyalty, and disposition among its citizens to sacrifice unto death 
for the national community. In Sun’s view, the individual right of freedom impeded social stability 
and national unity. 
Wang (2003:33-4) also holds that Sun emphasised people’s rights (minquan) were not 
about personal or civil liberties; instead, Sun argued that China desperately needed unity and 
national liberalisation. However, Sun insisted that citizens’ rights were not merely those of the 
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state, but included those of scholars and the literati and other social groups as well as those of 
merchant guilds, local organisations and extended families. Sun’s interpretation of collective rights 
therefore also implied the equality of all citizens regardless of social status and occupation. 
Minquan thus represented the collective power due to the people, their share in determining the 
destiny of China and their role in saving China. Sun conceived of collective rights and duties as 
strictly for the purpose of national unity, and the aim of Sun’s emancipatory communication was 
to counter the social, economic and political oppressions by the absolute power of the monarchy. 
In Sun’s pursuit of collective power, however, individual rights had to be sacrificed.  
With the minquan principle, Sun’s political intention was to achieve China’s 
transformation from a monarchy into a modern nation-state. Sun contemplated how best to balance 
the power between the authority and the people, concluding that the collective power of the people 
was essential to the constructing of a republic. Sun claimed that the minquan principle was about 
protecting the collective power of the people, and the balance of power between the people and 
the government had to be achieved through the constitution. However, in a modern nation-state, 
citizenship represents the balance between a powerful state and less powerful citizens, while 
constitutionalism exists in the cohesive relation between collective and individual rights. In Sun’s 
concept of collective and individual rights, however, the latter had to be sacrificed for the former 
for the sake of national unity; in the same vein, Sun’s understanding of constitutionalism was 
solely to protect the collective rights of the people.  
At this point, it is important to examine constitutionalism in relation to individual rights 
and duties in the modern nation-state. Miller and Rose (2008:48) maintain that it was political 
rationality, which began in the first half of the 20th century that constituted the citizen as a social 
being whose powers and obligations were articulated in the language of social responsibilities and 
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collective solidarities. Consequently, the individual was to be integrated into society in the form 
of a citizen with social needs, but in a contract in which individual and society had mutual claims 
and obligations. As such, the concept of social contract between the individual and the state was 
what protected individual rights in a modern constitutional nation-state. However, in Sun’s view, 
the constitution existed exclusively to protect the collective rights of citizens from the absolute 
power of the monarchy.  
Weatherley (2014:13-4) posits that early ideas about human rights, more specifically 
natural rights, are derived from the Hellenistic and Roman Stoic conception of natural law, which 
guided the implementation of state law and restrained the exercise of state power. Later thinkers 
like John Locke suggested that natural law not only imposed specific duties on people to treat 
others respectfully, but also invested them with the rights necessary to fulfil these duties. 
Weatherley (ibid.) argues that one of the most basic liberal assumptions about human rights is that 
they are the rights of human individuals, and the idea has been popular since early European and 
American declarations of rights enshrined the rights of man and the rights of the citizen.   
Sun’s understanding of political equality and freedom in the form of civil rights was 
interpreted originally from the concept of a balance of power between the people and the state, not 
between an individual and the state. The minquan principle thus symbolised not only the 
manifestation of Chinese civil rights but also the recognition of citizens as an important constituent 
of collective power. Sun explained the essence of the minquan principle by saying that “equality 
and our principle of democracy are also the same, because the principle of minquan maintains that 
the people, as far as government is concerned, ought all to have equal status, and that monarchical 
rule must be broken in order to bring that about. Therefore we say that minquan rule corresponds 
with equality.”24  
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Sun’s pursuit of citizens’ equality and freedom was also for the entire Chinese people rather 
than each individual citizen. Sun’s approach might be deeply related to the Confucian influence of 
collective well-being through datong ideology. However, Angle and Svensson (2001:xxiv) point 
out that during the early 20th century, the harmony of interests between individual and collective 
was regarded as both attainable and desirable, although some, like Sun, believed that the Chinese 
people had too much freedom and that national salvation required the sacrifice of their individual 
freedom.  
Liang, on the other hand, insisted that the citizenry was a collection of individuals and that 
sovereignty was based on the rights of individuals. Liang further argued for the correlation between 
individuals and a nation by claiming that “if one wants to seek the consciousness, feelings, and 
actions of individuals, one will never find that for which one looks and where its people have rights, 
one finds a nation with rights; where its people have no shame, one finds a shameless nation.”25 
Alternatively, Zhang Shizhao’s approach to politics, for example, does not depend on the belief 
that social action must always imply collective action, which may be one reason why he rarely 
invokes such terms as “commoners” or “masses” as political actors; for Zhang, min (the people) 
possess ruling authority, but political actors are almost always referred to as “persons” (ren), 
implying that anybody can participate successfully in changing shared environments.26  
On the other hand, collective power had its usefulness in consolidating citizens’ power.  
Marshall and Bottomore (1992:40) regard the outcome of collective power as one of the main 19th 
century achievements of political solidarity since the growth of trade unionism enabled the workers 
to use their civil rights collectively.  Thus collective power was also applied in protecting the rights 
of labourers. Sun extended his support of collective power to labour unions in opposition to the 
class conflict resulting from capitalism: “The largest organized bodies in the world today are the 
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labour unions which have grown up after the revolutions when liberty was won. Workers were 
dissatisfied with labour conditions, and proclaimed the inequality of capital and labour, the need 
for organisation, and the duty of resistance against nobles and capitalists…Only the negative 
weapon of non-cooperation through strikes, but it has been more deadly than any military weapon. 
If the workers make requests to the state or to the capitalists which are not granted, they can unite 
and strike as one man.”27  
Brødsgaard and Strand (1998:17-8) point out that the history of civil society in the West 
was propelled by a discourse of rights, especially individual rights, and the formation of a social 
realm outside the state; however, in China, the relevant discourse is one of relatedness and 
obligations, implying the importance of relations within collective. In the minquan principle, Sun 
elaborated the autonomy derived from collective rights of the people with the reflection of 
Confucianism with any mention of individual rights being largely missing: “When Confucius said 
the exercise of the great principles of the great empire for all, it was to advocate a united world 
under the rule of the people.”28 Sun’s understanding of citizenship reflected the traditional Chinese 
concept of collective action for the ultimate purpose of achieving equality and freedom for the 
people and for the nation.  
Sun strove to amalgamate the Confucian ideal of collective rights and the Western 
constitutional system; however, his insistence on collective rights was in conflict with the 
constitutional principle protecting individual rights. Sun was thus faced with the task of reconciling 
the conflicts between individual and collective rights concerning constitutionalism. While the 
balance between citizens’ rights and duties was the principle of citizenship, the coexistence of 
individual and collective rights was the principle of constitutionalism. Previously, Sun’s 
reconciliatory methodology had resorted to assimilating a weaker element to the stronger 
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constituent, e.g., the ethnic minority to the majority or family and clan to the nation, for political 
efficacy and efficiency. For Sun, citizens’ equality and freedom were contingent upon the existence 
of the nation and democracy was for the people, not for the individual. However, individual and 
collective rights were not mutually exclusive but interdependent in constitutionalism, and Sun had 
to recognise the need for their coexistence. 
 
 
3.3 Modern Nation-State and Women’s Citizenship  
Habermas (1996a, 1996b) distinguishes the Volksnation from the Bürgernation by pointing out 
that the former stands for the pre-modern nation as a folk-community (i.e., racially defined 
consanguine community) and the latter for a modern nation as political community (i.e., a republic 
established by politically aware citizens). Habermas (1997) also examines the relationship between 
loyalty and cultural identity by insisting that, while it is true that a political unit requires a collective 
identity, if it wants to settle its conflicts without violence, it [has to] accept majority rule and 
practise solidarity.29 Furthermore, Schwarzmantel (2003:100) posits that the Bürgernation, or a 
nation of the legally empowered by citizenship, is certainly more open and less restrictive than a 
Volksnation: it follows a much more voluntary and inclusive logic. All can join the Bürgernation, 
at least in principle, as long as they accept certain standards of tolerance and recognition of the 
rights of others as the condition of holding rights for oneself or one’s own group, which is the 
appeal of a civic nation.  
On the other hand, Liang distinguished between the modern nation and the traditional state 
by arguing that nations were not collections of individuals, families or tribes but were rather 
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composed of a people (minzu), which, in modern times, had to become a citizenry (Fogel and 
Zarrow 1997:18). Therefore, citizenship was a central element in making a modern nation-state, 
which both Sun and Liang seemed to have agreed upon. Zarrow (ibid.:3-5) argue that citizenship 
was a necessary element of citizens’ active rights that shifted premodern rulership to a modern 
nation-state; he also stresses that citizenship has proved to be a key concept in the rise of 
republicanism as subjecthood has evolved from the rulership, acknowledging citizenship as the 
source of active agency of citizens.  
Sun’s advocacy of the rights of voting and recall in his Fivefold Constitution clearly 
demonstrated his support for participatory citizenship. Sun interpreted that to vote was to perform 
participatory citizenship for the nation, and the right to recall protects citizens’ ability to exercise 
their collective power against any despotic authority with absolute power. Sun discussed his future 
plan of full constitutionalism for China: “All this is the consequence of the citizens of this Republic 
enjoying equal and direct electoral rights. Regarding this country from the aspect of international 
policy, we see that it was the first to establish equal and direct electoral rights for all the 
population.”30 Therefore, both Sun and Liang stressed the importance of the citizenry in 
establishing a modern nation-state, and Sun in particular emphasised the equal rights of citizens.  
Zarrow (ibid.) posits that citizenship developed in modern China by meeting certain needs 
to define membership in the national community to establish rights and duties or to give a certain 
protected status for these members as well as encouraging some kind of participation in state and 
society, illustrating the close connection between the ideas of citizenship and democracy. Sun 
emphasized the sequential order of implementing constitutionalism; first, national unity had to be 
attained, and only then could democratisation be implemented by granting citizenship. Thus, while 
each element of democracy was important, a degree of importance in terms of implementation was 
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based on the particularity of Chinese political situation. Taking a public oath, Sun announced the 
aim of the Chinese constitution on January 12, 1919, stating, “I will destroy the old and build the 
new, and fight for the self-determination of the people, and will apply all my strength to the support 
of the Chinese Republic, the realisation of democracy through ‘the three principles’, and to carry 
into effect ‘the Fivefold Constitution’ for the progress of good government, the happiness and 
perpetual peace of the people, and for the strengthening of the foundations of the State, in the name 
of peace throughout the world.”31  
Sun strove to establish a republic because he believed that the monarchy was founded upon 
class hierarchy and demanded the people’s submission to its absolute power; on the other hand, a 
republic represented the establishment of a modern nation-state by the power of the people. As 
discussed earlier, Sun initially considered two models of republican government: the American 
and the French models, both created after revolutions and by their citizens. Schwarzmantel 
(2003:74–6) highlights the essential differences between the American and the French republican 
models: the American founding fathers accepted conflict and division as American republicanism 
rejected classical ideas of civic virtue; whereas the French model was more unitary with a fear of 
division, factions and excessive pluralism, and French republicans saw the nation and the republic 
as synonymous. The French republican model thus gave greater importance to the state since the 
centralized state was seen as the interpreter and guarantor of the common interest, autonomous 
from society. 
Sun emphasised that America was the first country to carry out the principle of a separately 
established three-fold authority in the form of a written constitution. Sun stressed the importance 
of balance between state power and citizens’ rights in the minquan principle, showing his 
confidence in the new Chinese constitution: “We will use our Principle of the People’s Sovereignty 
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and remake China into a nation under complete popular rule, ahead of Europe and America. To 
realise this aim, we must first study democracy until we understand it with perfect clarity.”32 This 
demonstrated Sun’s reconciling style and willingness to study and adopt the positive elements of 
Western political structures in order to apply them to the Chinese context.  
Sun argued for the political hybridity of the Chinese constitution because a direct imitation 
of Western model would ignore China’s particular political context. Sun insisted, “We had taken 
the materials of European and American history, not with the intention of copying these countries 
and of following in their steps, but we advocate our principle of democracy in order to re-create 
China and make it a nation where the people have entire control, a nation which will be superior 
to either Europe or America.”33 Sun also preferred a reconciliatory system because he was aware 
of the negative by-products of Western political system, “Every emigrant after living some time in 
America enjoys the rights of citizenship. After emancipation of the blacks, the latter were also 
given rights of citizenship of America. But the American politicians took advantage of this and 
committed abominable misdeeds for a number of years, until a law was passed that illiterates were 
deprived of many civic rights.”34   
Unlike monarchy, each branch of a modern constitutional government maintains 
independence because constitutional branches have to be clearly defined so that there is no 
encroachment of one upon the other. Hence, the autonomy of each branch was the key to unity 
between the people and the government. After all, the balance of power between the people and 
the government depends upon the balance between autonomy and control within law. In a similar 
way, Sun’s minzu and the minsheng principles also emphasize Chinese cultural and economic 
autonomy while adopting positive elements from the West. Sun explained the reason for his 
selective adoption of Western political structure: “Democracy in its path of progress has met with 
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many obstacles. So we cannot take the foreign methods of exercising democratic rights as our 
standard; its guidance is not good enough… If we copy foreign government, thinking that it has 
advanced like physical science, we shall make a great mistake.”35 Even though both French and 
American models of government influenced Sun in constructing the new Chinese nation-state, 
China’s autonomy and its cultural and political particularity were the main elements that he 
considered.   
 
Women’s Citizenship  
The main enemy of participatory citizenship, according to Rose (1999:254), is any form of 
exclusion. The political doctrine of universal citizenship did not in itself eliminate the demand that 
a boundary be drawn between those who could and those who could not be citizens. Membership 
was open to every individual, and the risk of supporting solely collective rights lay in excluding 
each individual from the group. Tan (2005:1) stresses that citizenship is key to understanding the 
political problems of group membership and individual identity; it is also characteristic of the 
modern era, given that citizenship used to be the privilege of the few and has been used to exclude 
the entire groups of people on the basis of gender, religion, class, property, ethnicity, place of 
origin and age.  
Schoppa (2006:164-7) maintains that from 1917 to 1921, intellectual discussion and its 
emphasis on modernising China reached its apex with the rebellion of young men and women 
against the cultural traditions of patriarchy and social hierarchy. Kang Youwei also comments on 
the condition of women in his Book of the Great Unity (Datongshu) in which he claims that men 
repressed, restrained, deceived and bound women. In fact, Chinese reformers and revolutionaries 
179 
 
were eager to include women among their followers as they believed that the contribution of 
women was necessary in order to save China.36  
However, despite impassioned calls for the introduction of women’s rights in China, they 
were conspicuously absent from the political reforms implemented by the Qing administration.37 
Sun, who collaborated with many women in the Revolutionary Alliance, proposed to encourage 
the inclusion of women in the public space and politics. Sun declared, “Given there are many 
talented women, who were members of the Tongmenghui….it is inevitable that women in the 
future will enjoy their political rights.”38 On the other hand, Liang urged that men’s rights be 
surrendered before they were taken away, suggesting that men should share natural rights with 
women voluntarily. Moreover, Harrison (2000) emphasises the symbolism of women’s moving 
from private space to public space when the practice of foot-binding became prohibited and many 
girls moved from their homes to streets, parks, schools and institutions; furthermore, after the 1911 
revolution, women could enter government.   
Sun even metaphorically compared the constrained China’s economy to women’s bound 
feet.39 Sun recounted the harmful physical effects of foot-binding, saying that it limited women’s 
activities by preventing them from participating in the public space, and forbade the practice 
throughout China, promising an “appropriate penalty” to those who defied it. Additionally, Sun 
encouraged women to receive modern education and job training. On March 28, 1912, the 
provisional government gave the right to vote to women who could pass a test of education. Sun 
critiqued exclusionary gender practices for their negative effects, challenging those who opposed 
the voting rights of women and pointing to the example of suffrage in the West: “General voting 
rights are limited to being a privilege of men. In the last seven to eight years, women in England, 
then in America, fought successfully for their voting rights.”40 Chang and Gordon (1991) point out 
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that, even though Sun was vague about the time frame of doing so, he urged that the discussion of 
women’s political rights be brought to the parliament for a resolution in an executive order. On 
the other hand, Liang and other early reformers believed the vote should be limited to the small 
percentage of the adult population who were literate.41 This represented a difference between Sun 
and Liang in terms of women’s equality: Sun wanted universal suffrage in an attempt to give 
political citizenship to women.   
The Chinese tradition of ignoring women’s rights and freedom in the public space hindered 
political awareness and citizenship for women. Sun’s political support and inclusion of women in 
public space corresponded to his pursuit of freedom and equality of all human beings; it also 
symbolised his belief in universal inclusion, which catalysed solidarity among the people. Sun 
critically analysed unfair gender practices in China and compared them to the political advances 
of women in the West. Sun further explained how and why women successfully gained their voting 
rights in the West, saying, “During the European War, the majority of men went to the war front, 
leaving few men behind, and women made up for the poor availability of men. Since that time, 
men, who once opposed the extension of voting rights to women by saying that ‘women are not 
able to do men’s work’, have become unable to maintain that excuse.”42 Sun thus argued that it 
was only logical as well as pragmatic that women be given citizens’ political rights for national 
unity. His proposal of including women represented the empowerment of women by opening up 
public space in which women could perform their participatory citizenship.  
Previously, Sun regarded unity in language as a crucial vehicle for including both learned 
and illiterate people in the project of national unity because language allowed for an intersubjective 
understanding among the citizens. Sun was aware of the binary function of language in that it could 
either include or exclude the people in uniting or dividing the nation. Likewise, gender also had a 
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crucial role in producing national unity or division. China had been excluding women from 
political rights, which, Sun felt, impeded the modernisation of China. Therefore awarding women 
the rights of citizenship corresponded to a balance of women’s rights and duties in accordance 
with constitutionalism.  
Without public space to perform their political citizenship, women initially communicated 
the need for their rights in language. Specifically, women writers contributed to the rise of 
individual and gender emancipation. From 1917 to 1921, women writers contributed to the rise of 
individual and gender emancipation while working women were often placed at the bottom of the 
class hierarchy.43 Women’s own rejection of this social prejudice and exclusion is clearly 
manifested by Shi Cuntong, who wrote Against Filial Piety wherein she attacked the coerciveness 
of the Confucian traditional value of filial piety and argued against paternal dominance and 
arbitrariness. Schoppa (ibid.) presents the example of the female writer Ba Jin, who wrote a novel 
during the May Fourth Movement in which some parents were known to pressure their daughters 
to kill themselves in order to reap praise from the community.   
The inclusion of women in the project of participatory citizenship signified Sun’s intention 
to bring about the equality of women’s political rights by emancipating them from the restrictive 
practices of traditional patriarchy. In addition to Sun’s support for women’s right to vote, he 
advocated their participation in military service and their right to receive education. His 
emancipatory lexes argued rationally for the inclusion of women and demanded their equal 
political rights, not simply because they were beneficial to the nation, but also they were regarded 
as necessary for women to live as autonomous persons and fulfil their humanity.44  
Sun’s support for women’s equality also included encouraging them to perform their 
voluntary citizenship and thereby carry out the balanced duties and rights of a citizen. Giving 
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women the right to receive education reflected his belief in equality of gender, allowing women to 
build political awareness through intellectual achievement. Sun emphasised the importance of 
women’s education in his speech to the Guangdong Women Teachers’ School in 1912, saying, “It 
is indeed imperative for our colleagues to establish this school at this moment, given that, although 
there are more than 200 million women in China, women’s education has never been taken 
seriously, and consequently, women intellectuals are rather rare. Thus the most pressing matter at 
this moment in Chinese education is to advocate women’s education.”45  
The underlying reason for Sun’s argument for the inclusion of women was also closely 
related to an emancipatory motive for all human beings. His emphasis on the universal education 
also reflected it because Sun regarded the importance of the people as the core element of the 
nation regardless of gender. The authors of the 1905 Citizens’ Reader also reflected a similar idea 
to Sun’s in their assertion that political knowledge should be commonly available to all citizens. 
They wrote, “The nation is collectively owned by the people. It is not true that only officials can 
take care of national matters and that these matters are of no relevance to the rest of the people. 
Furthermore, the argument that patriotism is based on all of the people sharing common knowledge 
in order to equate the people’s interest to the national interest was also prevalent.”46 On the 
occasion of the political declaration of the Nationalist Party in April 1913, Sun further 
demonstrated his support for women’s education in relation to women’s voting rights, saying, 
“Women’s education is to expand women’s knowledge and to support women’s rights.”47 
Accordingly, Sun regarded education as an important component of citizens’ rights, reaffirming 




Sun’s idea including women in the project of universal education also resonated within 
Tongmenghui, the secret society he founded in order to establish a Chinese republic. He believed 
that universal education represented equal citizenship and would prevent gender conflicts. This 
also reverberates in his minsheng principle, reflecting Sun’s belief that a fair distribution of 
intellectual wealth would prevent class conflict. Sun’s insistence on women’s education also 
corresponded with his belief in women’s autonomy through the acquisition of knowledge, 
encouraging women to believe in their autonomous selves: “Women should, at the beginning, 
establish their own organisations for women’s education in order to endow women with knowledge 
and to strengthen their power; only then can they begin to compete with men, and they are bound 
to win; do you believe so? And I have one more suggestion to offer, that is, not to rely on men to 
undertake this project, in case it becomes exploited by men to benefit their own interests.”48  This 
speech, given in 1912, reveals that Sun was forward-thinking: not only did he criticise gender 
inequality in education, but he also endeavoured to ease gender conflict by supporting women’s 
interests and position in society in order for them to attain political and economic autonomy.   
Regarding the public opinion of Chinese women labouring during the early republican 
period, Schoppa (2006:160) stresses that working women were often placed at the bottom of the 
class hierarchy. He further notes that Chinese tradition included cruel practices against women, 
such as female infanticide and foot-binding; and that China’s female suicide ratio was double that 
of Japan and ten times that of Sweden. Sun acknowledged that the geographical and social 
immobility of women also caused their political and economic exclusion because women were 
often confined to the private space of home. Indeed, spatial immobility kept not only women but 
also other oppressed classes such as the disabled, the elderly and minors from entering public space 
to perform their citizenship. Sun’s praxis of emancipatory communication included all strata of 
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excluded citizens, encouraging them to be a part of the new China. However, he also made it clear 
that such inclusions were contingent upon women’s performance of citizens’ duties, highlighting 
his principle of maintaining a balance between citizens’ rights and duties. He indicated that those 
who failed to meet citizens’ obligations would forfeit their rights as well.  
Sun (1994:240–1) promoted the well-being of pregnant women, the elderly (those over 50 
or 60), the disabled and the sick, intending that they would receive local medical treatment, care 
and support. Furthermore, he also included minors; depending on their locality, he advocated that 
they should be protected by law and entitled to a local education. He also stressed children’s 
education and its funding, reflecting his compassion for the underprivileged and vulnerable. He 
declared, “Promote the popularisation of education; develop child-oriented education, restructure 
the schooling system; increase educational investment; and secure its independence.”49    
Women were often conditioned by rigid gender narratives, which encouraged female piety 
and implicitly supported male dominance. Furthermore, Confucianism discouraged women from 
performing economic and political citizenship in public space. Women therefore waged a struggle 
to participate in patriotic and public affairs, succeeding in joining Sun’s revolutionary cause and 
organisations.50 This demonstrates that women managed to contribute publicly in their own way 
to the establishment of the new Chinese republic. In the process, Sun encouraged women to 
perform citizenship in public spaces. For Sun, women represented oppressed and excluded citizens, 
and without their inclusion, a new all-inclusive China could not be achieved. However, his efforts 
to include women were also confronted by challenges from the Confucian tradition of patriarchy, 
of which main aim was to maintain social order by the powerful constituents of society. Sun needed 
to redress the unfair treatment of women, and the solution was to encourage women to perform 
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their citizenship by providing them with space and the rights of citizens, legally protected by 
constitutionalism.  
From a post-modernist theoretical point of view, Sun’s act of granting women their 
citizenship resonates what Butler (1990) refers to as performative gender, which is a doing action; 
it is not about following a given social or cultural attribute, but rather is about constructing gender 
by performance. Butler (ibid.) claims that the subject is ‘performatively constituted’ by 
autonomous acts, including acts that signify a particular gender. In the same vein, Sun helped 
women perform their citizenship and gender rights. This was also a process of subjectifying 
women against their inscribed traditional gender role, and against its ‘ritualised production, a ritual 
reiterated under and through constraint, prohibition and taboo.’51   
Sun’s emancipatory communication strove to provide women with social and geographical 
mobility to perform their citizenship. It also endeavoured to emancipate women from the 
restrictive space of the traditional gender hierarchy and social practices by giving them political 
rights such as voting, education and undertaking military service. Sun’s emancipatory efforts also 
challenged the fundamentals of Confucianism and Chinese traditional duties imposed on women. 
Sun’s emancipatory lexes thus corresponded to the reconciliatory praxis through which both 
citizen’s duty and gender right were balanced. Sun’s emancipatory communication empowered 








3.4 Political Tutelage and Individual Freedom 
Twelve years after the establishment of the first Chinese republic, Sun concluded that China was 
not yet ready for a constitutional government. On April 12, 1924, Sun completed his draft of the 
Programme of National Reconstruction, wherein he gave special attention to the role of the 
government in educating the people. Sun’s minquan principle was also altered to facilitate the 
competence of the people in their knowledge of politics; accordingly, Sun instructed the 
government to train and guide the people so that they would know how to exercise their rights of 
election, recall, initiative and referendum.52 For example, article eight of the Programme of 
National Reconstruction stipulated that, during the period of political tutelage, “the people must 
be able to fulfil their duties as citizens, and must pledge themselves to carry out the principles of 
the revolution.”53  
Sun continued to encourage the Chinese people to be prepared to sacrifice their rights for 
the common good of the nation: “On no account must we give more liberty to the individuals; let 
us secure liberty instead for the nation. The individual should not have too much liberty, but the 
nation should have complete liberty. When the nation can act freely, then China may be called 
strong. To make the nation free, we must each sacrifice his personal freedom.”54 His comments 
clearly demonstrate that Sun considered individual freedom to be an enemy to national unity.  
Sun instructed that, in the first phase of military operation, the entire country be subject to 
military rule and that, to hasten the unity of the country, the government employ military force to 
conquer all domestic opposition and propagate the principles of the party so that the people might 
be enlightened. Upon the completion of the military operation, the period of political tutelage in a 
province should begin, and military rule should cease as soon as order within the province is 
completely restored. During the period of political tutelage, Sun emphasized that “the government 
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should dispatch trained officers who have passed the examinations to the different districts to assist 
the people in making preparations for local self-government.”55   
Sun began to allow political parties to mobilise and exercise the authority of government 
organisations and justified such actions in his theories of politics and party rule. It represented the 
intervening power of the state over individual rights. This trend of limiting individual freedom 
continued even after Sun’s death in 1925 through the period of political tutelage, in which the 
KMT would educate the Chinese masses in the practicalities of democratic local self-government 
until they were able to fully understand and operate within such a system. Consequently, Sun’s 
efforts to enlighten the people politically produced the effect of denying the political rights of the 
people in the process of tutoring the masses.  
In 1929,  the year the period of political tutelage was to begin according to Sun’s instruction, 
Hu Shi, in his essay in Xinyue, argued that a genuine protection of human rights required a legal 
foundation that applied impartially to all, including members of the military and the government. 
Hu argued that Sun’s writings pointed to the need to promulgate the provisional constitution: “Sun 
initially completed it in 1906, and it was subsequently repeatedly revised, and wrote his Sun’s 
Theory in 1919, and in the sixth chapter, he repeatedly emphasized the importance of a transitional 
period and speaking very clearly, stated that by this time, we should have a Provisional 
Constitution in order to instruct the people how to implement regional autonomy.”56 When the 
National government issued an order concerning the protection of human rights, Hu Shi (ibid.) 
argued that human rights were protected by law in every country in the world and that a foundation 
for the rule of law (fazhi) needed to be established. 
Fitzgerald (1996:20) correctly notes that the purpose of pedagogical politics was not simply 
the awakening of the people, but also the establishment of a state structure that would portray itself 
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to its citizens as a political teacher. Pedagogy was thus a style of politics as much as it was a goal 
of political action in centralising authority over its operations, extending its authority over the 
community at large and promoting tighter discipline within the party and society. Fitzgerald (ibid.) 
indicates that Sun infringed upon the rights and freedom of the people through political tutelage, 
noting that awakening people involved teaching workers, peasants, merchants, women and 
students where their real interests lay. On the other hand, Fitzgerald (ibid.) points out, the political 
tutelage was carried out as forcefully as possible, and a variety of rationales was put forward to 
explain the representative relationship between leaders and followers in tutelage politics.57  
With regard to the pedagogical implication of hierarchical relationship between the teacher 
and the pupils, Weatherley (2014:15) calls attention to the fact that the universality of human rights 
was threatened by political tutelage. By advocating for the collective rights of citizens and the state, 
Sun let political tutelage override individual rights.  Furthermore, Sun resolutely demonstrated his 
intention to teach the people by comparing the politically inchoate people and nation to a child: 
“China today needs the Republic just as a child needs school… enlightened despotism has as its 
end an absolute monarchy, whereas our period of preparation and training has as its end the 
creation of a republic.”58 From the paternal perspective, Sun concluded that the emergent stage of 
China as a modern nation-state might take more time and that it had to be taught to achieve the 
status of autonomy in order to enjoy full constitutionalism.  
Beneath the conflict between citizens’ freedom and pedagogical politics, there was another 
problematic aspect concerning Sun’s imposition of political tutelage: the equality of citizen was in 
direct conflict with elitism. Elitism was present in the form of political hierarchy between these 
tutoring officials and the masses. Jenco (2010:49) explains that even though the people came to 
occupy an unprecedented position of sovereignty and agency, the elites remained at the centre of 
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both. Even though the division between the elites and the masses was often articulated by both 
reformers and revolutionaries, Jenco (2010) points out that the elites remained blind to the 
contributions of non-elites because “the levers that elites once exclusively maneuvered can remain 
in their control even as they attempt to democratise literature by eliminating classical language.”59   
Political tutelage is antithetical to constitutionalism because the latter is based on the 
balance of power between the people and the state, and the constitutional principle of the equality 
of citizens precludes a hierarchical relation between elites and the masses. As Sun’s political 
tutelage was juxtaposed against the rights of individual citizens, Sun’s interpretation of 
constitutionalism represented the idea that the condition of individual freedom could be sacrificed 
for national unity by the state. Accordingly, the equality of citizen was also precluded by political 
tutelage based on the hierarchical relation between tutor and pupil or between elites and the masses, 
which was also a replica of Mencius’s well-known inculcation that produced social division 
between governors and the governed. Duara (1995:100) aptly describes the government stance on 
guiding the people as, “the radical nationalists declared that in the period of political tutelage, the 
masses had to be shown the path to rational progress”. However, the hierarchical relation between 
the people and the Qing government was exactly what originally motivated Sun to overthrow the 











The Minsheng Principle 
INTRODUCTION 
Sun’s minsheng principle (livelihood of the people) was aimed to protect the economic rights of 
tenant farmers from unjust tax systems, the unequal distribution of capital and, most importantly, 
unequal land ownership. Sun believed that rise in the value of land was created by people’s labour 
that the profit should be given back to those who generated it: the labourers. Accordingly, Sun 
proposed a land equalisation plan through which the government would buy back land from 
landlords at market price for redistribution.  
In this chapter, I argue that Sun’s minsheng principle represented Sun’s moral obligation 
to include tenant farmers in the economic rights of livelihood rather than a concrete economic plan 
to solve the cause of their economic exclusion. This is significant because it revealed a gap in 
Sun’s land equalisation plan between his emancipatory inclusion of the peasants and the reality of 
economic conflict involving the exclusionary system of land ownership. Sun’s plan advocated his 
belief in economic harmony through communal cooperation and sharing, countering Marx's 
interpretation of material history wherein class conflict in economic struggle created human 
evolution. Consequently, Sun’s land equalisation plan was challenged by both landlords and 
farmers as it lacked sufficient funds and a detailed plan. 
Sun’s minsheng principle also demonstrated his reconciliatory approach to Confucian 
datong communalism and Western communism in order to protect tenant farmers from economic 
exploitation. In his effort to reach socialism directly by bypassing the necessary phases of 
economic development, Sun rejected the negative effects of capitalism while trying to adopt its 
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positive elements of individual land ownership and economic incentives at the same time. 




















4.1 Land and Tenant Farmers  
China was traditionally an agrarian country, so land was a primary source of wealth. Social and 
economic activities accordingly evolved around the use of land and the distribution of goods. In 
the hierarchical composition of traditional Chinese society, the most respected were scholars, who 
were usually landlords; farmers were assigned the next level of social respect, followed by artisans 
and merchants. This reflected the importance of agriculture in society and the common belief that 
farmers would not abandon their country in times of danger.1 Sun also commented on the 
importance of farmers, emphasising the necessity to protect them and their livelihood: “Since the 
production of food in China depends on the peasants, and since the peasants have to toil so bitterly, 
we must have the government make regulations by law for the protection of peasants if we want 
to increase the production of food.”2  
However, even though agriculture was regarded with more respect than commerce, for 
example, farmers were constantly challenged by economic hardship. Sun’s principle of livelihood 
was conceived by witnessing the hardship of peasants, including his own father, with the intention 
of helping farmers achieve a desirable livelihood by equalising land ownership and regulating 
capital. However, Sun expressed frustration when his minsheng principle was not well understood 
in comparison with his earlier minzu and minquan principles: “After thirteen years of changes in 
our democratic government and after thirteen years of experience, our comrades have all come to 
understand clearly the principles of nationalism and democracy; however, regarding the principle 
of livelihood, they don't comprehend.”3 Sun (1930:422) firmly declared that the underlying 
purpose of his land equalisation plan in the minsheng principle was to return the value of surplus 
labour to the labourers, not to the landowners: “This proves that rise in land values should be 
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credited to all the people and to their efforts; the landowner himself has nothing to do with the rise 
and the fall [in land values].”  
According to Sun’s minsheng principle, landowners could set the value of land for sales 
autonomously. If the value was set excessively high, then the landowner would have to pay higher 
taxes in proportion to the land value; if the landlord set the value too low, then the government 
would buy the property at the price they had set. From this point on, all increases in land value 
would go to the community and help defray the costs of government. Sun’s proposal also revealed 
the influence of both traditional Chinese communalism and Soviet style communism as he 
advocated for state-regulated capital as a means of promoting industry. Sun explicated the structure 
of his plan: “Our Principle of Livelihood is a form of communism. It is not a form that originated 
with Marx but a form that was practiced when primitive man appeared upon the earth.”4  
Sun’s 1894 letter to Li Hongzhang, then the viceroy of Zhili Province, reveals Sun’s early 
economic assessment on agriculture and peasants’ livelihood in China. Sun’s primary concern was 
developing new technologies and economic innovations to strengthen China and to augment 
peasants’ livelihood, arguing that the fullest exploitation of natural resources would bring about 
China’s national economic strength. On the other hand, Sun asserted that the key to a strong China 
lay not in importing and manufacturing armaments such as ships and guns, but rather in the 
development of the economy, including agriculture. Of particular importance to Sun was the need 
to increase agricultural productivity through the use of modern machinery and underdeveloped 
arable land. Sun appealed to Li, saying, “Man cannot eat soil, but soil can produce the five grains 
and the hundred fruits to feed man. Man cannot eat grass but grass can nurture the six animals, 
which provide meat for his table. When one says, ‘the land has unused benefits, and the people 
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have excess strength’ it means that the soil for growing crops is not fully cultivated and that the 
forests and waters are not fully tapped. How can we achieve wealth in this fashion?” 5  
Sun also addressed the issue of farmers’ livelihoods by explaining his concerns regarding 
the disproportionate structure of Chinese population in farming: “There are only about 50 million 
people to be found in China engaged in productive labour. And so it turns out that in China, out of 
eight people, only one is engaged in productive labour. It is not to be wondered at that our country 
is poor. The Chinese proverb has it: “One peasant tills the soil, six eat rice” or “the worker works 
alone but six people consume the fruits of his labour.”6 Regarding the unfair landownership in the 
Qing Dynasty, Hsü (2000) explains that a high concentration of land was owned by the socially 
privileged class as “about 50-60 percent of arable land was in the hands of the gentry and another 
10 percent was possessed by the Manchu bannermen and officials, leaving only 30 percent of the 
available arable land to the rest of the four hundred million Chinese people. Consequently, 60 to 
90 percent of Chinese farmers had no land at all, and the life of landless peasants was extremely 
onerous despite their hard work. What made the peasant’s life even harder was the fall in grain 
price, which was estimated to have dropped by about one-half between the years 1815 and 1850.”7  
This economic disarray and its impact on the peasants continued; for example, between the 
early 1820s and the early 1840s, the price of rice fell 50 percent, and cotton prices also declined 
significantly, in part due to a decrease in demand with the influx of less expensive foreign products 
after the Opium War. The Qing government accordingly imposed surcharges and raised conversion 
rates as the effective rate of taxation steadily climbed.8 Moreover, Sun noted that foreign trades 
also had a negative impact on the livelihood of the peasants: “Foreign nations use the treaties to 
bind China’s customs and likin taxes; neither the customs nor the likin stations are free to raise the 
tariff rate on foreign goods, but they can increase duties at will upon Chinese goods…  It is clear 
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that if we want Chinese industries to flourish, we must follow the protective policy of the United 
States and of Germany, resist the invasion of foreign goods and protect our native goods.”9  
In the face of economic hardship and political chaos, Sun suggested an innovative option 
in his speech at the Institute for the Study of the Farmers’ Movement in 1924, saying, “In solving 
problems concerning the landowners, we can make the landowners pay a heavy tax on the value 
of their land. If the landowners refuse to pay this tax, we can confiscate their land, make it public 
land, and give it to the farmers so that they will own the land they till.”10 In fact, the underlying 
cause of unfair landownership and the resultant economic adversity for peasants was inextricably 
connected to the ratio of available arable land to population. Mounting population pressure on both 
physical and government resources, a worsening state fiscal crisis, foreign encroachment and 
growing local disorder all began to strain social structures throughout China. By the 1840s, the 
political and economic turmoil was accompanied by a marked rise in popular resistance to rents 
and taxes.11  
It is relevant to explore the Western discourse on land and agriculture, which emphasized 
that land was the source of individual wealth. For example, Tribe (1978) maintains that Western 
discourse on the land in the 19th century encouraged peasants to exploit more of the earth, explore 
the possibilities of land and create a structure constituted by the concepts of capital, profit, 
exchange, production and distribution. Tribe (ibid.) further claims that “the agriculture process of 
production, from ploughing to sowing to reaping, is conceived as the outcome of the conscious 
activity of the individual, without whose intervention nothing takes place.”12 His remarks suggest 
that the Western understanding of agriculture was a direct and cooperative performance between 
the autonomous labourer and land. Furthermore, the Western glorification of machinery and the 
advancement of agricultural tools also demonstrate human beings’ will to explore, develop and 
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eventually exploit the land, indicating its support for the employment of technology and scientific 
applications for pragmatic purposes of improving the livelihood of farmers. This was the main 
driver of economic development in the West.  
In contrast, Chinese discourse on land emphasised a relationship of respect, placing the 
labourer in a position of subjugation to the land. The land was an object of superstition, something 
to worship and respect, and harvests were produced seasonally and naturally rather than through 
the intervention of machinery: “Grains and fibres, on the other hand, are produced from the land, 
nurtured through the seasons, and harvested with labour; they cannot be gotten in a day.”13 In 
addition, the Confucian taxonomy of class and occupation internalised the normativity of the social 
hierarchy; for example, the great sage Mencius said that manual labourers were bound to be 
governed by the intellectually higher governors.14 Labour and its reward were thus separately 
retained.   
Arable land therefore represented an economic and social division between landlords and 
peasants. Labour ethics emphasised quotidian labour, encouraging peasants to work around the 
clock without making a sustainable living. A popular traditional narrative reveals how to control 
the people with their livelihood from the perspective of governors: “The way of the people is this; 
when they have a constant livelihood, they will have constant minds, but when they lack a constant 
livelihood, they will lack constant minds. When they lack constant minds there is no dissoluteness, 
depravity, deviance, or excess to which they will not succumb.”15  
Even though discourses on land differed in their themes and purposes between China and 
the West, the system of tenancy and the burden of taxation seemed to be a common source of 
economic conflict between peasants and landlords. Tribe (1978:92) examines the tenancy system 
in the West by describing the agony of farmers resulting from the unfair equation of the system: 
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“The farmer is an undertaker who promises to pay to the landowner, for his farm of land, a fixed 
sum of money (generally supposed to be equal in value to the third of the produce) without the 
assurance of the profit he will derive from this enterprise”. His comment summarizes and 
problematizes the repercussions of the tenancy system. At the same time, Tribe (ibid.:92) argues 
against the tenancy system, insisting that the rent is a derivative of land and the tenancy system is 
a contract where land is inserted; thus the unspoiled relation between human labour and land is 
damaged by the tenancy system. On the other hand, Sun pointed out the hereditary aspect of 
occupation in the West, particularly for the peasants: “[in Europe] the occupations of the common 
people were also hereditary; they could never do anything else. If a man was a tiller of the soil, his 
children and grandchildren would be farmers. A labourer’s children and grandchildren would have 
to do bitter toil.” 16  
In China, the power of the landlords also interfered with the autonomous relationship 
between human labour and land. Although there were various relationships between landlords and 
tenants involving the tenancy system, Lin (1997:136) points to the exploitation of poor tenants by 
unscrupulous landlords, who “arbitrarily increased rent, practiced usury, manipulated crop prices 
and exercised tyranny over their tenants”. Lin (ibid.) further stresses that such exploitation did not 
necessarily generate “class awareness on the part of the oppressed tenants”, emphasising the 
possibility that the delay in modern citizen awareness among the peasants in China might have 
been related to the tenancy system. Lin’s observation confirms that the Confucian discourse on 
land and agriculture produced docile tenant farmers resigned to the tenancy system and consequent 
hardship; thus “the landlords, irrespective of their social backgrounds, were predominantly of the 
parasitic rather than the managerial type, living on rents which were often turned into commercial 
or usury capital.”17 This had a detrimental effect on peasants’ livelihood and on the economic 
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development of agriculture. Hence tenant farmers’ economic hardships represented an externality 
of the tenancy system in farming and class division by land ownership. 
From a Marxist perspective, Elster (1986:315) argues that land implies a medium for the 
autonomous relationship between human labour and nature, insisting that the instruments of labour 
must be elevated to the common property of society. Furthermore, he asserts that the whole of 
labour must be regulated on a cooperative basis to ensure a just distribution of the products of 
labour. Elster (1986:162) also suggests that peasants’ rights and duties should be balanced in their 
connection to nature through land ownership; tenancy thus interfered with the natural relationship 
between peasants and the land as it imposed a sense of duty to remain and work, which ultimately 
benefited the landlords. Sun’s appeal corresponds to Elster’s point: “Most of the fruit of a year’s 
unremitting toil goes finally to the landowner. As a result, great numbers of farmers are abandoning 
their farms and many fields are becoming waste and unproductive… unless we can solve the 
agrarian problem, there will be no solution for the livelihood problem.”18 Tenancy thus represented 
a systematic dichotomy between autonomous labourers and tenant peasants, requiring land 
ownership by the labourer. This was what inspired Sun’s conception of the land equalisation plan 
in his minsheng principle. 
 
Taxation    
Cohen (1984) elucidates how the tax system in agriculture caused the tenancy system to persist in 
China: “For the state, the need for agrarian rent reduction was left unheeded because it was still 
taken for granted that agriculture was the only truly important sector of the economy and major 
government’s tax revenue.”19 Callinicos (2004) additionally notes that a particular quality of the 
East was that states characteristically tax not only peasants but landlords as well, at least in that 
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they take a percentage from the surplus the landlord has extracted. Thus one arena in which tax is 
opposed to rent exists in the structural antagonism between the state and the landed aristocracy. 
Furthermore, Elster (1986:310) maintains that taxes are, in both the East and the West, the source 
of life for the whole apparatus of executive power; strong government and heavy taxes are thus 
identical and tax creates a uniform structure of relationships and people. 
The tax system in the late Qing period was onerous.  One press article in October 1904 
described the heavy tax that people were forced to pay at every turn: “They were taxed twice when 
transmitting goods - once upon entering the city and once upon leaving the city, and they must pay 
again if they lead an ox past a checkpoint.  In addition to these direct levies, and even more difficult 
to enumerate, are the indirect taxes such as household taxes, electrical taxes, and pawn shop 
taxes.”20 This was in contrast to the Confucian ideal of datong communalism, which presented a 
different aspect of the concept of taxation. For example, Chinese political thought regarded datong 
(Great Harmony) as the goal of China’s rulers 21, who were morally obliged to provide the people 
with an ideal environment in which there was enough wealth for family and tax payment.22 On the 
other hand, Chong (2010:193) argues that the definition of datong Confucian ideology could be 
also translated into such terms as anarchism, universalism or utopianism, and Sun’s ideologies 
often reshaped them into a hybrid. 
Tax revenue from the peasants was significant to the Qing government. The method of 
collection was the “single-whip system”, which consolidated all taxes into one compound sum to 
be paid twice a year; a tenant farmer had to pay 50 percent of the yield for rent. The rent was paid 
not in grain, but in silver taels. Adding to the pressure on the tenant farmer, the Qing conversion 
ratio for one silver tael to copper currency, which used to be 1:1,000  before the Opium War, 
soared as high as 1:1800 by 1846.23 What made matters worse was the corruption among the 
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bureaucrats and gentry. Judge (1996) explains that the level of corruption was such that only 20 
percent to 30 percent would enter the bureaus’ coffers while 60 percent to 70 percent served the 
officials and the deputies; another portion was expropriated by the gentry managers and still more 
was embezzled by the clerks. Whatever was left over was sent to the great managers and to all 
imperial general inspectors; they in turn gave the soldiers some 10 to 20 percent of the sum that 
they had received.24   
Sun’s proposal on land taxation was influenced by the single tax concept proposed by 
Henry George (1839-97), an American economist and land reformer best known for his book 
Progress and Poverty. Under his single tax concept, the government would tax all unearned 
income resulting from rising land values and the scarcity of land caused by economic development. 
The revenues from such a single tax would be so large as to make possible the abolition of other 
taxes. Sun (1927:233) explained his plan: “In the event of this principle being applied, the two 
following conditions must be observed: taxation according to the value of the land and 
compensation according to the declared value. In China, up to this day, the so-called three grade 
system of collection of land taxes has been preserved, but owing to the weak development of 
transport and industry, land values were not as high in the past as they are today.” The influence 
of Karl Marx was also evident, who advocated the public ownership of capital and insisted that 
society has to provide appropriate rewards for labour, but that capital accruing from the machine 
should be owned by the public. Both Marx and George believed that social problems stem from 
economic inequality. Sun was impressed by George’s theory of public ownership of land and by 
Marx’s theory of public ownership of capital; he initially combined the two theories in order to 
apply to China’s specific economic needs.  
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However, after a general introduction to Marx, Sun rejected Marxist theory. Gregor 
(2000:xi) adds that Sun rejected Marxism entirely because he saw it as having little to say about 
the problems that the revolution was compelled to contend with; Gregor (ibid.) further argues that 
theoreticians in the first quarter of the 20th century even denied the direct relevance of Marxism to 
China. Sun explained why he argued against Marx’s assessment: “Marx’s materialistic theory did 
not set forth any law of social progress and cannot be a determining factor in history; Marx, in his 
investigation of the social problem, emphasized [only] the material side.”25 Sun rejected Marx’s 
argument due to its pessimistic view of human nature, which went against his belief in a more 
moderate and cooperative process of human evolution. This rejection led to Sun’s future economic 
policy, which was intended to bypass the negative effects of capitalism. 
Eventually, Sun explicitly stated that he would not abolish all other taxes. Hou (in Sih 
1974:106) stresses that the idea of the single tax was conceived and expressed by Sun between 
1907 and 1912, but he did not reject it until 1924 in his lecture on the minsheng principle. Sun 
observed, “The burden of miscellaneous levies upon the common people is too heavy; they are 
always having to pay out taxes and so are terribly poor…The reasons for the heavy burdens upon 
the poor are the unjust system of taxation practiced by the government, the unequal distribution of 
land power, and the failure to solve the land problem.”26  Sun instead proposed that the government 
adopt four methods to cope with the social and economic problems of the time: first, reform plans 
for society and industry; second, public ownership of the means of transportation and 
communication; third, direct taxation and collection of taxes; and fourth, distribution of national 
wealth on the basis of social and individual needs. However, Sun’s proposal of these four methods 
presented a basic sketch that reflected his compassion to augment the economy and people’s 
livelihood rather than a specific economic policy.  
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Sun recognised that the underlying problem of agriculture and land ownership impeded 
China’s modernisation. For example, when the harvest was poor, the peasant had to sell his 
freeholding land to a landlord, resulting in the ever-increasing concentration of landholding among 
the rich. As such, Sun’s main argument of land equalisation in his minsheng principle was inspired 
by the economic hardship faced by the peasants resulting from unfair land ownership. As discussed 
earlier, after the Opium War, many displaced and unemployed peasants moved to the cities while 
many others went abroad for coolie labour as the continuous shrinkage of individual landholdings 
put yet more pressure on peasants and their livelihoods. Sun argued for farmers’ rights and the fair 
distribution of land so that they could maintain the return on their labour: “If we are to increase 
the production of food, we must make laws regarding the rights and interest of the farmers; we 
must give them encouragement and protection and allow them to keep more of the fruit of their 
land…The protection of the farmers’ rights and the giving to them of a larger share in their harvests 
are questions related to the equalisation of land ownership.”27  
Sun was keenly aware of the confiscation of land after the Russian Revolution.  In a speech 
to the First Graduating Class of the Institute for the Study of the Farmers’ Movement in 1924, Sun 
explained the post-revolution Soviet taxation system: “Now that Russia has reformed its 
agricultural policies, landowners have been eliminated and the nation’s farmland has been 
distributed to ordinary farmers so that they may own the land they farm. When farmers own the 
land they till, all they have to do is to pay taxes to the government; no longer will landlords come 
to collect their rents.”28 However, Sun initially showed his reluctance to directly replicate the 
Soviet system of confiscating land, considering the particularities of the Chinese economy and 
culture. He preferred a reconciliatory approach, which was his political philosophy, to using 
coercive power.  
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However, Sun’s rejection of the Soviet land nationalisation methodology led to a delicate 
situation given that China had received financial and military aids from the Soviet Union. This 
may have been due to Sun’s intention to maintain China’s autonomy from Russian political 
influence over his land equalisation plan. Sun claimed that his land equalisation plan was intended 
to bring about the traditional Chinese ideology of “Land to the Tiller”, explaining that his plan 
suited China’s particular needs at the time: “The methods for the solution of the land problem are 
different in various countries, and each country has its own peculiar difficulties. The plan which 
we are following is simple and easy – the equalization of landownership.”29 Sun also expounded 
on land distribution in his minsheng principle, explaining that it would be based on the mutual 
agreement of the involved parties rather than by coercive force: “What is our policy? We propose 
that the government shall buy back the land, if necessary, according to the amount of land tax and 












4.2 Emancipatory Inclusion 
Sun frequently argued that class struggle could be overcome through economic harmony and 
cooperation among citizens, believing that they functioned as a catalyst of positive social change. 
For Sun, society progressed through economic cooperation among humans; it was therefore 
necessary to include the economically excluded classes of people in his minsheng principle. Sun’s 
proposal suggested easing the class conflict by means such as reconciling economic interests and 
offering an alternative. He declared that social evolution arose from economic rebalancing for the 
majority of the people, not from the conflict of that majority; therefore economic reconciliation 
was to the economic benefit of the majority.31  
Rather than class conflict and class warfare, economic reconciliation through cooperation 
between landlords and peasants was the central aim of his minsheng principle. Sun argued, “Here 
is a reconciliation of the interests of capitalists and workers, rather than a conflict between them. 
Society progresses then, through the adjustment of major economic interests rather than through 
the clash of interests. If most of the economic interests of society can be harmonised, the majority 
of people will benefit and society will progress.”32 Here, Sun’s comment implies that his 
methodology would deny, avoid or skip the negative consequences of an economic system by 
resorting to his firm belief in economic harmony through cooperation to counter material conflict. 
This also represents a gap between the material conflict and Sun’s ideal of economic harmony with 
regard to land ownership.   
Sun asserted that capitalism mistakenly regarded materialism as the centre of economic 
history, thereby causing social chaos; he instead argued that social chaos could be solved by 
rectifying the historical mistake so that materialism would not be the centre of history. In fact, the 
framework for Sun’s minsheng principle demonstrated his desire for preventative action against 
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the possible negative effects of Western capitalism because he was concerned about the conflict 
between rich and poor, which might lead to a class war. Sun believed that the appropriation of land 
and capital was the central cause of the negative effects of Western capitalism, and he specifically 
identified two main causes of economic conflict: first, the landlords’ monopoly on land, and second, 
their appropriation of the profit from surplus labour generated by peasants. As such, people’s 
livelihoods were mostly involved with material economy, however, Sun tried to persuade the 
people with his morally charged appeal by addressing fair land ownership, distribution of wealth 
and economic rights. The juxtaposition of materiality and morality thus conflicted in Sun’s land 
equalisation plan.    
Sun also wanted to bypass certain stages in economic development; however, these stages 
were necessary for a pre-modern economy such as China’s to go through. According to Marx, 
social forces are inextricably connected to the dynamics of the dialectic inherent in the conflicts 
of each economic system; nevertheless, Sun insisted that almost all of the complex theoretical 
arguments of Marx were unrelated to the particular economic circumstances of China. As a result, 
even though Sun was concerned about the economic exclusion of the tenant farmers, he refused to 
confiscate the land from the landlords because it represented coercive power, and it was against 
his political philosophy. On the other hand, abandoning his land equalisation plan would forego 
the emancipation of the tenant farmers, and, if the system of tenancy continued, then Sun feared 
class war might occur.   
Sun thus wanted to reach a peaceful agreement with the landlords through a cooperative 
understanding for the sake of improving the livelihoods of tenant farmers. Sun argued, “The rise 
in value of the land becomes a public fund as a reward to all those who had improved the 
community and who had advanced industry and commerce around the land.”33 Sun’s comment 
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reconfirmed his moral obligation to his minsheng principle, which was intended to ease the 
economic suffering of the tenant farmers by returning their surplus labour to them in the form of 
the economic right of land ownership. Sun reemphasised the importance of the minsheng principle 
by insisting that peasants must be given the economic right of land ownership and that the 
exploitation of labourers had to be stopped. Sun also accepted the autonomy of landlords in setting 
the land price, suggesting that the price first be set by the landlords in order to reflect social 
improvements and the progress of commerce and industry. This indicated that Sun’s political 
tendency was also conciliatory to both parties rather than reconciling them.   
Sun acknowledged the correlation between land price and industrial progress, which 
represented free market economy. However, Sun’s methodology represented his resolute intention 
to reject the Marxist argument, which insisted on the inevitability of class struggle and conflict 
during the development of a pre-modern economy. In fact, Sun absolutely denied the effects of 
capitalism. Furthermore, in addition to Confucian datong ideology and the shared production of 
communism, Sun’s proposal reflected the influence of Christian socialism, which sympathised 
with the poor and the weak, advocating social cooperation in order to improve the status and 
welfare of the marginalised. Accordingly, Sun’s conflation of economic systems in the land 








4.3 Land to the Tiller 
Confucius once remarked that poverty would vanish where there was an equal distribution of 
wealth in society, so a wise ruler should see to it that the rich possessed their wealth without 
arrogance, while the poor possessed sufficient means of subsistence without suffering, so that 
social harmony could be attained.34 Sun tried to replicate the Confucian ideal, believing that 
regulating private capital would put an end to monopolisation and narrow the gap between rich 
and poor. Bol (2008:29) emphasises that some early Neo-Confucians also proposed such radical 
policies as ending the private land market, distributing the estates of landlords in equal proportions 
to farmers and restoring an egalitarian rural society based on the idealised ‘well-field system’. In 
a similar vein, Sun argued against profit making, insisting that it destabilised social harmony: 
“Since the production of food aims at profit, when food prices are low in the in the native country, 
the food will be shipped for sale and greater profits abroad. Even when there is famine, when the 
people are short of food and many are starving, these private capitalists are not concerned…With 
such methods of distribution, which aim wholly at profit, the problem of livelihood can never be 
well solved.”35 
Sun admitted that his emancipatory communication was based on Chinese traditional moral 
values with a particular emphasis on agriculture and redistribution of land. Sun argued that the 
minsheng principle would bring economic harmony through moral evolution instead of through 
class conflict: “What really is the principle of livelihood? In my last lecture, I revealed a little of 
what it means; I said that minsheng, or livelihood, has been the central force in the cultural progress 
of society, in the improvement of economic organisation, and in moral evolution.”36 Similarly, the 
question for Neo-Confucians was not whether they should accept the reality of economic 
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inequality, but what morality would mean in a world in which economic power operated 
independently of political power.  
The Confucian ideal of “Land to the Tiller” represented a moral obligation rather than a 
concrete economic plan. Likewise, Sun’s plan to improve the people’s livelihood and to ensure the 
equitable distribution of wealth reflected Chinese traditional moral values rather than serving as a 
concrete economic plan. Sun reemphasised the expected consequences of the plan: “When the 
minsheng principle is fully realised and the problems of the farmer are all solved, each tiller of the 
soil will possess his own fields – that is to be the final fruit of our efforts.” 37 In Sun’s speech titled 
‘Land to the Tiller’, addressed to the graduating students of the Institute of Peasants Movement in 
1924, he also urged a peaceful solution to distribute land to the peasants.  
Sun’s idea of “Land to the Tiller” came originally from the first Ming emperor, who had 
come to the throne in part as an agrarian reformer, breaking his estates up under a “Land to the 
Tiller” policy that ushered in an era of small freeholding proprietorship.38 However, over the 
course of the Ming Dynasty, the trend was toward re-concentration in the hands of fewer owners, 
though not in the same form as before.  Rowe (2009:96) explains that the peasant war of the Ming-
Qing transition improved the position of tenant farmers as landlords granted willing and capable 
tenants permanent tenancy rights or surface ownership of land. This arrangement gave tenants a 
sense of security and an incentive to make capital improvements and experiment with new crops; 
and the amicable agreements between the landlords and tenant farmers in redistributing land 
provided a precedent showing that the livelihood of farmers could be achieved through cooperation. 
Therefore, the “Land to the Tiller” policy was historically created partly due to economic 
pragmatism from the side of landlords and partly due to the economic struggle that the tenant 
farmers engaged in with the landlords. Consequently, their economic conflict was reconciled 
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through cooperative negotiation by both parties. This showed that the land equalisation plan 
required both mutual understanding and negotiations.    
Even though Sun was also aware of and influenced by the economic developments in the 
West, such as the British industrial revolution, the Russian socialist revolution, and the ideas of 
philosophers such as Karl Marx and Henry George, Western material history did not dominate 
Sun’s moral commitment to economic harmony. Rather, a conflation of various ideologies, for 
example, Confucian economic harmony, cooperative labour and shared production, formed the 
core of the minsheng principle. Sun firmly insisted that he would not imitate the Western social 
system outright, pointing out the political problems in the West: “Many Chinese scholars, who 
have been absorbing all forms of Western knowledge, have thought that we could solve our 
problem by imitating the West without realising how divided are the socialist parties of the West 
upon social questions, and how far away they still are from a single course of action.”39     
Even after receiving economic and military aid from the Soviet Union, Sun is known to 
have argued against Marxism, the economic and political foundation of the newly established 
Russian nation-state. Allen (in Sih 1974) points out that Sun, after having carefully examined the 
materialist interpretation of history and the Marxist doctrine in relation to communism, argued that 
class war was a social disease. Furthermore, The Joint Manifesto, which was announced on January 
26, 1923 in conjunction with Adolf Joffe, the Russian envoy in Beijing, explicitly stated that, “the 
communist order or even the Soviet system cannot actually be introduced to China.”40 Sun insisted 
that the evolution of humankind was based neither on class war nor on coercive power, but through 
cooperation and reconciliatory effort to share economic benefits among human beings. Sun’s 
minsheng principle was, therefore, in defence of the Chinese traditional moral obligation to protect 
economic harmony among the people.  
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It is apparent that the methodology of land nationalisation during the Russian Revolution 
generated a negative impression on Sun, who wanted to avoid confiscating land by violent and 
coercive means; instead, he was willing to reconcile the economic interests of both landlords and 
peasants through peaceful negotiation. Accordingly, Sun did not agree to embrace communism 
completely as the core Chinese economic system. At the same time, Sun was aware of the benefits 
and negative effects of capitalism in the West. It is interesting to observe that Sun did not reject 
outright capitalism even though he adopted part of it; he also denounced imperialism although 
both capitalism and imperialism are closely connected. Sun rejected only the possible negative 
consequences of capitalism, such as the inevitability of class war in the process of human and 
economic evolution. Additionally, while Sun’s aim was to reach socialism, Sun was also aware of 
the defects of socialism, so he resorted to, what Linebarger (1937:254-5) referred to as, a “grudging 
admiration” for socialism.  
Sun constantly reflected upon the Chinese traditional ideology that social progress could 
be achieved through harmonious cooperation as he rebuked the Marxist analysis, arguing, “Class 
war is not the cause of social progress, it is a disease developed in the course of social progress. 
The cause of the disease is the inability to subsist, and the result of the disease is war. What Marx 
gained through his studies of social problems was a knowledge of diseases in the course of social 
progress. Therefore Marx can only be called a social pathologist.”41 Sun concluded that Marx's 
methods were not applicable to the Chinese economic situation and instead supported state 
capitalism by encouraging state industries.  
However, there was a gap between Sun’s pursuit of economic harmony based on human 
cooperation and what was a realistically feasible economic policy. Hou (in Sih 1974:96) points out 
that Sun’s “Land to the Tiller” plan was presented without a sufficient source of funds and details 
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on land distribution.  For example, in Sun’s publication of “The International Development of 
China”, the six programmes he presented had little data for evaluating his development plan; 
furthermore, individual projects in terms of technical or engineering feasibility, internal 
consistency and cost-benefit analysis were missing, and he did not make any systematic estimate 
on the input requirements or the effects on the national product.  
Consequently, questions remained as to how Sun would accomplish the objective of “Land 
to the Tiller” and how the government would acquire an enormous amount of farm land for 
distribution to the tenant farmers. Ultimately, the conflict in Sun’s land equalisation plan was 
between his moral obligation and material viability. Although Sun’s economic policy was based 
on the economic communalism of Confucian datong ideology in order to satisfy his moral 
obligations, it did not offer a concrete economic plan to solve the material conflict concerning land 
redistribution. Moreover, even though Sun strongly denied the negative effects of capitalism, he 
was also aware that his minsheng principle required a certain condition of capitalism that 
acknowledged the rise in value of land in order to return it to the tenant farmers. And that was why 
Sun did not reject capitalism completely.     
After Sun resigned as provisional president of the Republic of China in 1912, he reiterated 
his stance on the future of China’s tax system in a speech to members of the Tongmenghui at a 
farewell party in Nanjing on April 1, 1912. This time, Sun (1994) admitted the challenge that his 
land equalisation plan was facing: lack of government funds in proportion to the massiveness of 
the plan. This finally revealed the gap between his moral ideals and material reality: “Several 
decades in the future, all those who own land will effortlessly enjoy the rights of having been here 
first. So to collect tax according to acreage of land brings you to the inequality of land rights. Some 
of those who seek laws that correct these inequalities advocate the nationalisation of land. But it 
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is probably beyond the powers of a nation to buy up the land in the entire country.”42 Consequently, 
Sun’s admission based on a realistic assessment of the land equalisation plan affected the landlords’ 
attitude, who then became resistant to the plan.  
Another challenge to Sun’s minsheng principle was how to morally reconcile the conflict 
between economic harmony and profit making. Sun’s method of reconciliation previously 
depended upon combining positive elements from the Chinese and Western values and systems 
into a hybrid. However, in dealing with the dissimilarity between profit making and economic 
harmony in his minsheng principle, Sun tried to counter the material conflict involving 
landownership and tenancy by propagating mutual cooperation between landlords and tenant 
farmers based on the idealised systems, such as the principle of “Land to the Tiller” and the 
Confucian ideal of datong communalism supplemented by Western communism; this was in an 
effort to “pre-empt” the class war by emphasising the moral obligation of cooperation: “If this 
becomes true, the people will not only have a communistic share in state production, but they will 
have a share in everything. When the people share everything in the state, then will we truly reach 
the goal of the minsheng principle, which is Confucius’ hope of a Great Commonwealth 
(datong).”43    
However, Sun’s moral persuasion was defended without a detailed plan, and consequently, 
as Mao Zedong once commented, “Sun left this country a legacy of confusion.”44 Sun (1930) 
instead focused on the future possibilities upon the completion of his land redistribution plan, by 
arguing, “If we attack the problem now, we can solve it; but if we lose the present opportunity, we 
can never find a way out. The discussion of the land problem naturally causes a feeling of fear 
among the landowners, but if the Kuomintang policy is followed, the present landowners can set 
their hearts at rest.”45 
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4.4 Sun’s dilemma  
Sun’s land equalisation plan was a hybrid of communism and communalism inspired by the 
Confucian datong ideology of economic harmony through cooperative labour and common 
production. The plan innately opposed the aspects of self-interest and labour exploitation that 
capitalism represented. However, his plan also had the elements of capitalism in that rises or falls 
in the price of land, which fluctuated, were based on the mechanism of market economy rather 
than a centrally controlled economy. This represented a conflict within Sun’s plan because the 
effects of capitalism that Sun wanted to avoid at all costs were the condition of his land equalisation 
plan. Moreover, Sun did not agree with the concept of profit making, the core principle of 
capitalism and free market economy, because he believed it was antithetical to the moral principle 
of Confucian datong communalism and to that of communism.  
In fact, Sun did not deny capitalism altogether because he wanted to maintain some of its 
positive elements, such as individual incentives and private land ownership; however, these were 
antithetical to the principle of communism. Sun defended communism in relation to the minsheng 
principle: “We cannot say that the theory of communism is different from our minsheng principle. 
Our Three Principles of the People mean government of the people, by the people and for the 
people – that is, a state belonging to all the people, a government controlled by all the people, the 
rights and benefits for the enjoyment of all the people.”46 Sun made an effort to explicate the 
minsheng principle in relation to communism by arguing that the minsheng principle and 
communism were mutually harmonizing. He claimed that both shared the same values and purpose, 
emphasising that the only difference was in methodology since the minsheng principle was 
proposed to accommodate the particular situation of China. Sun stressed the compatibility of the 
two: “So, not only should we not say that communism conflicts with the minsheng principle, but 
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we should even claim communism as a good friend. The supporters of the minsheng principle 
should study communism thoughtfully.”47  
Sun’s proposal faced further challenges as the surplus labour of tenant farmers was 
appropriated by landowners. It demonstrated the conflict of interest between the two classes, which 
was exactly what Marx argued. However, Sun solely insisted on human cooperation to counter the 
material conflict. This is one of the reasons why Sun rejected the Russian method of confiscating 
properties from the landlords: Sun refused to use coercive power because he believed in peaceful 
negotiations. Sun explained that his land redistribution plan was different from nationalisation 
because his principle was exclusively for the livelihood of the people, and the purpose and 
methodology of his land equalisation plan was about human cooperation in service of economic 
harmony.  
Sun demonstrated his adherence to ideology and personal beliefs: “It is a very different 
thing from what is called in the West nationalisation of property, confiscation for the government’s 
use of private property which the people already possess.  Our plan provides that land now fixed 
in value shall still be privately owned. If the land problem can be solved, one half of the problem 
of livelihood will be solved.”48 Sun also stressed the uniqueness and authenticity of amalgamating 
the two ideologies of Chinese traditional communalism and Western communism. Sun’s argument 
was based on the “communistic” or “communal” livelihood of human beings to reach socialism 
directly without suffering the “negative effects” of capitalism during the process of economic 
development. However, the minsheng principle required a specific economic plan to manage the 
material aspects of conflict of interests rather than persuading solely with moral duties. Sun instead 
provided a rather idealistic goal of his plan: “The Minsheng principle’s method of distribution will 
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aim not at profit but at supplying the people with food. Our Minsheng principle aims at the 
destruction of the capitalistic system.” 49 
In fact, Sun underestimated the level of interest conflict and potential discontentment 
between landowners and tenant farmers. These were the very negative effects of capitalism that 
Sun had relentlessly rejected from the beginning. Sun confessed, “As soon as the landowners hear 
us talking about the land question and equalisation of landownership, they are naturally alarmed, 
just as capitalists are alarmed when they hear people talking about socialism and want to rise up 
and fight it.”50 Nevertheless, Sun’s logical solution of overcoming the conflict of interest between 
the landlords and tenant farmers was not offered. Instead, Sun hoped to bypass the negative stages 
of economic development of capitalism and reach socialism directly. In the process, Sun tried to 
reconcile material conflict with mutual cooperation as he believed the latter was a quality that 
inherently existed in all human beings. Sun explained his stance in relation to the origins of 
communism: “The first society formed by man was a communistic society and the primitive age 
was a communistic age …. Their system of living is entirely communistic, which proves that the 
society of our primitive ancestors must have been communistic.”51 Thus Sun hoped to counter the 
material conflict with the persuasion of moral duty.   
Sun urged for cooperation between the tenant farmers and the landlords to help the 
government solve the conflict concerning land ownership, fearing opposition to his plan or even 
revolts to take place. Accordingly, Sun’s conciliatory approach was criticised by some as 
compromising or weak, at best. Moreover, even though he sought to eliminate economic hardship 
of tenant farmers, he did not want to repeat what the West experienced during its economic 
development: inequality in wealth. Since Sun was concerned with economic equality, his plan of 
equalising land and the control of private capital was designed to ensure equitable distribution of 
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income and wealth. However, Sun did not want pure socialism because he did not advocate for the 
state to own all means of production; nor did he advocate for pure capitalism, for he never trusted 
capitalists who, he believed, would control the economy to the detriment of the people unless 
restrained.52 Sun’s principle thus conflated various ideologies concerning the betterment of the 
people’s livelihood, yet he did not take a clear stance on the nation’s economic structure.  
Gregor (2000:104) also notes that, although Sun advocated state management of those 
undertakings that exceeded the capacity of private enterprise, he also insisted on the legal 
protection of property and the exercise of private initiatives as essential to China’s rapid economic 
growth and industrialisation. Therefore Gregor (ibid.) claims that, even though at the heart of Sun’s 
developmental ideology was a combination of anti-Marxist, nationalist, class-collaborationist and 
productivistic theories of productive forces, a recognition of the critical role played by the material 
forces in the history of nations was central to Sun’s minsheng principle. Sun needed to solve the 
material conflict concerning landownership through specific economic policies rather than by 
moral persuasion based on cooperative understanding between peasants and landowners because 
land equalisation was about the material economy.  
Sun amalgamated multiple economic approaches into a hybrid plan in his minsheng 
principle. Sun did not deny capitalism outright because his land equalisation plan employed part 
of capitalism, nor could he avoid the necessary effects of economic development without a 
concrete plan. Sun accordingly advocated a kind of regulated capitalism in which private 
enterprises with competition and state ownership with monopolistic power coexisted: another 
hybrid form. His economic policy called for the government’s close guidance. With his opposition 
to the Marxist argument and capitalism, Sun had to find a reconciliatory solution to maintain the 
particularities of the Chinese economy. Sun argued, “China may have to find the answer within 
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rather than from the Western cases. Western nations have not yet found any satisfactory methods 
to deal with these evil practices arising out of the land question.”53 
In Sun’s philosophy, only social equality through land redistribution could dissolve the 
class conflict.  However, Sigren (in Sih 1974) argues that Sun employed a social interpretation 
instead of the materialistic interpretation of history, asserting that Sun was compelled to discredit 
the materialistic interpretation of history because he could not accept its corollary of class struggle, 
which he personally observed during the social and economic development in the West. On the 
other hand, Sun insisted that the minsheng principle and its land redistribution programme had to 
be achieved without causing class conflict, arguing that cooperation and mutual understanding 
between tenant farmers and landowners would bring about economic harmony and progress.  
Hence, Sun’s dilemma lay in the gap between his ideology and China’s economic reality.  
Sun’s minsheng principle represented his ideal economic plan for solving the material 
conflict. However, Sun wanted neither pure socialism nor pure capitalism; he wanted to eliminate 
poverty, but he did not want to repeat the negative consequences of economic development. At the 
same time, Sun claimed that the minsheng principle was communism, arguing that there was no 
real difference between the two. The only difference, he claimed, lay in the methods by which they 
are applied. Sun’s intention with his land equalisation plan was to give people a better livelihood 
by bypassing class conflict and reaching state socialism directly by selectively conflating the 
ideologies of communalism and communism. However, the underlying structure of Sun’s land 
equalisation programme carried the mechanism of capitalism because an increase in the value of 
land derived from people’s surplus labour, and the government’s purchase of land at the market 




Time Constraints and Foreign Capital   
Sun’s land equalisation plan faced resistance from landowners. Moreover, Sun realised that his 
plan had to depend upon foreign capital, provoking concern regarding China’s political 
sovereignty as well as economic autonomy amid foreign encroachment. Indeed, Sun’s insistence 
on China’s cultural and economic particularity did not persuade well the international lenders. Hou 
(in Sih 1974:101) argues that Sun was very clear about the issue of time constraint and the 
necessity of foreign capital as he argued that, despite using foreign capital, China’s sovereignty 
would never be compromised and China would be always in control. Sun defended his plan and 
even implied the possibility of confiscating land in certain cases, implying a change in his 
methodology in land equalisation: “This criticism is not entirely correct. In the manifesto of the 
First National Congress of the Kuomintang in 1924, it was clearly stated that the state should 
distribute land to land-lacking tenants. The state may acquire such land for distribution by buying 
land from landlords (according to the equalisation of land rights programme) and by confiscating 
land from those landlords who fail to pay land value tax or who possess uncultivated wastelands.”54  
However, the issue of time constraint interfered; Hou (in Sih 1974:101) points out that Sun 
did not want to accept the strict demands of the foreign lenders, which required a lengthy process 
of negotiation. This demonstrated an element of Sun’s naivety with regard to the demands of 
international financial institutions. Hou (ibid.) also insists that Sun regarded the borrowing of 
foreign capital as a business transaction, not a concession to foreign exploitation or the domination 
of China by imperialist powers. Sun believed that China could advance the people’s livelihoods 
by tapping into foreign capital; however, Sun did not investigate the intention of lenders from 
political perspectives, which would inevitably threaten China’s economic independence. Sun again 
showed he lacked a detailed strategic plan in seeking international loans, as he pursued his own 
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economic plan inspired by his compassion to better the livelihood of the people. Thus Sun’s moral 
obligation and compassion to people’s livelihood overlooked the political conditions of borrowing 
foreign capital. 
Sirgen (in Sih 1974:124) argues that social change in history necessarily takes the form of 
open conflict and painful transition. Sun might have rejected the Marxist arguments of the negative 
effects of capitalism in order to bypass them. Sirgen (ibid.) further suggests two possible methods 
for solving such social questions: one is the peaceful method of evolutionary socialists and the 
other, the revolutionary method of the communists, arguing that only the former was satisfactory 
for Sun’s purposes because “the old system cannot be changed in a minute and it must be reformed 
gradually”. Sun believed that, if there were no reconciliation or harmony through peaceful 
cooperation, there would have been no human evolution.  
Sun persistently emphasised that economic progress could be achieved, not through the 
conflict of interests or selfish motives, but rather by sharing and maintaining communal harmony 
through cooperation. However, Sun ultimately acknowledged the irreconcilable relationship 
between material conflict and morally inspired cooperation, concluding that struggle was the 
answer: “What is the cause of social evolution? Judging by Marx’s theory, we would have to say 
that social change is caused by class struggle, and class struggle is caused by the capitalist 
oppression of workers. Since the interests of capitalist and workers inevitably conflict and cannot 
be reconciled, struggle ensues and this struggle within society is what makes for progress.”55 
Sun had previously refused to acknowledge that both negative and positive aspects of 
competition and struggle exist in the history of human evolution and economic development. 
However, it was necessary for Sun to realise that not only economic harmony but also conflict 
existed during economic growth, and that each did not necessarily have to, or could not be 
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assimilated into the other, but they rather coexisted. The role of the government is at its best when 
providing the people with specific plans to prevent or mitigate the potential negative effects of an 
economic system because material conflict is as natural as humanistic cooperation during an 
economic development. Conflicts are produced when men continually struggle for their survival 
and economic progress. Conflicts could not be simply avoided by skipping the necessary phases 
of economic development. Both cooperation and struggle are thus required to improve the 
livelihood of humans as a part of human evolution.  
At this point, it is also important to observe a change in Sun’s political style, which used 
to put emphasis on time-efficient revolution to gradual reform. Prior to the 1911 revolution, Sun 
relentlessly supported the revolution as a matter of political urgency to save China; the time 
constraint thus played an important role in propagating his emancipatory communication. For 
example, while Sun was promoting ethnically defined nationalism in his minzu principle, he 
resorted to coalescing with the ethnic majority of the Han race for political efficacy and time 
efficiency in overthrowing the Qing dynasty. He also supported collective rights and the power of 
the state over the individual rights for a similar reason in promoting constitutionalism. After the 
revolution of 1911, however, Sun started supporting the time-taking method of peaceful 
negotiations in purchasing land despite having to depend on foreign funding instead of the time-
efficient Soviet style of confiscating land. Sun’s moral principle of economic harmony and 
cooperation took the priority instead of the time efficient method of confiscation in the case of 
land equalisation plan.   
The change in Sun’s political praxis may be explained by the binary aspects of conflicts 
between economic reality and moral ideals in his minsheng principle. For example, his moral 
obligation to improve the livelihood of the people inspired by the traditional Chinese ideology was 
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challenged by the reality of material conflict in the economic modernisation of China. Capitalism’s 
potentially negative effects, such as material conflict and class war, were contrasted with its 
positive mechanism of private ownership and individual incentive of the market economy. The 
ideal methodology of land equalisation by the time-consuming process of peaceful negotiation was 
juxtaposed with the time-efficient methodology of confiscating land. However, Sun preferred to 
employ multiple ideologies for a hybrid of methodologies: “Socialism, communism and the 
doctrine of livelihood agree on the principle, but differ in the methods of realising that principle.”56 
Sun insisted that cooperation was the ultimate driving force of human evolution in countering the 
negative effects of capitalism. Accordingly, Sun’s intersubjective understanding of others’ 
suffering and his moral obligation to ease their economic hardship were in conflict with material 

















The Overseas Chinese and Sun 
INTRODUCTION 
Sun often claimed that the overseas Chinese were the mother of the 1911 Revolution for 
their emotional and financial support, and he was compassionate about including them in the 
process of establishing the first Chinese republic. Sun (1927b) argued that the psychological 
distance among the Chinese people was shaped by the perception of their own geographical 
centeredness. As a consequence, the overseas Chinese were considered the other Chinese because 
they had deserted the two most essential geographical elements: the Centre Kingdom and its native 
soil. Furthermore, their psychological liminality regarding China was closely related to the 
indefinite duration of their sojourn.  
In this chapter, I argue that Tongbao inclusion helped reconcile Sun’s own exclusionary 
political praxis as well as the geographically centred Chinese identity, and its corollary was 
transnational patriotism among the overseas Chinese. This is significant because, first, Tongbao 
inclusion was based on Sun’s reconciliatory approach to Confucian fraternal love and Christian 
universal love, and by amalgamating nationalism and cosmopolitanism into a hybrid form of 
inclusive citizenship; second, it represented Sun’s belief that all Chinese were born from the same 
womb of Mother China, symbolising broadened inclusiveness in Chinese identity. Consequently, 
transnational citizenship strengthened the overseas Chinese to voluntarily participate in building a 
modern Chinese nation-state as it transformed them into autonomous patriots regardless of their 




5.1 The Overseas Chinese and their Identity 
One of the approaches to analysing the basis of Chinese identity is to examine the Chinese words 
that Chinese people frequently use to describe themselves. For example, the Chinese word gen 
(roots), metaphorically meaning ground, is a familiar word which may appropriately describe 
Chinese identity, implying that it is rooted in Chinese soil.  However, this geographically defined 
identity inevitably excluded those who had left the native soil, such as the overseas Chinese. 
Loyalty to the native soil was, thus, an essential constituent of Chinese identity. Like many other 
cultural constructs, Chinese identity also contained a binary aspect of inclusion and exclusion: 
while it included those who loyally remained on the native land, it excluded those who left. Thus 
the greatest challenge for Sun was to construct a new collective Chinese identity that would include 
the overseas Chinese.  
Sun critically examined the social prejudice against the overseas Chinese, which “was 
shaped by the [mainland] Chinese perception of their own geographical centeredness”1, suggesting 
that Chinese self-satisfaction and self-perceived cultural superiority might have been caused by 
their own view of China as the centre of the world while locating others at the periphery. Sun 
further analysed the consequences of this attitude: “[the Chinese] would not tolerate the thought 
of any other superiority over themselves, or of allowing others to correct their mistakes.”2 This 
self-righteous attitude, Sun claimed, made the Chinese narrow-minded and undoubtedly hindered 
their economic progress and political modernisation. Thus the sense of geographical centeredness 
in Chinese identity produced psychological distance from others.     
Accordingly, Schoppa (2006:11–2) suggests that even the homes of many ethnic minorities, 
such as Mongols, Tibetans and Uighurs, were geographically peripheral, while the Chinese home 
was centred in China, the site where one’s ancestors were buried and where eventually one would 
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oneself be interred. Schoppa (ibid.) further claims that a shared native place is also one of the most 
important practical bases for connections and networks. In turn, the connections and networks of 
one’s native place play a crucial role in forming collective identity. Thus the combination of 
functionality and conceptuality concerning home and native soil further strengthened the notion of 
Chinese roots, which were closely connected to the geographically fixed quality of the Chinese 
identity.   
Before 1893, when the Qing government formally lifted the punishments for those who 
had left China, the authorities often expressed concerns about political conspiracy among the 
overseas Chinese and migrants were regarded as deserters, criminals, potential traitors or political 
conspirators.3 Worsened social and economic hardship after the Opium Wars and the Taiping 
Rebellion forced many coolie labourers, particularly from Sun’s native province of Guangdong 
and the nearby Fujian region, to leave China to work in plantations, mines and railway construction 
in the New World. Between 1838 and 1870, more than 500,000 healthy Chinese labourers with an 
average eight-year contract were sent to Latin America, the Caribbean and eventually North 
America.4 Many of these coolie labour émigrés remained in their host nations and formed the 
overseas Chinese communities.  
Wang (1991: 6) explains the sojourner pattern among the overseas Chinese, which broadly 
refer to traders (huashang) and coolies (huagong); the word huaqiao came to apply not only to all 
those previously known as huashang and huagong, but also to teachers, journalists and other 
professionals. Thus the scope of huaqiao was expanded to include various occupational categories 
of migration. Wang (ibid.) clarifies that the coolie pattern derived from the migration of large 
numbers of men of peasant origin, landless labourers and the urban poor; and the term coolie was 
associated with the beginnings of industrialisation in North America. On the other hand, in 
225 
 
Southeast Asia, coolie labour was never the dominant pattern, but was largely composed of the 
huashang pattern of migration.  
From early on, Sun showed his affinity to the overseas Chinese, possibly because he was 
influenced by his earlier experience with the huagong immigrants in Hawaii. Sun’s description of 
the overseas Chinese as the ‘mother of the Chinese revolution’ serves well to indicate the 
contribution of the overseas Chinese networks to the establishment of the first Chinese republic 
through their emotional and financial support for Sun’s revolutionary efforts. Even though Sun 
was also supported by the wealthy huashang communities, the most significant emotional support 
came from the coolie labourers of huagong Chinese, who were known to have contributed their 
hard earned wages to Sun.  
In his letter to Li Hongzhang in 1894, Sun pleaded for Li’s compassion for the condition 
of the overseas Chinese labourers and their suffering. Sun insisted that the Chinese migrants were 
often forced to move by war, natural disaster or economic distress, challenging the prejudice of 
Chinese society against them. Sun wrote in his letter, “I am most familiar with the piglets 
(labourers) who are exported at the rate of nearly 400,000 a year. Seldom do we see any of these 
returning safely home. I know that, unless we completely eradicate the vicious political system, 
the citizens of China will not only have no rights of their own to talk about, but even if they should 
be among the fortunate ones themselves, they will not be able to leave the rewards of their labour 
to their descendants.”5 
After Sun’s first revolt failed in 1895, he and other revolutionaries had to flee to Japan, As 
did many other reformers after the Empress Dowager Cixi’s successful coup against the Emperor 
Guangxu’s One Hundred Days’ Reform. Since the overseas Chinese possessed a good source of 
political and financial power, both reformists such as Kang Youwei and Liang Qichao and the 
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revolutionary parties including Sun tried to win support from the overseas Chinese. This was how 
the conflict between the revolutionaries and reformists surrounding the overseas Chinese 
originated. The revolutionary and reformist parties competed by setting up new organisations such 
as reading clubs, night schools and drama troupes to disseminate their own messages in addition 
to print media such as newspapers, magazines and booklets propagating their political arguments.6  
For example, in Singapore, against Kang Youwei’s the Protect the Emperor Party, the 
revolutionaries launched a fierce attack on the ideology of the reformist organ; in particular, the 
disappointment among the overseas Chinese with the increasingly strong economic domination by 
foreign powers and the Qing government’s poor political management in protecting China led 
them to support Sun and his revolutionary party. Wang (2000:68-70) notes that the Qing 
government did not expect the overseas Chinese to be willing to support Sun’s nationalism and its 
spread among the poor and illiterate beyond China.   
Many overseas Chinese shared some of the prejudice against the Manchus, and this 
prejudice was further strengthened by the Qing government’s refusal to protect its overseas 
subjects and its inability to defend Chinese territory against foreign encroachment. Cook (in Lee 
and Lee 2011:172) points out that many huaqiaos continued to be exposed to anti-Qing rhetoric 
long after it had died out on mainland China due to their involvement with the overseas secret 
societies. This led many overseas Chinese people to accept the revolutionaries; and later they were 
absorbed into the mainstream of the revolutionary movement. Accordingly, anti-Manchuism 
became one of the central characteristics of nationalism among the overseas Chinese. Finally, 
when intellectuals in the treaty ports and young overseas students followed Sun’s revolutionary 
party, the revolutionaries gained more influence over Kang Youwei’s Protect the Emperor Party, 
whose base supporters were originally the intellectuals and established huashangs.  
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Wang (1991:7) points out that these overseas Chinese were increasingly conscious of the 
weakness of the Qing government and its unfair treatment of them. Thus they started questioning 
their citizen’s rights, and furthermore, voluntarily sought to modernise their motherland; in 
particular, for those with wealth in Southeast Asia, their interest in investing in modern business 
and industry were strong. At this point, Sun saw the prospect of turning the growing nationalism 
among the overseas Chinese into a powerful transnational patriotism in order to establish a new 
Chinese republic. In defying the exclusionary aspect of Chinese identity, which was defined on 
geographical centeredness and social prejudice against the overseas Chinese, Sun sought to 
empower them with citizens’ rights so that they could autonomously participate in the process of 
constructing the new Chinese republic. Sun believed that there had to be comparable political 
rights for the overseas Chinese so that they would perform their duty of patriotism transnationally.  
Consequently, while contemplating how to include the overseas Chinese politically, Sun 
realised that it was necessary to first create an inclusive Chinese identity, which would help 
overcome their psychological liminality and sense of geographical distance. In the process, Sun 
realised that his own nationalism was also narrowly defined in terms of geography and race, 
impeding the inclusion of the overseas Chinese as autonomous participants. Sun thus sequentially 
reconciled exclusionary nationalism with cosmopolitanism, creating the hybrid of transnational 
inclusion. This was Sun’s vision of Tongbao inclusion.  
In the process, Sun altered his racially charged nationalism to transnationalism in order to 
encompass all overseas Chinese and the ethnic Chinese minorities living overseas, while 
maintaining their allegiance to the motherland under the umbrella of common Chinese identity. 
Wang (1991:7) asserts that even though Sun’s emancipatory communication was primarily driven 
by nationalism, it was also enhanced as a transnational alternative of a conscious migration policy 
228 
 
that brought both the huashangs and the huagongs together under a common Chinese identity. 
Thus the huashangs and the huagongs were united under the status of common huaqiao citizens. 
As a result, the integrated pattern of huaqiao gave the highest priority to patriotism and the 
transmission of nationalist ideals to all Chinese abroad.7 
Yan (1976: xvii), on the other hand, asserts that many of the overseas Chinese were patriots, 
and their patriotic feeling was due to concern for their kin and their native place in China. 
Consequently, the overseas Chinese, despite their place of work and residence, became part of 
China and associated with its people. Sun’s transnational inclusion accommodated their concerns 
by offering an inclusive Chinese identity and extending a transnational citizenship, both of which 
played a significant role in the 1911 Revolution. On September 30, 1916, when Sun delivered a 
speech in Shanghai to a group of overseas Chinese soldiers, he commended the contribution of the 
overseas Chinese to the fall of the Qing monarchy: “The Overseas Chinse was really one of the 
most powerful forces when imperial rule was abolished.”8 Additionally, in A History of the 
Chinese Revolution, Sun acknowledged his gratitude to the contribution of the overseas Chinese, 
academics and members of the secret societies: “Those who generously contributed money to the 
army were mostly overseas Chinese. Those who enthusiastically spread the word were mostly 
academics. Those who charged in front and defeated the enemy were soldiers and members of 








5.2 Christian Influence   
Upon his inauguration on January 1, 1912 as President of the first Chinese Republic, Sun 
proclaimed the adoption of the first republican form of government in Asia, the freedom of religion 
to protect Christianity and an outright ban on foot-binding for women, opium smoking and 
superstition or idol worship. Upon his death, his family held a Christian funeral in private 
according to his will in spite of opposition from both conservative right-wing nationalists and 
radical left-wing communists.10 Given Sun’s education at mission schools, Sun’s Christian belief 
was initially influenced by the teachings of missionaries. He believed that China’s modernisation, 
political or industrial, could be achieved by taking after the Western model even though Sun 
maintained Chinese traditional values at the same time. Yan (1976:148-9) argues that it would be 
wrong to claim that Sun’s political philosophy was derived entirely from one or two particular 
Western traditions; likewise, it would be equally wrong to say that his thought was a mere 
extension of Confucianism.  
It is clear that the formation of Sun’s emancipatory communication was drawn from the 
syncretism of various social and political ideologies such as liberalism, socialism, Marxism, and 
social Darwinism in reconciliation with Confucianism. Even though Sun specifically demonstrated 
the influence of Christianity and appreciated its effect on Chinese modernisation, he did not copy 
Christian values and practices outright, but constantly reconciled them with Chinese tradition. 
Nevertheless, Sun’s idea of China’s cultural, political and economic modernisation was closely 
related to Christian influence; in particular, Christianity introduced scientific knowledge such as 
medicine.  
According to De Bary (2008:774), the scientific contribution of Christianity in the late 
Qing period includes the Protestant missionaries’ special attention to building new colleges, which 
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contributed significantly to the development of modern education, medical training and studies in 
the humanities and social sciences. Moreover, the missionaries were also involved with the press; 
70 percent of existing Chinese language newspapers were created by the missionaries for 
evangelisation, while 80 percent of English newspapers in 19th century China were established by 
foreign merchants.11 On the other hand, medical missionaries also aimed to preach and covert the 
Chinese to Christianity in the process of healing the patients as some Chinese people suspected 
that missionaries were serving their own countries’ military and commercial interests.  
Christianity also had an altruistic influence since Sun’s Christian belief was in helping 
others through humanistic cooperation. Sun stressed the common traces of human kindness in both 
Western and Chinese cultures: “Since our interaction began [with the foreigners], some people 
have thought that the Chinese ideal of kindness and love was inferior to the foreigners’ because 
foreigners in China, by establishing schools and carrying on hospitals to reach and relieve the 
Chinese, have been practicing kindness and love…yet kindness and love are old qualities of 
Chinese character…”12  Sun once referred to Western medicine as the kindly aunt that led him to 
the high road of politics, reminding of Hume’s phrase: “The Superior doctor serves the nation; the 
middle doctor the individual; the inferior treats physical ailments.”13 Furthermore, Dr. Cantlie, 
who saved Sun from kidnapping in London, was Sun’s teacher at Hong Kong Medical School run 
by missionaries. Sun later confessed his Christian belief in a letter to a friend in Hong Kong after 
his dramatic release from the kidnappers: “It was due to God’s help because I prayed hard for His 
mercy.”14 
 Furthermore, Sun’s Christianity combined with his Hakka ethnic background helped to 
broaden his Chinese identity. In terms of ethnicity and religion, Christianity was not received and 
constructed by Hakka Christians in opposition to Han identity or culture. Instead, Christianity was 
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used and renegotiated in continued claims to legitimate Han identity because Christianity allowed 
Hakka Christians to reassert, reinterpret and to some extent reinforce their Hakka identity.15 For 
Sun, a Hakka and Christian, the combination of his ethnic and religious background also allowed 
him to conceive his future nationalism defined by the ethnic majority of Han race without causing 
him much moral conflict. It might have been natural for Sun to identify with the Han based on his 
negotiated identity. However, Sun’s Christian values also caused a dilemma at a later time as Sun 
realised that the inclusive love of Christianity and his racially exclusionary nationalism were in 
conflict.    
Most importantly, Christianity was a powerful tool in forming political alliance for Sun. 
When combined with the Confucian element of brotherhood, it formed a strong solidarity. Sun had 
several Christian friends as his closest political allies, and Christianity provided political alliance 
during Sun’s first two attempts at revolution in 1895 and 1900: two of his closest allies – Lu 
Haodong and Zheng Shiliang – were Christians.16 On September 5, 1912, in a welcome reception 
held by the churches of Beijing, Sun argued that religion and politics were complementary forces 
in a nation: “Religion and politics are interrelated, and religion is indispensable as a remedy for a 
nation’s political shortcomings, for a religion is rich in virtue. I hope that everyone will apply their 
religious virtues to compensate for their political imperfections.”17 
 In the political activities of secret societies, both traditional Chinese fraternity and 
Christian universal inclusion were reflected in maintaining solidarity and egalitarianism among 
citizens. Hsü (2000) notes that Sun won support from secret societies, whose members were mostly 
socially excluded classes and overseas Chinese; on the other hand, scholars and the gentry 
generally followed Kang Youwei and Liang Qichao. Yan (1976: 15) explains that perhaps the most 
important element in the solidarity of a secret society were those inclusive Christian brothers and 
232 
 
fraternal officers, who were addressed as Elder Brother, Second Brother and Third Brother; thus 
ordinary members could feel that they were governed and guided by people who were older and 
more experienced in the society. All other members were generally known as xiongdi: brother and 
comrade. Besides, swearing oaths at secret societies was a well-known ritual: the oath was given 
for the first time while members put their left hands on a Christian bible raising their right hands, 
and before taking the oath, they say, “I earnestly ask God to be my witness”. At the secret societies, 
Sun led the oath and the others would follow.18 
This egalitarian and fraternal spirit of Christianity and Confucianism served as one of the 
important bases of solidarity for the secret societies in narrowing the gap between the ruling and 
the ruled, enabling ordinary members to feel solidarity within the organisation. The spirit of 
brotherhood was a principle of both obedience and unity, representing the duties and rights of the 
members. Its membership was open to everybody, making it universal and fraternal, and based on 
equality for all citizens. Sun explained universal inclusion and fraternity, which were the central 
concept behind Tongbao transnational inclusion in his lecture to the Christian Alliance of Canton 
on May 9, 1912: “In the eyes of the Church, my brothers and sisters, all of you are believers; as 








Christianity and Confucianism 
Ching (in Küng 1989:74) points out that Confucian teachings were oriented toward improving the 
political order as a means of achieving universal love, promoting generations of scholars to strive 
towards participation in government. Ching (ibid: 89-91) further asserts that Confucianism had to 
confront the challenges of Western science and technology, and respond to political and social 
challenges at the same time. For example, Chong (2010:71) points out that, although lacking 
knowledge of the Confucian classics, Christian school graduates in Hong Kong and elsewhere 
were full of Western knowledge and enthusiasm for change, political or otherwise. Chong (ibid.) 
insists that mission school graduates were ready and quick when it came to taking action as they 
believed that a strong will or faith was a powerful source of action. 
While nationalism was spread and inculcated as a religion, Confucianism represented a 
cultural universalism based on the harmony of the natural and social orders and the sanctity of 
family life unlike Marxism, which argued for the triumph of human effort over the natural universe 
and the sanctity of labour.20 In this regard, both Christianity and Confucianism greatly helped Sun 
in propagating his emancipatory communication as his reconciliatory approach to both religions 
turned out to be an effective tool to cement transnational unity among the overseas Chinese; it 
shaped a broader Chinese identity that willingly included the overseas Chinese. Ching (in Küng 
1989:86) argues that nationalism is innately selfish, a kind of collective egoism, whereas 
Confucianism makes important universal assertions about the moral and social orders. Here, the 
influence of Christianity also helped Sun objectively assess his own nationalism. This was evident 
when Sun altered his argument in his minzu principle from insisting on the narrowly defined 
nationalism based on consanguinity of race to a more inclusive Five Race Republic, which also 
brought forward political benefits such as securing Chinese territories.    
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Ching (ibid.) insists nationalism and Confucianism are not mutually exclusive because the 
two need each other and have helped each other in history. Situated between nationalism and 
Confucian influence, Christianity broadened Sun’s political scope through its emphasis on 
compassion and the emancipatory cause, allowing the possibility of reconciliation with 
exclusionary nationalism and balancing the influence of nationalistic Confucianism. Having 
realised the shortcomings of the exclusionary aspect of racially defined nationalism that he had 
propagated during his early revolutionary efforts, Sun broadened the boundary of nationalism to a 
transnational context by including all overseas Chinese, such as the ethnic minorities living 
overseas. In fact, Sun’s belief in the equality of all citizens had to do more with the influence of 
Christianity because Confucianism was more inclined to social hierarchy.  Sun argued that both 
the overseas Chinese and overseas ethnic minorities should be politically empowered as equal 
citizens of China. He thus proposed providing the overseas Chinese with passports, establishing 
Overseas Chinese Commissions at national, provincial and local levels, giving overseas Chinese 
voting rights and appointing overseas Chinese delegates to national and provincial legislatures. 21 
On the other hand, Yao (1997) compares and contrasts the concepts of Confucian jen and 
Christian agape. He (ibid.:21) argues that, while agape can be translated in English as love, it is in 
fact more than love in that it defines the relationship between Christians and their God and between 
Christians and their neighbours. On the other hand, jen in Chinese is not the translation of love but 
is essentially love, both ethical and religious, in that it defines that relationship between Confucians 
and their transcendental pursuit. Yao (ibid.) further maintains that Confucianism and Christianity 
are two different traditions with certain important similarities.22 Central to their difference is the 
distinction between humanism and theism: in Confucianism, the first principle of this heritage is 
that of the unity between Tian (Heaven) and human beings, followed by the unity between 
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ancestors and descendants, while Christian agape has a wider application and meaning, describing 
a generous action by one person for the sake of others.  
In reconciling the differences and similarities between Christian theistic love and 
Confucian humanistic love, Sun also discovered a binary aspect of universal inclusion and theistic 
exclusion in Christianity. The claim of Christian universality by missionaries represented a 
particular world view privileging the Christian religion as the only path to truth. Furthermore, since 
Christianity is monotheistic, its claim of universality is accompanied by the exclusion of other 
cultural and religious traditions that are deemed incompatible. In this binary claim of exclusion 
and universality that lay the origins of contempt for and rejection of non-Christian culture.23 Sun’s 
conciliatory approach to Christianity thus transcended the exclusionary side of theism by 
emphasising the inclusion of people from a humanistic perspective, which shows the influence of 
Confucianism. Thus both Christianity and Confucianism influenced the formation of Sun’s 
emancipatory communication with their similarities and differences. However, the ultimate effect 
of synchronising the characteristics of agape and jen was Sun’s conception of Tongbao inclusion, 
in which theistic love transformed into Sun’s humanistic compassion demonstrated by recognising 
and including overseas Chinese.  
On the other hand, Ching (in Küng 1989) emphasises that Confucius’ central doctrine is 
always concerned with human relationships, asserting that it is associated with loyalty (zhong) to 
oneself and reciprocity (shu), or respect and concern for others; the latter referring more to social 
behaviour, and the former to the person’s inner orientation.24 Ching emphasises that jen is also 
translated variously as goodness, benevolence, humanity and human-heartedness. The person with 
jen loves all and everyone. Furthermore, Ching (ibid.) asserts that Confucianism acknowledges the 
moral autonomy of the individual conscience, even if traditional Confucianism tended to subject 
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individuals to the collective, sacrificing individual freedom for the sake of the collective. With 
regard to the collective and the individual, Sun’s central ideology of inclusion was for the 
collective purpose and unity of the nation, thus individual rights and citizenship were to be 
sacrificed for the nation. His maxim of tianxia weigong also argues for collective rights and 
entitlements. In the same way, Tongbao inclusion was also conceived on the basis of collective 
Chinese living abroad rather than individual overseas Chinese.  
Ultimately, under the influence of Christianity, Sun realised that his pursuit of a racially 
defined exclusionary nationalism came into conflict with his belief in Christian universal love. 
Accordingly, Tongbao inclusion, an act of humanistic reconciliation of universal love and 
fraternity, replaced the racially charged nationalism and eventually catalysed a transnational 
patriotism. Sun commented on the interactive and mutually influencing aspect between 
Christianity and politics: “Christians should therefore give full play to their religious faith, helping 
to shoulder the national responsibilities so that we can attain perfection in both politics and 
religion.”25 Its motive was Sun’s compassionate inclusion of the overseas Chinese.  
Sun also believed that Western rationality and Chinese traditional values did not have to 
be mutually exclusive, arguing that both could coexist through reconciliation. Sun made a similar 
argument, alleging that modernity did not have to be separated from the Chinese people’s heritage 
even though Christianity was a powerful belief system that supported Europe’s road to modernity 
and a great source of its strengths.26 Sun’s struggle was therefore to adopt modern values without 
abandoning Chinese traditions; as a result, he conflated the positive elements of Western economic 
and political advancements and Chinese moral values for the primacy of the people. Wang (in Lee 
and Lee 2011:14) further argues that Sun was able to challenge differences by turning them into a 
hybrid. Christianity strengthened Sun’s respect for certain Chinese values and his will to further 
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employ Western knowledge. Sun explained his idea of broadening the scope of knowledge through 
reconciliation in a speech in Beijing on September 5, 1912: “Because the political system has 
changed and we are in a period of transition, all citizens must pool their ideas and efforts in an 
attempt to resuscitate the nation. Such a revival is a matter of expanding popular knowledge.”27  
Sun’s reconciliatory approach to Christianity and Confucianism resulted in broadening the 
scope of inclusion. Yao (1997) introduces the idea of expanding the concept of family towards 
neighbours in Christianity, explaining that “neighbour refers to an open relationship between 
individuals and between communities; thus anyone who follows Christ is a brother or a sister …. 
Brothers and sisters are symbolic terms for the family of God. Anyone who has faith in Jesus 
Christ is recognised and treated as a brother or a sister in this big family.”28 Thus, by including 
neighbours as brothers and sisters, Tongbao inclusion extended the object of inclusion to multi-
ethnic groups, and even to Sun’s lifelong enemy, the Manchus as the equal member of the republic. 
This could be interpreted as the influence of Christianity according to what Yao (ibid.) describes 
as “perfection cannot be attained by loving only one’s friends: much more important is one’s love 
for one’s enemies.”29 Ultimately, Sun supported a Five Race Republic, reflecting the broadening 
of his policy of inclusion.   
Finally, Sun found a common element between Confucianism and Christianity: the 
inclusion of everyone through kindness and love. In his Three Principles of the People, Sun reflects 
on Confucian and Christian love: “In the past no one discussed love better than Motze. His “love 
without discrimination” is the same thing as Jesus’ “universal love”. The ancients applied the 
principle of love to government, saying, “Love the people as your children,” and “be kind to all 
the people and love all creatures”. Love was used to embrace all duties, from which we can see 
how well they put kindness and love into effect.”30 From Confucian perspective, Sun’s praxis of 
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conciliatory efforts contains an element of universal love (boai), which transcends class, race and 
gender; and Sun’s underlying attitude also represents another significant Chinese tradition: 
benevolence (renai). Thus in both Confucianism and Christianity, the ethic of humanity culminates 
in the love of fellow human beings, including others, neighbours and enemies; in Confucianism, 
the love of others remains an entirely natural feeling for familial and national ties, while in 
Christianity, love is understood not as feeling emotion, but rather as selfless, active goodwill, 
respectful of the other.31 
Alternatively, Yao (1997) explains inclusive love in relation to Christian agape and 
Confucian jen, and between humanism and theism.32 Sun’s ultimate decision to include ethnic 
minorities, especially the Manchus, signifies Sun’s principle of forgiving oppressors of the past. 
This also demonstrates Sun’s praxis of breaking with the past in order to construct a broadened 
Chinese identity. More importantly, Sun demonstrated his belief that both Christianity and 
Confucianism shared a common love. Küng (1989) adds, “Jesus Christ proclaimed a personally 
involved love. This love includes those who suffer and those who are oppressed, the sick and the 
guilty, but also the opponent, the enemy. It is a universal love and an entirely active doing of the 
good.”33 
At this point, Sun’s reconciliatory attitude was accentuated by his assertion that the essence 
of Confucian benevolence was also found in Western culture in the form of universal love. Sun 
showed his respect for benevolent deeds regardless of cultural or national origin, such as the 
endeavours of Western missionaries in China, who established educational institutions and 
hospitals in order to educate and ease the suffering of the socially excluded Chinese. Sun therefore 
asserted that universal love was present both in the East and the West and that it encompassed 
everyone. An inclusive Chinese identity was an essential element for the solidarity of the Chinese, 
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and Sun explained love and kindness, emphasising the importance of acting on them: “In the 
practical expression of the fine qualities of kindness and love, it does seem as though China were 
far behind other countries, and the reason is that the Chinese have been less active in 
performance…as we study other countries, let us learn their practical methods, revive our own 
kindness and love, the spirit of ancient China, and make them shine with greater glory. Love is not 
understood as feeling emotion, rather as active goodwill (thus action).”34  
At the same time, Sun’s love could be interpreted as paternalistic: it reflected both the 
Christian emancipatory compassion to save the people and the sense of the Confucian governor 
toward those who were governed. Judge (1996:140) claims that the principle of paternalism and 
dependence in Confucianism was the defining nature of relations between the rulers and the ruled 
that determined the nation’s social history for centuries and that during the era of modernisation, 
the idea was constantly contested. On the other hand, Yao (1997:80-1) explicates an example of 
benevolent paternalism from Mencius’s teaching that describes how when one saw a child was 
about to fall into a well, one could not help feeling alarmed and compassionate. Yao (ibid.) argues 
this showed one’s jen with the child, a transcendence by compassion. Thus Sun’s paternalistic 
approach may be an instinct to save the child by feeling unity with the child.  The natural impulse 
is to rescue the child and following this impulse is an act of compassion. It is possible that under 
the influence of Confucianism, Sun might have extended both kinds of paternalistic love – love 
for the governed and for the children - toward the people of the nation.     
The scope of Chinese identity, which had originated within the narrowly defined 
geographical centeredness of China, was finally broadened and expanded in terms of the objects 
of inclusion and its geographical boundary under the influence of Christianity. Accordingly, the 
exclusionary social prejudice against the overseas Chinese was transformed into an inclusive 
240 
 
acceptance. However, the inclusion of the overseas Chinese also required an active acceptance and 
empowerment rather than a purely intellectual understanding and tolerance. In effect, Tongbao 
transnational citizenship catalysed an active embrace by empowering overseas Chinese with 
participatory citizenship. Sun did not merely argue for inclusion of the overseas Chinese but acted 
upon it by proposing Tongbao citizenship and granting them the rights of citizens.  
Confucian fraternal love and Christian universal love, which became Tongbao inclusion, 
produced Tongbao citizenship through Sun’s action of empowering the overseas Chinese with 
participatory rights. It not only required transcending the narrow confines of the geographically 
centred Chinese identity, but also transnationally included Chinese people regardless of their 
ethnic background or political stance. Küng (1989) comments that both Christianity and 
Confucianism were challenged to extend their ethical reflections beyond the individual relations 
and pay closer attention to the social dimension of action.35   For Sun, Tongbao inclusion was a 















5.3 The Tongbao Inclusion and Participatory Citizenship 
The concept of Tongbao was a linguistic breakthrough in which transnational Chinese identity was 
conceived based on Christian universal love and Confucian fraternal love, linking the Chinese who 
had never left their native soil to the other who left it: the overseas Chinese. Sun’s concept of 
transnational Tongbao inclusion and citizenship offered the overseas Chinese a chance to 
relinquish their psychological liminality and join the political comradery by transcending the 
geographical boundaries of native soil for a common political cause. However, Sun’s initial task 
in extending Tongbao inclusion to the overseas Chinese was to reconcile the local particularism of 
the host nations’ culture and the particularity of Chinese culture. Being loyal to the motherland 
and working in the host nation, the overseas Chinese were affected by the qualities of both cultures. 
In order to overcome the exclusion experienced by the overseas Chinese in their host nations, Sun 
was convinced that it was crucial to develop an inclusive Chinese identity for the overseas Chinese 
in order to unite their collective power.  
Sun carried out the following process of inclusion for the overseas Chinese. First, Sun 
reconfirmed the Tongbao inclusion by fully acknowledging the necessity of their emigration from 
China, simultaneously destabilising the fixity of the geographically centred Chinese identity. 
Second, Sun defied the narrow boundary of the traditional exclusionary Chinese identity by 
supporting the transnational fluidity of Tongbao inclusion. This also recognised the cultural 
particularities of the overseas Chinese, which were based on both Chinese and the host nations’ 
cultures. Third, Sun extended transnational citizenship to the overseas Chinese so that they could 
participate in building a modern Chinese nation-state. Consequently, the empowered overseas 
Chinese joined in making the Chinese republic in solidarity through the newly conceived inclusive 
collective identity regardless of the geographical location of Chinese people as the transnational 
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Tongbao citizenship helped achieve cultural and political unity among the overseas Chinese. It 
united the dichotomised Chinese identities since participatory citizenship was based on the 
autonomy and volition of the actor rather than a passively received identity based on geographical 
centeredness.  
Habermas’s (in Habermas and Cooke 1998a) notion of ‘national consciousness’ provides 
the cultural basis for solidarity among citizens, and he argues for the necessity of plural identities 
and differences.36 His argument also corresponds with Sun’s praxis to form an all-inclusive 
Chinese cultural identity that reached beyond geographical confines. Furthermore, Sun’s concept 
of Tongbao transnational citizenship catalysed solidarity among Chinese citizens on the basis of 
political participation. The production of unity through an inclusive cultural identity was a 
corollary of Sun’s reconciliatory approach to Confucian fraternal and Christian universal love. 
Schwarzmantel (2003) claims that central role of national identity in cementing common 
citizenship provides the political cohesion necessary for a democratic community, as he argues 
that “an awareness of shared history and being members of an on-going community with a 
particular public culture supplies the basis for overarching political identity.”37 Likewise, Sun’s 
endowment of participatory citizenship to the overseas Chinese represented the reconciliation of 
their cultural identity and political autonomy within the concept of Tongbao inclusion. 
As previously discussed, the essence of the differences between Confucian jen and 
Christian agape is that the former is humanistic and centred on human progress and self-
transcendence while the latter is theistic and centred on divine salvation. Humanity is the source 
of all forms of Confucian jen, while God’s charity is the source of all forms of Christian agape. 
However, the message of emancipation is present in both theistic and humanistic inclusion by love, 
and one of the central tenets of Christianity is that one must treat others as one would like to be 
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treated oneself in social practice between an individual and other people. Sun was well aware of 
this because he himself wanted to be included in Chinese common identity; Sun was regarded 
being not too Chinese by the mainland Chinese, but too Chinese by the overseas Chinese. Sun 
realised that the ethnic minorities had the same need, and Tongbao inclusion was extended equally 
to all those who participated in the common cause of establishing the Chinese republic. However, 
regarding the view that Sun was an elite who might have taken advantage of the overseas Chinese 
for their political and financial support, it is necessary to examine the objective and object of Sun’s 
emancipatory communication. Tongbao inclusion and transnational citizenship were conceived for 
the overseas Chinese so that they could autonomously join as free and equal members.  
 
5.3.1 The Minzu Principle (Nationalism) and Tongbao Inclusion 
The psychological liminality of the overseas Chinese was, as Chan (2005) comments, like the 
symptom of the stranger’s lack of feeling for distance: “He is oscillating between remoteness and 
intimacy, his hesitation and uncertainty, and his distrust in every matter.”38 On the other hand, 
Chan (ibid.) also argues that the possibility of translocality shows that he or she can, in a certain 
sense, be in more than one place at the same time39; simultaneity is thus a defining characteristic 
of transnationalism, opening up the possibility of hybridity in geographically oriented identity.  
The liminality of the overseas Chinese could be due to their sense of belonging and loyalty 
to both places - the motherland and the host nation. The prefix ‘trans’ in ‘transnationalism’ thus 
corresponds to some of the characteristics of cosmopolitanism in that it goes beyond loyalty to the 
boundaries of a place.  Sun also conceived of transnational Tongbao inclusion by reconciling 
cosmopolitanism and nationalism. Nationalism often excluded others on the basis of the 
consanguine race and territorial space. Tongbao inclusion offered the possibility that ethnic 
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difference and geographical distance would not undermine the solidarity of the people, 
emphasising that transnational patriotism could be achieved by voluntary participation. Sun’s 
Tongbao inclusion signified that the overseas Chinese finally became autonomous citizens. 
Yung Wei (in Sih 1974) emphasises that, although a dedicated nationalist, Sun was not 
totally anti-foreign since he called for the peoples of the world to help China to realise its goal of 
national independence.40 Sun (1953a) also proposed inviting foreign capital for the development 
of the Chinese economy: “We must welcome the influx of large scale foreign capital on the largest 
possible scale, and also must consider the question of attracting foreign scientific forces and highly 
trained experts to work in our country and train us. Then in the course of the next ten years, we 
shall create our own powerful large scale industry and shall accumulate technical and scientific 
knowledge.”41 On the other hand, Tony See Sin Heng (in Lee and Lee, et al. 2011) insists that 
Sun’s emphasis on national unity and the importance of racial and ethnic solidarity also meant that 
he rejected cosmopolitanism. Heng (ibid.) points out that Sun argued that cosmopolitanism was 
still inappropriate for China because it lacked national identity.42 However, what Sun really meant 
was that China needed to implement two ideologies in a sequential order; first, achieving a sense 
of national identity, and then seeking cosmopolitanism for the benefit of modernising China.  
Sutherland (2012) argues that in relation to the juxtaposition of nationalism and 
cosmopolitanism, ethical cosmopolitans tend to emphasise what people have in common, whereas 
cultural cosmopolitans highlight their diversity.43 However, Harvey’s (2009) survey of ‘adjectival 
cosmopolitans’, who attempt to reconcile ‘respect for local differences with compelling universal 
principles’,44 may be the most appropriate to describe the nature of Sun’s transnationalism. 
Harvey’s ‘adjectival cosmopolitans’ are interested in what links territory as a basis for political 
organisation with the emotional power invested in people’s sense of place.  On the other hand, 
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Calhoun (1995) rejects a purely dichotomous view of cosmopolitanism and nationalism, pointing 
out that the national has never been entirely national, but is instead always embroiled with 
immanent cosmopolitan orientations, suggesting the possibility of the complementary coexistence 
of the two. Likewise, the hybrid of nationalism and cosmopolitanism in the form of the 
transnational patriotism of the overseas Chinese offered the possibility of the two to coexist. Sun 
led the sociocultural and political components of citizenship to an inclusive patriotism. Tongbao 
transnational inclusion thus symbolised a reconciled nationalism and cosmopolitanism, thereby 
producing Chinese unity.  
Sun initially challenged the usefulness of cosmopolitanism by arguing that the Chinese 
were not qualified to talk about an internationally oriented ideology. However, Sun did not oppose 
cosmopolitanism altogether; instead, he favoured a sequential progression wherein 
cosmopolitanism could be introduced once nationalism had taken a strong foothold among the 
Chinese people. Sun argued that one could discuss cosmopolitanism only after the coercive power 
of imperialism was overthrown and individual selfish ambitions had disappeared. Furthermore, 
Tongbao transnational inclusion played a crucial role in mobilising political, economic and social 
resources across frontiers to form transnational patriotism among the overseas Chinese.  
Chan (2005) emphasises that cosmopolitan status means that “one is allowing oneself to 
be inhabited by the other, while still recognising the other, [and it] thus does not, and should not, 
absolve [one of] attachments based on locality, because such attachments provide the individual, 
however cosmopolitan, with a spiritual anchor.”45 Sun’s transnational Tongbao inclusion was made 
possible by transcending the confined geographically centred identity based on the proximity to 
native soil in favour of an all-inclusive Chinese identity. Autonomous and participatory Tongbao 
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citizenship therefore played a pivotal role in consolidating a new Chinese identity; furthermore, 
Sun’s transnational patriotism symbolised his departure from his earlier exclusionary nationalism.   
 
5.3.2 The Minquan Principle (Democracy) and Tongbao Citizenship 
Sun’s notion of membership in the new Chinese republic was based on participatory rights rather 
than passively received entitlements, and the transnational Tongbao identity also provided the 
political cohesion necessary for granting participatory citizenship. Thus Tongbao transnational 
citizenship, a symbol of membership of a newly established Chinese republic, directly defied the 
narrowly defined citizens’ rights that excluded the political participation of the overseas Chinese 
based on geographical distance. Schwarzmantel (2003) asserts that citizenship should be divorced 
from nationality because of its inability to maintain itself an open democratic community.46 Sun’s 
Tongbao transnational citizenship corresponds to this concept because it rejected the exclusionary 
aspects of Chinese identity and instead accepted the autonomy of the overseas Chinese as long as 
they were willing to voluntarily contribute to building the Chinese republic. Sun’s concept of 
transnational Tongbao citizenship thus opened a new way to political participation for the overseas 
Chinese.  
Sun’s concept of participatory citizenship represented the logic of inclusion and expansion 
of its members rather than exclusion and limiting in the conditions of membership. Consequently, 
the two separate identities – the passively received identity based on geographical centeredness 
and the actively achieved identity based on patriotic participation - were reconciled in the form of 
transnational Tongbao citizenship. Furthermore, Sun’s concept of participatory Tongbao 
citizenship represented the equality of citizens’ rights regardless of geographical distance, 
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producing collective identity and political consciousness among the overseas Chinese. For Sun, 
the inclusion of the overseas Chinese demonstrated not only his compassionate will to empower 
them politically but also his appreciation for their involvement in the process of establishing the 
Chinese republic.  
Tongbao citizenship was also an extension of the minquan principle in that both aimed to 
grant equality and freedom to all Chinese people. In particular, the effect of the Tongbao citizenship 
was the collective power of huagong coolie labourers. Sun (1930) argued in the minquan principle 
that the only weapon of non-cooperation [for the labourers] was an absolute refusal to engage in 
work, and this manifested itself that strikes were much more formidable than the weapons of war. 
Sun (ibid.) further asserted that, “if the workers made demands of the nation or capitalists which 
were not granted, the workers could all unite and strike as one man.”47 Tongbao citizenship thus 
effectively helped to consolidate collective power among the huagong labourers.  
Sun’s vision of the membership in the new Chinese republic was based on political 
participation. Participatory citizenship as a membership of a newly founded republic also directly 
defied exclusion by occupation or geographical location. Schwarzmantel (2003) emphasises that 
citizens’ political aim should be to create a bond of civic community in which people feel a sense 
of identification with the political framework, invoking values of shared citizenship and political 
equality.48 Accordingly, Tongbao citizenship inspired transnational patriotism and granted the 






5.3.3  The Minsheng Principle (People’s Livelihood) and Tongbao Labourer  
Transnational Tongbao citizenship, in particular, transformed indentured overseas Chinese 
huagong coolie labourers into autonomous citizens and patriots. This helped them overcome the 
absence of their citizens’ rights in the host nations by becoming overseas Chinese citizens. By 
stressing the importance of the autonomy of overseas citizens regardless of their location and the 
nature of their occupations, Tongbao citizenship was an attempt to provide huagong labourers with 
moral and legal entitlements to participate in the political movement for China’s modernisation. 
For Sun, it was crucial to develop an inclusive identity to consolidate Chinese collective power for 
the unity of the people.  
As transnational inclusion also required a broader collective identity, Sun employed 
performative citizenship in connection to their labour power. Sun (1930) stressed that labour was 
an active movement, thus work constituted an element of active citizenship, pointing out that, in 
order to struggle more effectively, the people had naturally organised themselves and realised the 
value of organisation. Sun’s comment inspired the huagong labourers collective consciousness 
through political awakening as he asserted that “the largest organised bodies in the world today 
are the labour unions” 49, encouraging the huagong labourers to form unions to oppose inequality 
in their work conditions. By stressing the importance of labour regardless of the nature of work or 
geographical location, Sun also proposed moral and legal entitlements to the huagong overseas 
Chinese. 
Transnational Tongbao citizenship also symbolised the emancipation of indentured coolie 
labourers from economic exploitation. Recognising collective rights in the host nation through 
participatory citizenship transformed the huagong labourers from mere indentured labourers into 
autonomous citizens. This, in turn, produced collective citizen power among the overseas Chinese. 
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Tongbao citizenship hence achieved what the minsheng principle strove for: the possibility that 
the labouring Chinese who were away from their native land to sustain their livelihood, could 
achieve the same citizen status as Chinese patriots equal to that of the Chinese on Chinese soil. 
Sun advocated workers’ rights by emphasising their collective power, which ultimately helped 
them achieve citizens’ rights by performing their citizen’s duties of patriotism. Miller and Rose 
(2008) aptly illuminate the labourer’s a new identity and his autonomy; “Finally, a worker is given 
a new identity as an active and motivated individual only when he seeks autonomy, control, variety 
















This thesis has explored how Sun’s emancipatory communication played a crucial role in 
establishing the first Chinese republic and modernising China. Sun believed that modern 
rationality was an essential element for political awareness, arguing that a democratic state 
belonged to neither any particular social class nor to a monarchy embodying absolute power, but 
rather to the people. Sun also insisted that an intersubjective understanding of others’ hardship was 
the driving force of human evolution. The primary methodology of Sun’s modernisation of China 
focused on synthesising positive approaches in both Chinese and Western values whilst sustaining 
social and political attributes particular to Chinese society and history.   
Habermas (1984) holds that we are communicatively able to reach mutual understanding 
because human beings are part of an intersubjective linguistic community. Among the various 
influences that shaped Sun’s reconciliatory approach, it was Western language that awakened Sun 
to the necessity of inclusive education. Sun was also influenced by the Western style of pedagogy, 
which introduced him to modern rationality by encouraging an inquisitive mind rather than 
repetitive memorisation, which was typical of Chinese pedagogy. Reflecting upon the Western 
linguistic structure, Sun argued for the synchronisation of spoken and written Chinese in order to 
eliminate the linguistic othering of those who were excluded from access to written Chinese 
communication. Sun understood that national unity required linguistic inclusion and equal access 
to education, which he believed would serve as catalysts for modern rationality and political 
awareness among Chinese citizens, both of which he considered prerequisites of a modern nation-
state. Sun accordingly urged the literati and scholars to share responsibility for the education of 
the socially excluded. 
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Furthermore, Sun’s concept of Tongbao citizenship demonstrated his determination to 
include the overseas Chinese by granting them full citizens’ rights based on condition that they 
materially and voluntarily participate by contributing to the development and advancement of the 
first Chinese republic. In fact, Sun relied upon their financial contributions and he was sympathetic 
to the sufferings of overseas Chinese for the lack of their legal protection, freedom of mobility and 
livelihoods in their host nations, making him eager to grant them citizen’s rights. Sun also saw an 
opportunity to draw large numbers of talented and wealthy overseas Chinese. Ideologically, Sun’s 
Tongbao inclusion of overseas Chinese was formed by reconciling Confucian fraternal love 
(closely connected to humanistic collectivism) and Christian universal love (emancipatory theism), 
and its corollary was the transnational patriotism of the overseas Chinese. 
Sun’s logic of inclusion had its goal: the unity of the nation. In Confucianism, love for 
others remained oriented mainly toward familial and national ties; on the other hand, in 
Christianity, every human being could become his or her neighbour.1 Through his reconciliation 
of Confucianism and Christianity, Sun was able to transform the theistic approach to the 
understanding of human suffering. Consequently, the concept of Confucian love of the family, 
which had been confined to the geographical boundaries of China, expanded under the influence 
of Christianity in terms of its object and border by reaching out to enemies and beyond Chinese 
territory. This humanistic and theistic reconciliation eventually led Sun to include the ethnic 
Chinese minorities in their host nations as well as in China by promulgating the Five Race Republic.  
In order to counter the absolute power of the monarchy and empower Chinese people with 
citizens’ rights, Sun also proposed the Fivefold Constitution, a hybrid of the Western constitutional 
structure and the Chinese traditional court system. Sun believed the constitution was necessary to 
balance the power of the state and the rights of the people so that the former would not encroach 
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upon the freedom of the latter. The Fivefold Constitution also represented a balance between the 
rights and duties of the people. Habermas (1996a) suggests that constitutional principles cannot 
become the driving force for creating free and equal persons until they are situated in the historical 
context of a nation of citizens in such a way that they link up with those citizens’ motives and 
attitudes. Sun believed that the constitution would be also a vehicle for transferring the Chinese 
people’s cultural loyalty from the monarchy and family to the new republic by granting them the 
participatory citizenship to perform their rights. 
However, Sun’s emancipatory communication often faced conflicts caused by the binary 
elements inherent in an ideology or a system, and Sun mainly relied on amalgamating multiple 
values and systems into hybrids in his reconciliatory praxis. For example, the Five Race Republic, 
the Fivefold Constitution and Tongbao inclusion were the result of reconciling binary concepts, 
i.e., the naturally or culturally constructed race in propagating nationalism; the individual or 
collective rights in proposing the constitution; an inclusive or exclusionary function of Chinese 
identity. However, during the process of amalgamation, Sun’s syncretism oftentimes depended 
upon assimilating or merging the weaker and smaller groups and individuals into more powerful 
and dominant constituents and collectives, and the consequence was the exclusion of the former 
in spite of their nominal inclusion. Furthermore, the inclusion of some represented the exclusion 
of the other, yet the inclusion of the other must be based on the coexistence of both dominant and 
weaker parties. As a result, Sun’s reconciliatory inclusion destabilised the coexistence of diverse 
constituents through his coercive methodology of assimilation. Ironically, Sun’s emancipatory 




In the case of the minzu principle, Sun’s nationalism was confronted by the binary concept 
of naturally or culturally constructed race when Sun opted to propagate a racially defined 
nationalism supporting the Han ethnic majority, arguing that the Chinese nation-state be 
constructed based on consanguine race. Consequently, Sun’s emancipatory praxis solely included 
the ethnic majorities by effectively excluding the ethnic minority groups in his efforts to establish 
the Chinese modern nation-state. After the revolution, Sun eventually proposed the coexistence of 
ethnic majorities and minorities after having accepted both naturally inherited and culturally 
acquired qualities of race when he announced the Five Race Republic.  
Sun’s initial insistence on the naturally constructed race seems to be closely related to the 
reason of political efficacy. However, his employment of racially defined nationalism breached 
the fundamental principles of a modern nation-state as well as his own logic of inclusion, which 
required the equal rights of all citizens. Sun believed that the collective power of the “naturally 
produced” ethnic majority Han race could effectively counter the encroachment of foreign 
imperialism. However, his insistence on naturally constructed race as the sole constituent of the 
nation negated the culturally formed Chinese identity, which was based on diverse ethnic 
backgrounds, thus destabilising the coexistence of ethnic majority and minority groups, and 
ultimately undermining the national unity that Sun strove to achieve.   
After the 1911 revolution, Sun shifted to a more racially inclusive Five Race Republic 
(wuzu gongheguo); and in 1925 just before his death, Sun (1925:33) declared, “the government 
should undertake to render assistance and protection to the ethnic minorities in the country so that 
they could exercise their right of self-determination and self-government while resisting 
oppression and invasion from foreign countries.” Sun thus finally recognised the importance of 
symbiotic relations between ethnic majorities and minorities by advocating the autonomy of 
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various ethnic minority groups, believing that, only all-inclusive citizens’ equality and political 
rights could result in the unity of the people. Similarly, Sun also announced in the Manifesto of the 
First National Convention of the KMT that nationalism advocated both seeking national liberation 
and promoting equality among the various ethnic groups in China.2 In so doing, Sun altered his 
emancipatory praxis in order to maintain the coexistence of ethnic diversity, which is the principle 
of inclusion. Sun’s action corresponds to Habermas’s (1997:262) argument that what unites a 
nation of citizens as opposed to a Volksnation was not some primordial substrate but rather ‘an 
intersubjectively shared context of understanding’ among the citizens.  
With regard to his minquan principle, Sun also faced the challenge of balancing between 
individual and collective rights concerning constitutionalism. Sun argued mainly for the collective 
rights and the empowerment of the state over the rights of the individual citizens, and his 
subsequent imposition of military force against opposition and reliance on political tutelage 
threatened the constitutionalism he embraced. However, the reason Sun originally advocated 
constitutionalism was to ensure and protect citizens’ rights, devolving from the absolute power 
long imposed by the Qing monarchy. Nevertheless, in the process of supporting collective rights, 
individual rights were negated: this was particularly salient when Sun promulgated the three-phase 
national reconstruction program, consisting of military operation and political tutelage prior to the 
constitutional government, and his emancipatory praxis breached the principle of individual rights 
and freedom. The resulting political consequences were antithetical to the constitutionalism upon 
which the Chinese republic was to be established.  
Sun argued that the individuals in China had to give up their freedom if Chinese society 
was to become a strong and unified nation. In his judgment, individual freedom represented an 
impediment to national unity because he firmly believed that China required the system of 
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government, discipline, loyalty, and disposition among its citizens by sacrificing themselves for 
the sake of the nation. Sun further insisted that Chinese people had enjoyed historically an 
excessive level of individual liberty, which had fostered an absence of national unity. Accordingly, 
Sun urged his revolutionary comrades to sacrifice their personal freedom. However, the principle 
of constitutionalism does not advocate the power of the state to supersede individual rights; on the 
contrary, constitutionalism allows both individual rights and state power to coexist, which is also 
the condition of a modern nation-state. Habermas (1996a:496) points out that [within the 
constitution] each and every person should receive equal protection and equal respect in their 
integrity as irreplaceable individuals, and as members of the political community. Sun’s argument 
for the sole collective rights was again antithetical to constitutionalism and the principles of the 
modern, democratic nation-state that he had originally envisioned. 
With his minsheng principle, Sun was similarly challenged by the conflict between an ideal 
economic principle based on traditional moral obligation and a pragmatic methodology of material 
economy in bettering the livelihood of the people. Sun’s proposal of a land equalisation program 
was based on the government’s purchase of land at market value for redistribution, and it was 
based on the conflation of two very different economic systems: market economy and centrally 
controlled economy. While Sun’s proposal reflected the traditional Chinese ideology of communal 
cooperation for economic harmony, it rejected the Soviet style of coercive nationalisation, in which 
confiscated land from landlords would be redistributed amongst the peasants. Sun’s minsheng plan 
was mainly intended to realise the Confucian ideology of datong utopia with communal production 
and equal distribution; therefore, it was not land nationalisation.  
However, Sun’s pursuit of communalism was ultimately challenged by the economic 
conflict concerning private land ownership. He returned to the power of rhetoric to summon 
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support for the state’s programmes in the imperative of economic harmony on terms that the state 
would deem morally compelling. Sun denied the class conflict as described by Marx and 
selectively borrowed elements of capitalism, particularly individualised profit incentives and 
private land ownership. However, the pre-modern economy that was China’s political-economic 
legacy served to constrain Sun’s role in a radical transformation. His government could have 
implemented a specific economic plan after an intellectual analysis of the cause of class struggle 
to help mitigate the most negative effects that would result from even modest economic 
development, rather than negating it outright.  
Most of all, Sun’s conflict concerning his emancipatory praxis was closely related to the 
nature of his pedagogical role even though Sun’s modern rationality was initially inspired by the 
linguistic inclusion of Western pedagogy. Sun needed to shift his role from tutoring the politically 
inchoate citizens at the early stages of a modern nation-state to abdicating his authority to the 
growing autonomy of the people. However, Sun’s pedagogical character combined with his 
paternalistic elitism continued to govern China’s political modernisation rather than carefully 
nurturing the growth of the people’s autonomy.  
Moreover, in calling for national stability and social justice, Sun classified people into three 
categories: leaders or innovators, transmitters or disciples, and performers. Sun reconfirmed his 
pedagogical role by putting himself in the first category, the political party in the second, and the 
people in the third group.3 It demonstrated that Sun’s paternalistic elitism was deeply rooted in his 
motive to emancipate the people; at the same time, his belief that “people may be made to follow, 
but may not be made to understand”4   also represented the remnants of his unreconciled notion of 
the traditional Confucian class hierarchy that negated the autonomy of the people.  
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Consequently, the juxtaposition of growing need of autonomy for Chinese citizens and 
Sun’s adherence to pedagogical guidance caused an internal conflict within Sun’s emancipatory 
communication. The absolute power of the republican government returned to failed aspects of 
monarchical despotism characteristic of the Qing government that Sun’s emancipatory 
communication had overturned. The Confucian hierarchical relationship between the superiority 
of those who govern (elites) and the inferiority of the governed (the masses) therefore had a 
divisive effect on the social, economic and political aspects of the people. It allowed government 
power to supersede the rights of individual citizens and to undermine the principle of 
constitutionalism, which was intended to maintain a balance between the power of the government 
and the rights of the people.  
Habermas (1989) claims that the advent of a modern stage of social order is brought about 
by the argumentative account of ideologies as well as by the appeal to universal norms and 
principles based on science. Sun also emphasised the role of print media and universal education 
to encourage modern rationality, regarding public opinion and enhanced political awareness of the 
citizenry as necessary attributes of a modern nation-state. However, Sun’s insistence on his 
pedagogical role served to impede both political autonomy and the formation of a modern 
rationality amongst the people. Citizens were implicitly discouraged from debates and denied a 
role in forming autonomous public opinion. Instead, Sun asserted that public opinion should be 
formed and disseminated based upon state-determined priorities consistent with the objective of 
national unity. Accordingly, the media were discouraged of playing an independent role in forming 
public opinion as Sun openly stressed the media to assume a pedagogical responsibility in 
consolidating public opinion supporting the government in the interest of fostering national unity. 
Sun held a paternalistic regard for the role of the media in society as well.    
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However, public opinion was to form autonomously through the independent formation of 
the citizens’ awareness and rationality through public debates and arguments, free from the 
intervention of the political tutelage of the government. Consequently, despite Sun’s argument for 
the logic of inclusion and modern rationality, Sun’s role in the production of public opinion 
impeded the autonomy of the press and delayed the people’s political awareness. Instead, Sun’s 
pedagogical role combined with paternalistic elitism commanded hierarchy and loyalty. 
Consequently, it undermined China’s political modernisation. Sun’s emancipatory communication 
brought forth the first Chinese republic, yet the process of transforming China into a modern 
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Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press. 
  
Miyazaki, T. t., R. s. Miyazaki, et al. (1971). Miyazaki Tōten zenshū. 
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